Monday, July 20 |
9:00 - 9:45 |
Jon Kleinberg
(Cornell University)
TBA
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Computation
|
Session B: Information and Networks
|
Session C: Industrial Organization
|
Session D: Learning and Evolution
|
Session E: Repeated Games
|
Session F: Dynamic Games
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Hau Chan
(Stony Brook University)
Learning Game Parameters from MSNE: An Application to Learning IDS Games
|
Liad Blumrosen
(Hebrew U)
Networks of Complements
|
Barna Bako
(MTA TKI)
Strategic segmentation: creating monopolies can increase welfare
|
Ziv Hellman
(Bar Ilan University)
Sex and Portfolio Investment
|
Siddharth Pal
(University of Maryland)
A simple learning rule with monitoring leading to Nash Equilibrium under delays
|
Chiara Margaria
(Yale University)
Dynamic Coordination and Learning
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Shikha Singh
(Stony Brook University)
Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers
|
Gaëtan FOURNIER
(Paris 1)
Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria
|
Gaurab Aryal
(University of Chicago)
Empirical Contest Models
|
Jean Paul Rabanal
(Ball State University)
A simulation on the evolution of markets: Call Market, Decentralized and Posted Offer
|
Mathias Staudigl
(University of Bielefeld, IMW)
A new characterization of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring in continuous time
|
Marco Scarsini
(LUISS)
Atomic Dynamic Network Games
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Richard E Stearns
(University at Albany)
Realization Plans for Extensive Form Games without Perfect Recall
|
|
Yong Chao
(University of Louisville)
Nonlinear Pricing with Asymmetric Competition In the Absence of Private Information
|
Karen Khachatryan
(Middlesex University London)
Overconfidence, Imperfect Competition, and Evolution
|
Zhijian Wang
(Zhejiang University)
The social cycling in Fixed-Paired Matching Pennies Game
|
|
11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
|
13:30 - 14:15 |
Costis Daskalakis
(MIT)
TBA
|
14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Auctions
|
Session B: Contracts
|
Session C: Industrial Organization
|
Session D: Finance
|
Session E: Mechanism Design
|
Session F: Social and Political Models
|
Session G: Experimental Economics
|
14:45 - 15:15 |
Yangguang Huang
(University of Washington)
Hybrid Mechanism: Theory, Practice and Empirical Analysis
|
Alex Smolin
(Yale University)
Optimal Feedback and Wage Policies
|
Yifan Dai
(University of Iowa)
Dynamic pricing of experience goods with learning
|
Abhinav Anand
(University College Dublin)
Foster-Hart Risk and the Too-big-to-Fail Banks
|
Ethem Akyol
(TOBB University of Economics and Technology)
Welfare Comparison of Allocation Mechanisms under Incomplete Information
|
JACOPO PEREGO
(New York University)
Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement
|
Penelope Hernandez
(Valencia University- ERI-CES)
Words and actions as communication devices
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen
(London School of Economics)
Spying in Contests
|
Alice Peng-Ju Su
(National Taipei University)
Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms
|
Filomena Garcia
(Indiana University and ISEG/UECE)
Strategic Complementarities and substitutabilities in R&D networks
|
Matthias Leiss
(ETHZ - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
The Option-Implied Foster-Hart Riskiness
|
Philip N. Brown
(The University of Colorado at Boulder)
Optimal Mechanisms for Robust Coordination in Congestion Games
|
Artyom Jelnov
(Ariel University, Israel)
Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Possible Provocateur: How Intelligence Aects the Strategic Interaction
|
Ernest Lai
(Lehigh University)
Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Joyce Delnoij
(Utrecht University)
Competing first price and second price auctions
|
Venky Venkateswaran
(NYU Stern School of Business)
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets
|
Jooyong Jun
(Bank of Korea)
Entry of non-financial firm and competition in the retail payments market
|
Zhe Wang
(Stanford University)
Initiation of Merger and Acquisition Negotiation with Two-Sided Private Information
|
Esat Doruk Cetemen
(University of Rochester)
Dynamic Revenue Maximization on a Network
|
Jiabin Wu
(University of Oregon)
The Political Roots of Inequality and Inefficiency: An Evolutionary Model Under Political Institutions
|
Heinrich Harald Nax
(ETH Zurich)
