Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 11

9:00 - 9:45	**Vijay Krishna** (Penn State University) Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare

9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*

	Session A: *Mechanism Design*	Session B: *Experimental*	Session C: *Knowledge*
10:15 - 10:45	**Ichiro Obara** (University of California, Los Angeles) Mechanism Design with Information Acquisition: Efficiency and Full Surplus Extraction	**Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen** (Peking University) Pre-empting Inefficient contests with gender signaling	**Konrad Grabiszewski** (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México) "Knowing Whether," Meta-Knowledge, and Epistemic Bounded Rationality
10:45 - 11:15	**Jun Zhang** (Queen's University) Optimal Mechanism Design with Speculation and Resale	**Hong (Hannah) Lin** (Peking University) Separating Gratitude from Guilt in the Laboratory	**Ziv Hellman** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Countable Spaces and Common Priors

11:15 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*

	Session A: *Auctions*	Session B: *Computation*	Session C: *Learning/Evolution*	Session D: *Information*
11:30 - 12:00	**Leandro Arozamena** (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism	**Mohammad T. Irfan** (Stony Brook University) A Model of Strategic Behavior in Networks of Influence	**Christina Pawlowitsch** (Paris School of Economics) Neutrality, drift, and the diversification of languages	**David Ong** (Peking University) Mutual Certification of Experts in Credence Goods Markets
12:00 - 12:30	**Shmuel Zamir** (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions	**Erich Prisner** (Franklin College Switzerland) Comparison of Distribution Procedures for Few Indivisible Goods among Two Players	**Michael Jacob Fox** (Georgia Institute of Technology) Stochastic Stability in Language Evolution	**Maxim Ivanov** (McMaster University) Dynamic Informational Control

12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*				
14:00 - 14:45	**Olivier Compte** (Paris School of Economics) Plausible theories of behavior				
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Learning/Evolution*	Session B: *Political Economy*	Session C: *Matching*	Session D: *Dynamic Games*	Session E: *Communication*
15:15 - 15:45	**Jason Marden** (University of Colorado at Boulder) Achieving efficiency in distributed systems	**Wioletta Dziuda** (Northwestern University) Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo	**Georgy Artemov** (University of Melbourne) College admission problem with clear-in ranks	**Rida Laraki** (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique) A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games	**Sho Miyamoto** (Washington University in St. Louis) Obfuscating to Persuade
15:45 - 16:15	**Amparo Urbano** (University of Valencia) High-Dimensional Connectivity and cooperation	**Selcuk Ozyurt** (Sabanci University) Conflict Resolution: Role of Strategic Communication	**Jacob D. Leshno** (Harvard University) The college admissions problem with a continuum of students	**Aaron Bodoh-Creed** (Cornell University) Approximation of Large Dynamic Games	**Eduardo Perez** (Ecole Polytechnique) Complexity Inflation in Persuasion
16:15 - 16:30	*Coffee Break*				
16:30 - 17:15	**Asher Wolinsky** (Northwestern University) Search with adverse selection				

Tuesday, July 12

9:00 - 9:45	**Rakesh Vohra** (Northwestern University) Price Discrimination Through Communication			
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*			

	Session A: *Information*	Session B: *Auctions*	Session C: *Learning/Evolution*	Session D:*Mechanism Design*
10:15 - 10:45	**Jeanne Hagenbach** (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, France) Full Disclosure in Organizations	**Chinmayi Krishnappa** (University of Texas at Austin) A Sealed-Bid Unit-Demand Auction with Put Options	**Hanna Halaburda** (Harvard University) Better-reply Dynamics in Deferred Acceptance Games	**Estelle Midler** (Montpellier Supagro LAMETA) Avoiding deforestation efficiently and fairly: a mechanism design perspective
10:45 - 11:15	**Tymofiy Mylovanov** (Penn State University) Little White Lies–The Value of Inconsequential Chatter	**Nora Szech** (University of Bonn) Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions	**Georgios Piliouras** (Georgia Tech) Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games	**Ram Orzach** (Oakland University) Reverse Game Theory in Case Evaluation with Differential Information

