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Monday, July 11 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Vijay Krishna
(Penn State University)
Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Mechanism Design
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Session B: Experimental
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Session C: Knowledge
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Ichiro Obara
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction
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Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen
(Peking University)
Pre-empting Inefficient contests with gender signaling
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Konrad Grabiszewski
(Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
"Knowing Whether," Meta-Knowledge, and Epistemic Bounded Rationality
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Jun Zhang
(Queen's University)
Optimal Mechanism Design with Speculation and Resale
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Hong (Hannah) Lin
(Peking University)
Separating Gratitude from Guilt in the Laboratory
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Ziv Hellman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Countable Spaces and Common Priors
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11:15 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Auctions
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Session B: Computation
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Session C: Learning/Evolution
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Session D: Information
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11:30 - 12:00 |
Leandro Arozamena
(Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)
Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism
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Mohammad T. Irfan
(Stony Brook University)
A Model of Strategic Behavior in Networks of Influence
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Christina Pawlowitsch
(Paris School of Economics)
Neutrality, drift, and the diversification of languages
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David Ong
(Peking University)
Mutual Certification of Experts in Credence Goods Markets
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Shmuel Zamir
(Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions
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Erich Prisner
(Franklin College Switzerland)
Comparison of Distribution Procedures for Few Indivisible Goods among Two Players
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Michael Jacob Fox
(Georgia Institute of Technology)
Stochastic Stability in Language Evolution
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Maxim Ivanov
(McMaster University)
Dynamic Informational Control
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Olivier Compte
(Paris School of Economics)
Plausible theories of behavior
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Learning/Evolution
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Session B: Political Economy
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Session C: Matching
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Session D: Dynamic Games
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Session E: Communication
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Jason Marden
(University of Colorado at Boulder)
Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning
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Wioletta Dziuda
(Northwestern University)
Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo
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Georgy Artemov
(University of Melbourne)
College admission problem with clear-in ranks
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Rida Laraki
(CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique)
A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games
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Sho Miyamoto
(Washington University in St. Louis)
Obfuscating to Persuade
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
High-Dimensional Connectivity and cooperation
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Selcuk Ozyurt
(Sabanci University)
Conflict Resolution: Role of Strategic Communication
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Jacob D. Leshno
(Harvard University)
The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
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Aaron Bodoh-Creed
(Cornell University)
Approximation of Large Dynamic Games
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Eduardo Perez
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Complexity Inflation in Persuasion
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Asher Wolinsky
(Northwestern University)
Search with adverse selection
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Tuesday, July 12 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Rakesh Vohra
(Northwestern University)
Price Discrimination Through Communication
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Information
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Session B: Auctions
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Session C: Learning/Evolution
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Session D: Mechanism Design
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Jeanne Hagenbach
(CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France)
Full Disclosure in Organizations
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Chinmayi Krishnappa
(University of Texas at Austin)
A Sealed-Bid Unit-Demand Auction with Put Options
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Hanna Halaburda
(Harvard University)
Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games
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Estelle Midler
(Montpellier Supagro LAMETA)
Avoiding deforestation efficiently and fairly: a mechanism design perspective
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Tymofiy Mylovanov
(Penn State University)
Little White Lies–The Value of Inconsequential Chatter
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Nora Szech
(University of Bonn)
Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions
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Georgios Piliouras
(Georgia Tech)
Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games
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Ram Orzach
(Oakland University)
Reverse Game Theory in Case Evaluation with Differential Information
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11:15 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Knowledge
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Session B: Dynamic Games
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Session C: Political Economy
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Session D: Industrial Organization
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11:30 - 12:00 |
Jonathan Weinstein
(Northwestern)
Provisional Probabilities and Paradigm Shifts
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Thomas Wiseman
(University of Texas at Austin)
A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes
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Chong Huang
(University of Pennsylvania)
Social Learning in Regime Change Games
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José Luis Ferreira
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Capacity pre-commitment, price competition and forward markets
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Karl Schlag
(University of Vienna)
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Search without Priors
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Christiaan Matthijs Van Veelen
(CREED, University of Amsterdam)
In and out of equilibrium: evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting and population structure
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Galina Zudenkova
(Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
A Model of Party Discipline in Congress
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Ming-Hung Weng
(National Cheng Kung University)
Spatial Competition under Constrained Product Selection
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Michael Ostrovsky
(Stanford University)
Recent Results on Matching in Trading Networks
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Solution Concepts
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Session B: Contracts
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Session C: Dynamic Games
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Session D: Mechanism Design
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Dries Vermeulen
(University Maastricht)
Every simplicial set is a Nash component: an elementary proof
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Seungjin Han
(McMaster University)
Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection
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Chantal Marlats
(CORE, FNRS)
Strategic information transmission in exponential bandit problems
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Wouter Vergote
(CEREC, Facultés universitaire Saint-Louis and CORE, UClouvain)
Absolutely Stable Roommate Problems
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15:45 - 16:15 |
John Nash
(Princeton University)
Continued Work on the "Agencies Method" for Modeling Cooperation in Games Dependent on Coalition Formation Possibilities
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Takuya Nakaizumi
(UCSD and Kanto Gakuin University)
Rank Order Tournament of Multiple Venders In the Face of Hold Up Problem
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Philipp Strack
(University of Bonn)
Continuous Time Contests
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Eun Jeong Heo
(University of Rochester)
Probabilistic Assignment of Objects: Characterizing the Serial Rule
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Dirk Bergemann
(Yale University)
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
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Wednesday, July 13 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Nabil Al-Najjar
(Northwestern University)
Testing Bayesian Beliefs
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Decision Theory
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Session B: Information
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Session C: Learning/Evolution
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Session D: Coalitions
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Sean Horan
(Boston University)
Sequential Search and Choice from Lists
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Frank Rosar
(University of Bonn)
Imperfect private information and the design of information–generating mechanisms
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Christoph March
(Paris School of Economics)
Adaptive Social Learning
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Dinko Dimitrov
Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Burkhard C Schipper
(University of California, Davis)
Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
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Vasiliki Skreta
(NYU, Stern)
Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission
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Mathias Staudigl
(University of Bielefeld, IMW)
Stochastic stability in binary choice coordination games
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Dominik Karos
(Saarland University)
Coalition Formation in Simple Games
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11:15 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Dynamic Games
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Session B: Auctions
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Session C: Matching
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Session D: Information
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11:30 - 12:00 |
Johannes Horner
(Yale University)
A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring
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Theodore Turocy
(University of East Anglia)
Impulse Balance in Auctions: Some New Results
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Umut Dur
(University of Texas at Austin)
Dynamic School Choice Problem
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Jiwoong Lee
(Maastricht University)
A Characterization of Separating Equilibrium in Multidimensional Signaling Games
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Marie Laclau
(HEC Paris)
A Folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
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Luciano De Castro
(Northwestern University)
A New Class of Distributions to Study Games of Incomplete Information
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Onur Kesten
(Carnegie Mellon University)
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on A Family of School Choice Mechanisms
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Yuichiro Kamada
(Harvard University)
Multi-Agent Search with Deadline
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Olivier Tercieux
(Paris School of Economics)
Subgame perfect implementation under value perturbations
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Experiments
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Session B: Auctions
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Session C: Political Economy
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Session D: Industrial Organization
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Session E: Noncooperative Games
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Ernest Lai
(Lehigh University)
An Experimental Implementation of Multidimensional Cheap Talk
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(SUNY)
A Strategic Theory of Markets
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Michael Mandler
(Royal Holloway College, University of London)
The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
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Thomas Gall
(Dept. of Economics, University of Bonn)
Rewarding Idleness
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Elnaz Bajoori
(Maastricht University)
Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Barry Sopher
(Rutgers University)
Efficiency-Enhancing Partnership Protocols for Two-Person Games: Laboratory Analysis
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Jinpeng Ma
(Rutgers University)
Bubbles, Crashes, and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms
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Santiago Oliveros
(Haas School of Business-University of California, Berkeley)
The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem
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Alexander Matros
(University of South Carolina)
Treasure game
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Dov Samet
(Tel Aviv University)
Matching
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Nicolas Vieille
(HEC Paris)
Recursive methods in stochastic games: The case of patient players
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18:00 - 22:00 |
Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)
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Thursday, July 14 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
V Bhaskar
(University College London)
Incentives and the Shadow of the Future: Dynamic Moral Hazard with Learning
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Information
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Session B: Computation
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Session C: Networks
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Session D: Industrial Organization
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Alex Possajennikov
(University of Nottingham)
Belief Formation in a Signaling Game without Common Prior
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Debapriya Sen
(Ryerson University)
Potential games and path independence: an alternative algorithm
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Scott Moser
(University of Texas at Austin)
Stochastic Network Structure, Mobility and Efficiency
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Hsien-hung Chiu
(National Chi Nan University, Taiwan)
Simultaneously Signaling and Screening with Seller Financing
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Satoru Takahashi
(Princeton University)
On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games
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Ina Taneva
(University of Texas at Austin)
Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations
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Norma Olaizola
(University of the Basque Country)
Network formation under institutional constraints
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Abhimanyu Khan
(Maastricht University)
Evolution of behaviour when duopolists choose prices and quantities
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11:15 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Auctions
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Session B: Dynamic Games
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Session C: Learning/Evolution
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Session D: Coalitions
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11:30 - 12:00 |
Selin Damla Ahipasaoglu
(London School of Economics)
Analytical Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction
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David Rahman
(University of Minnesota)
A Folk Theorem with Private Strategies
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Yakov Babichenko
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.)