Meritocracy Can Dissolve the Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff: the Case of Voluntary Contributions Games
|
16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
|
16:45 - 17:30 |
Michael Kearns
(University of Pennsylvania)
TBA
|
|
Tuesday, July 21 |
9:00 - 9:45 |
Philip J. Reny
(University of Chicago)
TBA
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Applications
|
Session B: Bargaining
|
Session C: Cost Allocation
|
Session D: Dynamic Games
|
Session E: Information and Networks
|
Session F: Learning and Evolution
|
Session G: Signalling
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Pim Heijnen
(University of Groningen)
Catastrophe and cooperation
|
Younghwan In
(KAIST)
A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play
|
Luis Ortiz
(Stony Brook University)
Graphical Potential Games
|
Stefan Terstiege
(University of Bonn)
Gathering information before signing a contract: the case of imperfect information
|
Dominik Karos
(University of Oxford)
Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
|
TAO Wang
(SUNY Stony Brook)
Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly
|
Sneha Gaddam
(University of Leicester)
Delegation of Authority in Non-contractible Cost Setting
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Moshe Hoffman
(Harvard)
Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do
|
Fei Li
(University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Transparency of Outside Options in Bargaining
|
Eric Bahel
(Virginia Tech)
Stable cost sharing in production allocation games
|
Thomas Edward Wiseman
(University of Texas at Austin)
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game
|
Christian Kellner
(Uni Bonn)
Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
|
Zibo Xu
(Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Best-response Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games
|
Tobias Gesche
(University of Zurich)
De-biasing strategic communication?
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Jin Yeub Kim
(The University of Chicago)
The Economics of the Right To Be Forgotten
|
Yair Tauman
(Stony Brook University and IDC)
Bargaining on the Sale of a New Innovation in the Presence of Potential Entry
|
Sneha Bakshi
(University of Texas at Dallas)
Cost Enabled Choice of Pricing Rule when Buyers' Information is Private
|
Michael James Neely
(University of Southern California)
Sharing Information Without Regret in Managed Stochastic Games
|
Yuke Li
(Yale University)
A Network Approach to International Relations
|
Dai Zusai
(Temple University)
Best response dynamic in a multitask environment
|
Russell Golman
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Good Manners: Signaling Social Preferences
|
11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
|
13:30 - 14:15 |
Jason Hartline
(Northwestern University)
TBA
|
14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Auctions
|
Session B: Cooperative Games
|
Session C: Incomplete Information
|
Session D: Industrial Organization
|
Session E: Mechanism Design
|
Session F: Solution Concepts
|
Session G: Voting
|
14:45 - 15:15 |
Eiichiro Kazumori
(SUNY at Buffalo)
Building the Auction Markets for the World's Premier Risk-Free Securities: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions.
|
Francesc Llerena
(Rovira i Virgily University (Spain))
On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games
|
Yizhou Xiao
(Stanford University)
Information and Dynamic Trade
|
Ting Liu
(Stony Brook University)
Using clients' rejection to build trust
|
Alia Gizatulina
(University of St. Gallen)
Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms
|
Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
A new solution concept for the roommate problem: Q-stable matchings
|
Yaron Azrieli
(Ohio State University)
On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Youngwoo Koh
(Hanyang University)
Incentive and Sampling Effects in Procurement Auctions
|
Tamas Solymosi
(Corvinus University of Budapest)
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs in assignment games
|
Claudia Herresthal
(University of Oxford)
School rankings, student allocations and school choice reforms
|
Johannes Meya
(Goettingen University)
Dynamics of Yardstick Regulation: Historical Cost Data and the Ratchet Effect
|
Yu Chen
On Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
|
Christian Nauerz
(Maastricht University)
Common Belief in Maximin-Rationality
|
Christian Basteck
(Technische Universit�t Berlin)
The Borda Count and dominance solvable voting games