11:15 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			

	Session A: *Knowledge*	Session B: *Dynamic Games*	Session C: *Political Economy*	Session D: *Industrial Organization*
11:30 - 12:00	**Jonathan Weinstein** (Northwestern) Provisional Probabilities and Paradigm Shifts	**Thomas Wiseman** (University of Texas at Austin) A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games with Infrequent State Changes	**Chong Huang** (University of Pennsylvania) Social Learning in Regime Change Games	**José Luis Ferreira** (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) Capacity pre-commitment, price competition and forward markets
12:00 - 12:30	**Karl Schlag** (University of Vienna) Should I Stay or Should I Go? Search without Priors	**Christiaan Matthijs Van Veelen** (CREED) In and out of equilibrium: evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting and population structure	**Galina Zudenkova** (Universitat Rovira i Virgili) A Model of Party Discipline in Congress	**Ming-Hung Weng** (National Cheng Kung University) Spatial Competition under Constrained Product Selection

12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*			
14:00 - 14:45	**Michael Ostrovsky** (Stanford University) Recent Results on Matching in Trading Networks			
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Solution Concepts*	Session B: *Contracts*	Session C: *Dynamic Games*	Session D: *Mechanism Design*
15:15 - 15:45	**Dries Vermeulen** (University Maastricht) Every simplicial set is a Nash component: an elementary proof	**Seungjin Han** (McMaster University) Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection	**Chantal Marlats** (CORE, FNRS) Strategic information transmission in exponential bandit problems	**Wouter Vergote** (CEREC, Facultés universitaire Saint-Louis and CORE, UClouvain) Absolutely Stable Roommate Problems
15:45 - 16:15	**John Nash** (Princeton University) Continued Work on the "Agencies Method" for Modeling Cooperation in Games Dependent on Coalition Formation Possibilities	**Takuya Nakaizumi** (UCSD and Kanto Gakuin University) Rank Order Tournament of Multiple Venders In the Face of Hold Up Problem	**Philipp Strack** (University of Bonn) Continuous Time Contests	**Eun Jeong Heo** (University of Rochester) Probabilistic Assignment of Objects: Characterizing the Serial Rule
16:15 - 16:30	*Coffee Break*			
16:30 - 17:15	**Dirk Bergemann** (Yale University) Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information			

Wednesday, July 13

9:00 - 9:45	**Nabil Al-Najjar** (Northwestern University) Testing Bayesian Beliefs			
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Decision Theory*	Session B: *Information*	Session C: *Learning/Evolution*	Session D: *Coalitions*
10:15 - 10:45	**Sean Horan** (Boston University) Sequential Search and Choice from Lists	**Frank Rosar** (University of Bonn) Imperfect private information and the design of information–generating mechanisms	**Christoph March** (Paris School of Economics) Adaptive Social Learning	**Dinko Dimitrov** (Saarland University) Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players
10:45 - 11:15	**Burkhard C Schipper** (University of California, Davis) Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior	**Vasiliki Skreta** (NYU, Stern) Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission	**Mathias Staudigl** (University of Bielefeld, IMW) Stochastic stability in binary choice coordination games	**Dominik Karos** (Saarland University) Coalition Formation in Simple Games
11:15 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Dynamic Games*	Session B: *Auctions*	Session C: *Matching*	Session D: *Information*
11:30 - 12:00	**Johannes Horner** (Yale University) A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring	**Theodore Turocy** (University of East Anglia) Impulse Balance in Auctions: Some New Results	**Umut Dur** (University of Texas at Austin) Dynamic School Choice Problem	**Jiwoong Lee** (Maastricht University) A Characterization of Separating Equilibrium in Multidimensional Signaling Games
12:00 - 12:30	**Marie Laclau** (HEC Paris) A Folk theorem for repeated games played on a network	**Luciano De Castro** (Northwestern University) A New Class of Distributions to Study Games of Incomplete Information	**Onur Kesten** (Carnegie Mellon University) From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on A Family of School Choice Mechanisms	**Yuichiro Kamada** (Harvard University) Multi-Agent Search with Deadline

