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Sunday, July 15 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Asu Ozdaglar
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Dynamics in Near-Potential Games
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Mechanism Design
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Session B: Matching
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Session C: Knowledge/Expectations
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Session D: Networks
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Session E: Reputation
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Session F: Computation
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Nick Bedard
(University of Western Ontario)
The Strategically Ignorant Principal
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Umut Dur
(University of Texas at Austin)
Tuition Exchange
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Adam Dominiak
(Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University)
"Agreeing to Disagree" Type Results under Ambiguity
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Penelope Hernandez
(University of Valencia)
Strategic sharing of a costly network
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Zehao Hu
(University of Pennsylvania)
Vanishing Beliefs But Persisting Reputation
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Dieter Balkenborg
(University of Exeter)
Polyhedra and Nash equilibrium components: An elementary construction.
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Jing Chen
(MIT)
Epistemic Implementation and The Arbitrary-Belief Auction
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Alexander Teytelboym
(University of Oxford)
Strong stability in contractual networks and matching markets
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Ziv Hellman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
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Guillem Martinez
(University of Valencia)
Small world networks games
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Thomas Norman
(Magdalen College, Oxford)
Almost-Rational Learning of Nash Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity
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Pawel Dziewuski
(University of Oxford)
Equilibria in large games with strategic complementaries
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Ville Korpela
(University of Turku)
Bayesian Implementation in Societies with Strong Norm Agains Lying and Partially Honest Individuals
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Takeshi Suzuki
(Brown University)
Assignment Games with Path-Dependent Preferences
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Bassel Tarbush
(University of Oxford)
Agreeing to disagree: a syntactic approach
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Manuel Munoz-Herrera
(Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
Productive Exchange Games in Networks
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Francesc Dilme
(University of Pennsylvania)
Reputations through Switching Costs
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Vianney Perchet
(Universite Paris 7)
Nash Equilibria with uncertainties; Generalization of Lemke Howson algorithm
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Srihari Govindan
(University of Rochester)
Competition for a Majority
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Adam (Tauman) Kalai
(Microsoft Research)
Dueling Algorithms
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Voting
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Session B: Solution Concepts
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Session C: Incomplete Information
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Session D: Contracts
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Session E: Auctions
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Peter Coughlin
(University of Maryland)
Probabilistic Voting Models
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Tai-Wei Hu
(Northwestern University)
Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability
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Fabien Gensbittel
(Toulouse School of Economics)
Repeated Games with Incremental Information on One Side.
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Yutaka Suzuki
(Hosei University)
Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Yingni Guo
(Yale University)
Information Sharing and Voting
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Michael Trost
(Max Planck Institute of Economics)
An Epistemic Rationale for Order-Independence
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Xavier Venel
(University Toulouse 1 Capitole)
Stochastic games with a more informed controller.
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Martin Szydlowski
(Northwestern)
Incentives, Project Choice and Dynamic Multitasking
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Ina Taneva
(University of Texas at Austin)
Disclosure of Private Information in Auctions with Two-Dimensional Types
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16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
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16:45 - 17:30 |
Jerome Renault
(University Toulouse 1)
Limit values for Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games, and a distance for belief spaces
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Monday, July 16 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Stochastic games with short-stage duration
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Experimental Economics
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Session B: Repeated Games
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Session C: Cooperative Games
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Session D: Industrial Organization
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Session E: Theory
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Session F: Applications
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Alexander Matros
(Lancaster University)
All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence
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Bo Chen
(Southern Methodist University)
A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting
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Usha Sridhar
(Ecometrix Research)
Pareto Optimal Allocation in Coalitional Games with Exponential Payoffs
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Pierre Fleckinger
(Paris School of Economics)
Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments
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Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein
(University of Bonn)
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
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Raphael Boleslavsky
(University of Miami, School of Business)
Grade Inflation and Education Quality
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Leandro Chaves Rego
(Federal University of Pernambuco)
Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: an experimental study
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Jonathan Lhost
(University of Texas at Austin)
Worth the Wait? Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Search
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Andreas Nohn
(Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finland)
Monotonicity of Power in Games with Restricted Communication
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Bruno Oliveira
(Universidade do Porto)
Strategic optimization in R&D Investment
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Utku Ozan Candogan
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games
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Shah Mahmood
(University College Londdon)
Two New Economic Models for Privacy
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Kim Kaivanto
(Lancaster University)
Community Level Natural Resource Management Institutions Work in (Game) Theory as Well as in Practice: Lottery Allocation of Fishing Sites Implements Correlated Equilibrium