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
|
Yuan Tian
(University of Chicago)
Strategy-proof and Efficient Fair Scheduling
|
Till Florian Kauffeldt
(University of Heidelberg (Germany))
Games with exogenous uncertainty played by ”Knightian” players
|
Bruno Salcedo
(Pennsylvania State University)
Identification of solution concepts for semi-parametric discrete games with complete information
|
Endre Csóka
(University of Warwick)
Efficient Teamwork
?2241
|
Mantas Radzvilas
(London School of Economics and Political Science)
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
|
Peter Coughlin
(University of Maryland)
Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition
|
16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
|
16:45 - 17:30 |
Kevin Leyton-Brown
(University of British Columbia)
TBA
|
|
|
|
|
|
Wednesday, July 22 |
9:00 - 9:45 |
Tim Roughgarden
(Stanford University)
TBA
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Applications
|
Session B: Bounded Rationality
|
Session C: Information and Networks
|
Session D: Matching
|
Session E: Risk
|
Session F: Signalling
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Claudia M. Landeo
(University of Alberta)
Financially-Constrained Lawyers
|
Anna Rubinchik
(University of Haifa)
Impulsive decisions: nature or nurture? A stochastic approximation approach
|
Alexander Matros
(University of South Carolina)
Contests on Networks
|
Nicholas Arnosti
(Stanford University)
Short Lists In Centralized Clearinghouses
|
PULKIT KUMAR NIGAM
(University of South Carolina)
Optimal Lottery for Fundraising: The Organizer’s Problem
|
Jonas Hedlund
(University of Heidelberg)
Bayesian signaling
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Igor Letina
(University of Zurich)
Procuring Diversity
|
Mark Schneider
(University of Connecticut)
Frame Dependent Utility Theory
|
Norma Olaizola
(University of the Basque Country)
A unifying model of strategic network formation
|
Ata Atay
(University of Barcelona)
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core and competitive prices
|
Tomer Siedner
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Risk of Monetary Gambles: An Axiomatic Approach
|
Daeyoung Jeong
(The Ohio State University)
Cheap Talk and Collective Decision-Making: Voting Rules and Informed Decision Makers
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Ryan Scott Penning
(Energid Technologies)
Game Theory-Inspired Evaluation of Ground Vehicle Autonomy
|
Daniel Wood
(Clemson University)
Vague Messages in Biased Information Transmission: Experiments and Theory
|
Xu Tan
(University of Washington)
A Dynamic Opinion and Network Formation Model
|
Sophie Bade
(Royal Holloway, U of London)
Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only.
|
Jose Francisco Tudon Maldonado
(University of Chicago)
Price dispersion with ex ante homogeneity: A reassessment of the Diamond paradox
|
Jeffrey Mensch
(Northwestern University)
Monotone Persuasion
|
11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
|
13:30 - 14:15 |
Susan Athey
(Stanford University)
TBA
|
14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Auctions
|
Session B: Computation
|
Session C: Incomplete Information
|
Session D: Knowledge and Expectations
|
Session E: Mechanism Design
|
Session F: Voting
|
14:45 - 15:15 |
Tomasz Michalak
(University of Oxford)
Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction
|
Hau Chan
(Stony Brook University)
Resource Allocation with Budgets: Optimal Stable Allocations and Optimal Lotteries
|
Yonggyun Kim
(Korea Military Academy)
Stochastic Dominance of Signals and Reparametrization in Adverse Selection Model
|
Can Baskent
(University of Bath, England)
Non-Classical Approaches to the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox
|
Alia Gizatulina
(University of St. Gallen)
The Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types
|
Frank Huettner
(HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management)
Potential, voting, and power
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Mariann Ollar
(Univeristy of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics)
Privacy Preserving Market Design
|
Amy Greenwald
(Brown University)
Solving for Best-Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods
|
Wolfgang Kuhle
Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game
|
Pedro Jara-Moroni
(Universidad de Santiago de Chile)
Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in Large Games
|
Nima Haghpanah
(MIT)
Reverse Mechanism Design
|
Ritesh Jain