12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*				
14:00 - 14:45	**Olivier Tercieux** (Paris School of Economics) Subgame perfect implementation under value perturbations				
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*				
	Session A: *Experiments*	Session B: *Auctions*	Session C: *Political Economy*	Session D: *Industrial Organization*	Session E: *Noncooperative Games*
15:15 - 15:45	**Ernest Lai** (Lehigh University) An Experimental Implementation of Multidimensional Cheap Talk	**Eiichiro Kazumori** (SUNY) A Strategic Theory of Markets	**Michael Mandler** (Royal Holloway College, University of London) The fragility of information aggregation in large elections	**Thomas Gall** (Dept. of Economics, University of Bonn) Rewarding Idleness	**Elnaz Bajoori** (Maastricht University) Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces
15:45 - 16:15	**Barry Sopher** (Rutgers University) Efficiency-Enhancing Partnership Protocols for Two-Person Games: Laboratory Analysis	**Jinpeng Ma** (Rutgers University) Bubbles, Crashes, and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms	**Santiago Oliveros** (Haas School of Business-University of California, Berkeley) The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem	**Alexander Matros** (University of South Carolina) Treasure game	**Dov Samet** (Tel Aviv University) Matching
16:15 - 16:30	*Coffee Break*				
16:30 - 17:15	**Nicolas Vieille** (HEC Paris) Recursive methods in stochastic games: The case of patient players				
18:00 - 22:00	**Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)**				

Thursday, July 14

9:00 - 9:45	**V Bhaskar** (University College London) Incentives and the Shadow of the Future: Dynamic Moral Hazard with Learning			
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Information*	Session B: *Computation*	Session C: *Networks*	Session D: *Industrial Organization*
10:15 - 10:45	**Alex Possajennikov** (University of Nottingham) Belief Formation in a Signaling Game without Common Prior	**Debapriya Sen** (Ryerson University) Potential games and path independence: an alternative algorithm	**Scott Moser** (University of Texas at Austin) Stochastic Network Structure, Mobility and Efficiency	**Hsien-hung Chiu** (National Chi Nan University, Taiwan) Simultaneously Signaling and Screening with Seller Financing
10:45 - 11:15	**Satoru Takahashi** (Princeton University) On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games	**Ina Taneva** (University of Texas at Austin) Finite Supermodular Design with Interdependent Valuations	**Norma Olaizola** (University of the Basque Country) Network formation under institutional constraints	**Abhimanyu Khan** (Maastricht University) Evolution of behaviour when duopolists choose prices and quantities
11:15 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Auctions*	Session B: *Dynamic Games*	Session C: *Learning/Evolution*	Session D: *Coalitions*
11:30 - 12:00	**Selin Damla Ahipasaoglu** (LSE) Analytical Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction	**David Rahman** (University of Minnesota) A Folk Theorem with Private Strategies	**Yakov Babichenko** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.) Average Testing and the Efficient Boundary	**Anindya Bhattacharya** (University of York) Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research
12:00 - 12:30	**David Wettstein** (Ben-Gurion University) Innovation Contests	**Takuo Sugaya** (Princeton University) Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring	**Elena Inarra** (University of the Basque Country) Artificial Distinction and Real Discrimination	**Rene Saran** (Maastricht University) Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem

Time	Session A: *Axiomatic Foundations*	Session B: *Matching*	Session C: *Information*	Session D: *Mechanism Design*
12:30 - 14:00	*Lunch Break*			
14:00 - 14:45	**Alessandro Pavan** (Northwestern University) Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets			
14:45 - 15:15	*Coffee Break*			
15:15 - 15:45	**Sergiu Hart** (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness	**Daniel Monte** (Simon Fraser University) The Daycare Assignment Problem	**Liad Wagman** (Illinois Institute of Technology) Information Acquisition in Competitive Mortgage Markets	**Karol Szwagrzak** (University of Rochester) The replacement principle and the egalitarian rule
15:45 - 16:15	**Ezra Einy** (Ben Gurion University) Characterizatin of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom	**Azar Abizada** (University of Rochester) Pairwise stability in graduate college admission problem with budget constraints when students are picky.	**Maria Goltsman** (University of Western Ontario) Communication in Cournot Oligopoly	**Michele Lombardi** (Maastricht University) Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results
16:15 - 16:30	*Coffee Break*			
16:30 - 17:15	**Eddie Dekel** (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University) Optimal allocations with costly state verification and without transfers			

Friday, July 15

9:00 - 9:45	**Pierpaolo Battigalli** (Università Bocconi) Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games			
9:45 - 10:15	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Contracts*	Session B: *Auctions*	Session C: *Computation*	Session D: *Dynamic Games*
10:15 - 10:45	**Wolf Gick** (Harvard University) A General Theory of Delegated Contracting And Internal Control	**Xu Tan** (Stanford) Two-Dimensional Values and Information Sharing in Auctions	**Na Li** (CalTech) Designing Games for Distributed Optimization	**Sevket Alper Koc** (Kocaeli University, Turkey) Development, Women's Resources and Domestic Violence
10:45 - 11:15	**Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa** (University Carlos III) Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem.	**Gregory Pavlov** (University of Western Ontario) Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions	**Hau Chan** (Stony Brook University) Interdependent Defense Games: Modeling Interdependent Security under Deliberate	**Caroline D Thomas** (UCL) Experimentation with Congestion
11:15 - 11:30	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Networks*	Session B: *Noncooperative Games*	Session C: *Industrial Organization*	Session D: *Noncooperative Games*
11:30 - 12:00	**Joan De Marti** (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Network Games with Incomplete Information	**Rene Saran** (Maastricht University) Strategic Party Formation on a Circle	**Eray Cumbul** (University of Rochester) An Algorithmic Approach to Find Iterated Nash Equilibria in Extended Cournot and Bertrand Games with Potential Entrants	**Maria Montero** (University of Nottingham) The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis
12:00 - 12:30	**Guillermo Owen** (Naval Postgraduate School) A game-theoretic approach to network configurations	**Noah Stein** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Exchangeable Equilibria	**Filippo Balestrieri** (Hewlett-Packard Laboratories) Informed seller in a Hotelling market	**Maxim Nikitin** (Higher School of Economics) Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Liability and Litigation under Self-Serving Bias

12:30 **-** **14:00**	*Lunch Break*			
14:00 **-** **14:45**	**Ariel Rubinstein** (Tel Aviv University and New York University) Colonel Blotto's Top secret Files: Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action			
14:45 **-** **15:15**	*Coffee Break*			
	Session A: *Knowledge*	Session B: *Political Economy*	Session C: *Learning/Evolution*	Session D: *Dynamic Games*
15:15 **-** **15:45**	**Antonio Jimenez** (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas) Strategic Interactions in Information Decisions with a Finite Set of Players	**Steven Brams** (New York University) Narrowing the Field in Elections: The Next-Two Rule	**Bryan Bruns** (Independent Scholar) Visualizing the Topology of 2x2 Games: From Prisoner's Dilemma to Win-win	**James Alaric Best** (University of Edinburgh) How Many Chiefs? The Role of Leadership in Social Dilemmas
15:45 **-** **16:15**	**Rohit Parikh** (City University of New York) The Power of Knowledge in Games	**SunTak Kim** (University of Pittsburgh) Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting Mechanisms: An Experimental Study	**Erik Mohlin** (University College London) Evolution of Theories of Mind	**Yuhta Ishii** (Harvard University) The Effect of Correlated Inertia on Coordination
16:15 **-** **16:30**	*Coffee Break*			
16:30 **-** **17:15**	**Stephen Morris** (Princeton University) Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information			