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Marie Laclau
(HEC Paris)
Communication in Repeated Network Games with Private Monitoring
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Ryoji Sawa
(University of Wisconsin-Madison)
An Analysis of Stochastic Stability in Bargaining Games with Behavioral Agents
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Sylvain Chassang
(Princeton University)
Dynamic allocation under limited liability
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Pierre Cardaliaguet
(Université de Paris Dauphine)
On Long Time Average of Mean Field Games
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Solution Concepts
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Session B: Knowledge/Expectations
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Session C: Networks
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Session D: Auctions
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Session E: Political Economy
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Session F: Applications
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Zsombor Zoltan Meder
(Maastricht University)
Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons
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Romeo Balanquit
(University of the Philippines)
Common Belief Revisited
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Amrita Dhillon
(University of Warwick)
Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline
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Hanzhe Zhang
(University of Chicago)
Optimal Auction Design Under Competition
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Yun Wang
(University of Pittsburgh)
Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers
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Christina Pawlowitsch
(Paris School of Economics)
Meaning, free will, and the certification of types in a Biblical game
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Peter Streufert
(University of Western Ontario)
Specifying nodes as sets of actions
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Matthias Lang
(Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
The Fog of Fraud - Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity
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Tânia Oliveira
(University of Porto)
Dynamics of Human Decisions
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Jiawen Li
(University of York)
A non-cooperative approach to the Talmud solution for bankruptcy problems
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16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
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16:45 - 17:30 |
Ludovic Renou
(University of Leicester)
Repeated Nash Implementation
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Tuesday, July 17 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Eric Maskin
(Harvard University)
Evolution and Repeated Games
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Stochastic Games
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Session B: Signaling
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Session C: Mechanism Design
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Session D: Matching
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Session E: Learning/Evolution
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Session F: Fairness
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10:15 - 10:45 |
János Flesch
(Maastricht University)
Subgame-perfection in free transition games
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Aaron Bodoh-Creed
(Cornell University)
Conversations, Privacy, and Taboos
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Alejandro Francetich
(Stanford GSB)
Endogenous Informational Asymmetries in Dynamic Mechanisms
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Wonki Jo Cho
(University of Rochester)
Probabilistic Assignment: A Two-fold Axiomatic Approach
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Axel Bernergĺrd
(Stockholm School of Economics)
Finite-Population Mass-Action and Evolutionary Stability
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Steven Brams
(New York University)
N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Yehuda Levy
(Hebrew University)
A Discounted Stochastic Game with No Stationary Nash Equilibrium
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Fei Li
(University of Pennsylvania)
Dynamic Education Signaling with Dropout
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Ilan Lobel
(New York University)
Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Sales and Inventory Information
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Peter Troyan
(Stanford University)
Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas
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Jun Honda
(University of Vienna)
Equilibrium selection for symmetric coordination games with an application to the minimum-effort game
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Karol Szwagrzak
(University of Rochester)
Efficient, fair, and group strategy-proof (re)allocation in networks
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Guillaume Vigeral
(Université Paris-Dauphine)
A zero-sum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic value
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Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer
(European University Institute)
A Model of Competitive Signaling
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Gwenaël Piaser
(IPAG Business School, Paris)
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games
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John Nash
(Princeton University)
Plans and Work for Further Studies of Cooperative Games Using the 'Method of Acceptances'
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Bryan Bruns
(Independent Scholar)
Escaping Prisoner’s Dilemmas: From Discord to Harmony in the Landscape of 2x2 Games
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Robert Kohn
(New York University)
Parabolic PDEs and Deterministic Games
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 18:00 |
Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years
(Program)
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18:30 - 22:00 |
Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)
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Wednesday, July 18 |
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9:00 - 15:00 |
Celebration of Michel Balinski's 78 years
(Program)
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Repeated Games
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Session B: Voting
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Session C: Networks
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Session D: Incomplete Information
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Session E: Auctions
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Session F: Political Economy
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Juan Ignacio Block
(Washington University in St. Louis)
Codes of Conduct, Private Information, and Repeated Games
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Zhengjia Jiang
A Complete Geometric Representation of Four-Player Weighted Voting Systems
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Norma Olaizola
(University of the Basque Country)
One-way flow network formation under constraints
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Jeanne Hagenbach
(CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France)
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication
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Yumiko Baba
(Aoyamagakuin University)
Four Unit-Price Auction Procedures
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Cheng Li
(University of Miami)
Profiling, Screening and Criminal Recruitment
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Johannes Horner
(Yale University)
How fast do equilibrium payoffs converge in repeated games?