(The Ohio State University)
Fairness in Mechanism Design
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Sergio Parreiras
(The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Drop-out in Small and Large Contests
|
Mohammad T. Irfan
(Bowdoin College)
Causal Inference in Game-Theoretic Settings with Applications to Microfinance Markets
|
Yiming Liu
(University of Pittsburgh)
Is Reputation Bad?—Loyalty and Competence Trade-off
|
Evan Piermont
(University of Pittsburgh)
Rationalization and Robustness in Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
|
Holger Herbst
(University of Bonn)
Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information
|
Javier Rivas
(University of Bath)
Non-Sincere Voting in Common Value Elections
|
16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
|
16:45 - 17:30 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Evidence Games: Right to Remain Silent, Left to Disclose
|
|
|
|
Thursday, July 23 |
9:00 - 9:45 |
Rachel Kranton
(Duke University)
TBA
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Applications
|
Session B: Auctions
|
Session C: Contracts
|
Session D: Experimental Economics
|
Session E: Information and Networks
|
Session F: Matching
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Cesar Ulises Solis Cervantes
(Center for Research and Advanced Studies)
Solving Stackelberg Security Games for Multiple Defenders and Multiple Attackers
|
Nora Szech
(Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release
|
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Contracting for experimentation and the value of bad news
|
Kathleen Ngangoue
(DIW Berlin)
Learning from unrealized versus realized prices
|
Alexandros Rigos
(University of Leicester)
A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition
|
Garth Baughman
(University of Pennsylvania)
Deadlines and Matching
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Jorg Spenkuch
(Northwestern University)
Backward Induction in the Wild: Evidence from the U.S. Senate
|
Anton Tsoy
(MIT)
Auction Design with Advised Bidders
|
Elliot Lipnowski
(NYU Stern)
Repeated Delegation
|
Tahereh Rezaei Khavas
(Utrecht university)
Cultural Differences in Prisoner's Dilemma Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
|
Federico Valenciano
(University of the Basque Country)
The impact of negotiable cost-paying on basic models of network formation
|
Patrick Harless
(University of Rochester)
The Importance of Learning in Market Design
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
Tsz Ning Wong
(Pennsylvania State University)
Free Riding and Duplication in R&D
|
Biligbaatar Tumendemberel
(Hebrew University)
Generalized Third-price Auctions
|
Najmeh Rezaei Khavas
(visiting graduate researcher at UCLA)
The optimal group size in microcredit contracts
|
|
Yeochang Yoon
(The Ohio State University)
Biased News Media
|
|
11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
|
13:30 - 14:15 |
Ehud Kalai
(Northwestern University)
Stability Cycles in Big Games
|
14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Applications
|
Session B: Incomplete Information
|
Session C: Knowledge and Expectations
|
Session D: Mechanism Design
|
Session E: Voting
|
14:45 - 15:15 |
Aaron Bodoh-Creed
(U. of California, Berkeley)
Affirmative Action as a Large Contest
|
Jean-Francois Mercier
(McGill University)
Rent-Seeking Group Contests with Private Information
|
Ling Yang
(University of Pittsburgh)
When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of Persuasion
|
Irina Kirysheva
(Nazarbayev University)
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage
|
Hao Hong
(The Pennsylvania State University)
Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Jörg Franke
(TU Dortmund)
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests
|
Lars Peter Metzger
(Dortmund University)
Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information
|
Roee Teper
(University of Pittsburgh)
Learning the Krepsian State: Exploration through Consumption
|
Justin Merrill Peterson
(University of South Carolina)
Blind Stealing Games
|
José Manuel Zarzuelo
(The Basque Country University)
An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
Guy Arie
(University of Rochester)
Intermediary Bargaining for Price-Insensitive Consumers
|
Miklos Pinter
(Corvinus University of Budapest)
A new epistemic model
|
Chih-Chun Yang
(Academia Sinica)
Strong belief and weak assumption
|
Benjamin Schickner
(University of Bonn)
Dynamic Formation of Teams: When Does Waiting for Good Matches Pay Off?
