14th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook

Schedule of Talks (click here for PDF version, 5 print pages)

(as of Jul 11, 12:58)

 
Monday, July 21
 
9:15-10:00     Aumann: Rule Rationality Versus Act Rationality
10:15-10:40 25 Herreiner:
Envy as a Secondary Criterion of Fairness 		93 Zapechelnyuk:
Bargaining with a Ruler: Solution Implementation via Generalized Auction 		43 Krishna:
Absence of Commitment in Principal-Agent Games 		30 Inarra:
The Supercore for Normal Form Games 		63 Ozkal-Sanver:
Nash Implementation via Hyperfunctions
10:50-11:15   8 Berger:
A General Model of Best Response Adaptation 		65 Pelosse:
Anonymous Competitive Contracts 		79 Sekiguchi:
Repeated Games with Observation Costs 		73 Sanver:
Almost all Social Choice Correspondences are Subject to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
11:30-12:15     Turocy: The Gambit System for Computing in Finite Games
Lunch break
2:00-2:45     Shelton: Compact Structured Game Representations
3:00-3:25 89 Watanabe:
Asymptotic Properties of the Shapley Value of Patent Licensing Games 		13 Catilina:
Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: An Experiment 		7 Bergantiños:
The Consistent Coalitional Value 		80 Sengupta:
Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions with Discrete Bidding 		 
3:35-4:00 67 Poulsen:
Evolution of Preferences in a Simple Game of Life 		2 Apesteguia:
Blowing the Whistle 		29 Imhof:
Stable Sequences of Political Coalitions 		14 Chakraborty:
Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions 		 
4:15-5:00     de Farias: Learning and Teaching in Repeated Games: A Machine Learning Approach to Long-Term Best-Response Play
 
Tuesday, July 22
 
9:15-10:00     McLennan: Polyhedral Homotopy Computation of Extensive Form Nash Equilibrium Paths
10:15-10:40 44 Kutman:
The FBI-CIA Game 		  21 Filipovich:
Ambiguous Contracting: Natural Language and Judicial Interpretation 		99 Lacôte:
How to efficiently defeat a strategy of bounded rationality 		24 Chakraborty:
Ordinal Cheap Talk
10:50-11:15 23 Gorodeisky:
Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations and Backward Induction 		100 Marino:
Continuous Versus Discrete Market Game 		102 Orzach:
Private Information and Nonbinding Arbitration: A Proposal for Reducing the Costs of Litigation 		69 Ray:
Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games 		88 Wako:
Two Examples in a Market with Two Types of Indivisible Good
11:30-12:15     Lehrer: No-Regret, Approachability and Excludability with Bounded Computational Capability
Lunch break
2:00-2:45     Zamir: On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions
3:00-3:25 60 Neill:
Cooperation and Coordination in the Turn-Taking Dilemma 		10 Brams:
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes 		31 Izmalkov:
Multi-unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction 		41 Koessler:
Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types 		75 Savani:
Long Lemke-Howson Paths
3:35-4:00 9 Berger:
Fictitious Play in 2xn Games 		27 Hortala-Vallve:
Qualitative Voting 		84 Vidal-Puga:
Forming Societies and the Shapley NTU Value 		103 Shmaya:
Two Player Non Zero-sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time 		50 Luo:
A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability
4:15-5:00     Canty: Computing Equilibrium Strategies for Timely Detection
 