Average Testing and the Efficient Boundary
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Anindya Bhattacharya
(University of York)
Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research
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12:00 - 12:30 |
David Wettstein
( Ben-Gurion University)
Innovation Contests
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Takuo Sugaya
(Princeton University)
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
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Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
Artificial Distinction and Real Discrimination
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Rene Saran
(Maastricht University)
Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Alessandro Pavan
(Northwestern University)
Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Axiomatic Foundations
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Session B: Matching
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Session C: Information
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Session D: Mechanism Design
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness
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Daniel Monte
(Simon Fraser University)
The Daycare Assignment Problem
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Liad Wagman
(Illinois Institute of Technology)
Information Acquisition in Competitive Mortgage Markets
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Karol Szwagrzak
(University of Rochester)
The replacement principle and the egalitarian rule
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Ezra Einy
(Ben Gurion University)
Characterizatin of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
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Azar Abizada
(University of Rochester)
Pairwise stability in graduate college admission problem with budget constraints when students are picky.
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Maria Goltsman
(University of Western Ontario)
Communication in Cournot Oligopoly
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Michele Lombardi
(Maastricht University)
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Eddie Dekel
(Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University)
Optimal allocations with costly state verification and without transfers
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Friday, July 15 |
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Pierpaolo Battigalli
(Università Bocconi)
Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games
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9:45 - 10:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Contracts
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Session B: Auctions
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Session C: Computation
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Session D: Dynamic Games
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Wolf Gick
(Harvard University)
A General Theory of Delegated Contracting And Internal Control
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Xu Tan
(Stanford University)
Two-Dimensional Values and Information Sharing in Auctions
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Na Li
(California Institute of Technology)
Designing Games for Distributed Optimization
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Sevket Alper Koc
(Kocaeli University, Turkey)
Development, Women’s Resources and Domestic Violence
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10:45 - 11:15 |
Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa
(University Carlos III Madrid)
Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem.
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Gregory Pavlov
(University of Western Ontario)
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
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Hau Chan
(Stony Brook University)
Interdependent Defense Games: Modeling Interdependent Security under Deliberate
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Caroline D Thomas
(UCL)
Experimentation with Congestion
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11:15 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Networks
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Session B: Noncooperative Games
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Session C: Industrial Organization
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Session D: Noncooperative Games
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11:30 - 12:00 |
Joan De Marti
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Network Games with Incomplete Information
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Rene Saran
(Maastricht University)
Strategic Party Formation on a Circle
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Eray Cumbul
(University of Rochester)
An Algorithmic Approach to Find Iterated Nash Equilibria in Extended Cournot and Bertrand Games with Potential Entrants
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Maria Montero
(University of Nottingham)
The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Guillermo Owen
(Naval Postgraduate School)
A game-theoretic approach to network configurations
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Noah Stein
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Exchangeable Equilibria
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Filippo Balestrieri
(Hewlett-Packard Laboratories)
Informed seller in a Hotelling market
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Maxim Nikitin
(Higher School of Economics)
Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Liability and Litigation under Self-Serving Bias
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Ariel Rubinstein
(Tel Aviv University and New York University)
Colonel Blotto's Top secret Files: Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Knowledge
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Session B: Political Economy
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Session C: Learning/Evolution
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Session D: Dynamic Games
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15:15 - 15:45 |
Antonio Jimenez
(Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas)
Strategic Interactions in Information Decisions with a Finite Set of Players
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Steven Brams
(New York University)
Narrowing the Field in Elections: The Next-Two Rule
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Bryan Bruns
(Independent Scholar)
Visualizing the Topology of 2x2 Games: From Prisoner's Dilemma to Win-win
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James Alaric Best
(University of Edinburgh)
How Many Chiefs? The Role of Leadership in Social Dilemmas
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15:45 - 16:15 |
Rohit Parikh
(City University of New York)
The Power of Knowledge in Games
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SunTak Kim
(University of Pittsburgh)
Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study
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Erik Mohlin
(University College London)
Evolution of Theories of Mind
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Yuhta Ishii
(Harvard University)
The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination
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16:15 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Stephen Morris
(Princeton University)
Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
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