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Alessandra Casella
(Columbia University)
Vote trading with and without party leaders
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Federico Valenciano
(University of the Basque Country)
Asymmetric flow networks
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Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
On Payoff Irrelevant Beliefs and Discrimination
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Brian Baisa
(Yale)
Rank Dependent Preferences and Auctions
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16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
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16:45 - 17:30 |
Jose Rafael Correa
(Universidad de Chile)
Preannounced Pricing Policies with Strategic Consumers
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Thursday, July 19 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
William Sudderth
(University of Minnesota)
Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Stochastic Games
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Session B: Learning/Evolution
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Session C: Networks
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Session D: Bargaining
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Session E: Auctions and Discontinuous Games
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Session F: Theory
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Kimmo Berg
(Aalto University School of Science)
Characterization of Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Stochastic Games
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Heinrich Harald Nax
(JHU)
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets
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Emerson Melo
(California Institute of Technology)
Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets
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Ilwoo Hwang
(University of Pennsylvania)
Bargaining with Investment on the Outside Option
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Rupei Xu
(University of Minnesota--Twin Cities)
Strategyproof Cost Sharing Auction Game Mechanism for Public Service Facilities
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Jie Zheng
(Tsinghua University)
The Robustness of Bubbles in a Finite Horizon Model of Incomplete Information
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Svetlana Boyarchenko
(University of Texas, Austin)
Preemption games under Levy uncertainty
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Daniel Wood
(Clemson University)
Stable Conventions in Hawk-Dove Games with Many Players
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Brian Rogers
(Northwestern)
Cooperation in Anonymous Dynamic Social Networks
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Leyla Derin Karakas
(Johns Hopkins University)
Bargaining Under Institutional Challenges
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Sofia Moroni
(Yale University)
Online Auctions with a Deadline
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Michael Richter
(New York University)
Choice Theory via Equivalence
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11:15 - 11:45 |
Sergei Levendorskii
(University of Leicester)
Stopping time games under Knightian uncertainty
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Evan D Sadler
(NYU Stern School of Business)
Social Learning with Network Uncertainty
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Martina Nikolaeva Gogova
(EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht)
Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design
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Rida Laraki
(CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Discontinuous Strategic Games
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Alberto Pinto
(University of Porto)
On the convergence to Walrasian prices in random matching Edgeworthian economies
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11:45 - 12:00 |
Coffee Break
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12:00 - 12:45 |
Karl Schlag
(University of Vienna)
Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments
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12:45 - 14:15 |
Lunch Break
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14:15 - 15:00 |
Marco Scarsini
(LUISS)
Existence of equilibria in countable games: an algebraic approach
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15:00 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Repeated Games
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Session B: Finance
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Session C: Cooperative Games
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Session D: Voting
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Asaf Plan
(University of Arizona)
Returns to scale in the generation map of repeated games
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Maryam Sami
(Stony Brook University)
Reputational Concerns and Financial Contagion
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José Manuel Zarzuelo
(The Basque Country University)
Extending the Nash Solution to Choice Problems with Reference Points
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Semin Kim
(The Ohio State University)
Ordinal versus Cardinal Voting Rules: A Mechanism Design Approach
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15:45 - 16:15 |
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Priyanka Sharma
(Texas A&M University)
Is more information always better?: A case in credit markets
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Josune Albizuri
(Basque Country University)
Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete version
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Jean Guillaume Forand
(University of Waterloo)
Useless Prevention vs. Costly Remediation
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16:15 - 16:45 |
Coffee Break
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16:45 - 17:30 |
Bernard DeMeyer
(Université de Paris 1)
Risk aversion and price dynamics on the stock market
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