Schedule of Talks, 2003 International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook

Date: Jul 11, 12:58

		Monday	, July 21			
9:15-10:00	Aumann: Rule Rationality Versus Act Rationality					
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11:30-12:15	Turocy: The Ga	ambit System for C	Computing in Fir	ite Games		
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2:00-2:45	Shelton: Compact Structured Game Representations					
3:00-3:25	89 Watanabe: Asymptotic Properties of the Shapley Value of Patent Licensing Games	13 Catilina: Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: An Experiment	7 <b>Bergantiños:</b> The Consistent Coalitional Value	80 <b>Sengupta</b> : Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions with Discrete Bidding		
3:35-4:00	67 <b>Poulsen</b> : Evolution of Preferences in a Simple Game of Life	2 Apesteguia: Blowing the Whistle	29 Imhof: Stable Sequences of Political Coalitions	14 Chakraborty: Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions		
4:15-5:00	de Farias: Lear to Long-Term Best-		g in Repeated Ga	mes: A Machine	Learning Approach	

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