Wednesday, July 23
 
9:15-10:00     Roughgarden: Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
10:15-10:40 87 von Stengel:
Computationally Efficient Coordination in Game Trees 		53 Mathews:
Non-Binding Sequential Exchange Between Discounting Agents 		72 Sanchez Sanchez:
Decomposition Principle in Cost Games 		62 Nieva:
Enforcers and Induced Empty Core Games Derived From Any TU 2-Person Game: Ineffective Implementation or Not Agreed Upon Institutions? 		98 Stamatopoulos:
Innovation and Licensing in Models of Product Differentiation
10:50-11:15 85 Viossat:
Properties of Dual Reduction 		11 Breitmoser:
Long-Term Equilibria of Repeated Consistently Competitive Games 		78 Schlag:
On the Value of Randomizing and Limiting Memory in Repeated Decision-Making Under Minimal Regret 		97 Eguiazarova:
Comparative Statics for the Private Provision of Public Goods 		105 Sen:
General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-Reducing Innovation
11:30-12:15     Gossner: Costly Communication in Repeated Interactions
Lunch break
2:00-2:45     Neyman: Kolmogorov Strategy Complexity
3:00-3:25 16 Dragan:
The Least Square Values and the Shapley Value 		17 Dreisigmeyer:
Discretizing Evolutionary Games 		55 Mazalov:
Location Game on the Plane 		96 Polowczuk:
On Two-Point Nash Equilibrium in Concave Bimatrix Games 		95 Jaskiewicz:
On the Equivalence of Two Expected Average Reward Criteria for Zero-Sum Semi-Markov Games
3:35-4:00 59 Napel:
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis - A Unified Approach 		6 Belsky:
Optimization Using Weighted Fictitious Play 		32 Ju:
A Compensation Rule for Project-Allocation Games 		45 Kvassov:
Non-Zero-Sum Blotto Games 		91 Wiese:
On the Application of an Outside-Option Value to the Gloves Game
4:15-5:00     Kalai: Large Robust Games
 
Thursday, July 24
 
9:15-10:00     Simon: A Topological Approach to Quitting Games
10:15-10:40 22 González Díaz:
From Set-Valued Solutions to Single-Valued Solutions: the Centroid 		74 Sarangi:
The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation 		40 Kóczy:
The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension 		19 Haimanko:
On Continuity of the Equilibrium and Core Correspondences in Economies with Differential Information 		107 Birulin:
Public Goods with Congestion: A Mechanism Design Approach
10:50-11:15 94 Zarzuelo:
On Coalitional Semivalues 		33 Sarangi:
Strategic Path Reliability in Information Networks 		5 Bandyopadhyay:
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation 		46 Lambert:
Fictitious Play Approach to a Mobile Unit Situation Awareness Problem 		36 Kharabadze:
End of Boeing's Monopoly: How Does Airbus' A380 Introduction Affect Large Commercial Aircraft Industry?
11:30-12:15     Sudderth: Borel Stay-in-a-Set Games
Lunch break
2:00-2:45     Sorin: Multivalued Dynamics and Games
3:00-3:25   20 Engseld:
Coordination Through Status 		1 Albizuri:
Coalitional Configurations and Value 		15 Di Tillio:
Subjective Expected Utility in Games 		104 Nawar:
Internet Auctions with Traffic Congestion
3:35-4:00 76 Schanz:
Optimal Information Disclosure for a Policymaker Targeting Aggregate Activity 		82 Tenorio:
The Impact of Individual and Group Characteristics on Strategies and Outcomes in Coordination Games: Theory and Evidence 		3 Arin:
Egalitarian Distributions for Coalitional Models: The Lorenz Criterion 		26 Hon-Snir:
Utility Equivalence in Auctions 		86 von Schemde:
Construction of Equilibrium Components with Arbitrary Index and Degree
4:15-5:00     Hart: Adaptive Heuristics: A Little Rationality Goes a Long Way
 
Friday, July 25
 
9:15-10:00     Rosenberg: The MaxMin Value of Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring
10:15-10:40 83 Valenciano:
Bargaining, Voting and Value 		4 Asan:
On the Stability and Optimality of Coalitions Voluntarily Providing Impure Public Goods 		49 Liu:
Customer Information Sharing Among Rival Firms 		54 Matsuhisa:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium in Economy for Multi-Modal Logic 		92 Xue:
Sustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Local Interaction
10:50-11:15 90 Wettstein:
An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments 		61 Nieva:
Coase, an Extension of the Shapley-Aumann-Myerson Solution and Misleading Policy Implications 		106 Amir:
Merger Performance under Uncertain Efficiency Gains 		77 Schipper:
Multi-Person Unawareness 		64 Parthasarathy:
SER-SIT Stochastic Games and Vertical Linear Complementarity Problem
11:30-12:15     Schmeidler: Beliefs and Tastes in Context
Lunch break
2:00-2:45     Samet: One Observation Behind Two Puzzles
 
End of Conference