|
Xin Zhao
(University of Toronto)
Information Acquisition in Heterogeneous Committees
|
16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
|
16:45 - 17:30 |
Matthew Jackson
(Stanford University)
Repeated Favor Exchange and the Structure of Social Networks
|
|
|
|
|
|
Friday, July 24 |
9:00 - 9:45 |
Nicole Immorlica
(Microsoft Research New England)
TBA
|
9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Autions
|
Session B: Bargaining
|
Session C: Cooperative Games
|
Session D: Fairness
|
Session E: Matching
|
Session F: Social and Political Models
|
10:15 - 10:45 |
Nicholas Arnosti
(Stanford University)
Auctions, Adverse Selection, and Internet Display Advertising
|
Jack Anthony Fanning
(Brown University)
Polarization and delay: uncertainty in reputational bargaining
|
Josune Albizuri
(Basque Country University)
A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems
|
Steven Brams
(New York University)
How to Divide Things Fairly
|
Britta Hoyer
(University of Paderborn)
Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse
|
Cagil Tasdemir
(The Graduate Center of CUNY)
The Strategy of Campaigning
|
10:45 - 11:15 |
Brian Baisa
(Amherst College and University of Michigan)
A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders
|
Dongkyu Chang
(Yale University)
Bargaining with Arriving Sellers
|
Gabriela Delgadillo
(National Polytechnic Institute (I.P.N.))
Computing the Strong Nash Equilibrium For Conforming Coalitions
|
Albin Erlanson
(University of Bonn)
Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions
|
Francisco Robles
(Universitat de Barcelona)
One-seller assignment market with multi-unit demands
|
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu
(Public University of Navarre, Spain.)
Strategy-proof location of public facilities
|
11:15 - 11:45 |
XiaoGang Che
(Durham University Business School, UK)
Auctions versus Sequential Mechanism When Resale is Allowed
|
Ilwoo Hwang
(University of Miami)
A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock
|
Josep M. Izquierdo
(Universitat de Barcelona)
The core and the bargaining set for convex games
|
Wiroy Shin
(The Pennsylvania State University)
Discrimination in Organizations
|
Peter Troyan
(University of Virginia)
Designing Mechanisms to Make WelfareImproving Strategies Focal
|
Pere Timoner
(Universitat de Barcelona)
Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions
|
11:45 - 13:30 |
Lunch Break
|
13:30 - 14:15 |
Drew Fudenberg
(Harvard University)
TBA
|
14:15 - 14:45 |
Coffee Break
|
|
Session A: Autions
|
Session B: Dynamic Games
|
Session C: Incomplete Information
|
Session D: Learning and Evolution
|
Session E: Mechanism Design
|
Session F: Solution Concepts
|
14:45 - 15:15 |
Adi Vardi
(Tel Aviv University)
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets
|
Kyungmin Kim
(University of Iowa)
Trading Dynamics in the Market for Lemons
|
Thomas Joseph Rivera
(HEC Paris)
Regulation and the Structure of Information: The Effects of Peer Monitoring on Capital Adequacy Regulation
|
Holly Borowski
(University of Colorado)
Understanding the Influence of Adversaries in Distributed Systems
|
Albert Xin Jiang
(Trinity University)
Resource Graph Games: A Compact Representation for Games with Structured Strategy Spaces (Extended Abstract)
|
Yannai Aharon Gonczarowski
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research)
Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games
|
15:15 - 15:45 |
Jun Xiao
(University of Melbourne)
Awarding Scarce Ideas in Innovation Contests
|
Yi Chen
(Yale University)
Strategic Experimentation On A Common Threshold
|
Jiemai Wu
(Washington University in St. Louis)
Learning in Persuasion with Multiple Advisors
|
Svetlana Boyarchenko
(University of Texas, Austin)
Strategic exit with random observations
|
Ran Shorrer
(Harvard University)
A Model of Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game
|
Yehuda Levy
(Hebrew University)
Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria
|
15:45 - 16:15 |
|
Daria Khromenkova
(University of Mannheim)
Collective Experimentation with Breakdowns and Breakthroughs
|
Peter Orman
(UNC Chapel Hill)
On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders
|
Liwen Chen
(University of South Carolina)
Equilibrium Selection of Public Good Provision Mechanisms
|
Cedric Wasser
(University of Bonn)
Dissolving Partnerships Optimally
|
Anna Zseleva
(Maastricht University)
Zero-sum games with charges
|
|
|
|
|
|