Social Learning Workshop

Organized by Peyton Young

July 21 to July 23, 1996

Stony Brook, New York



  Social Learning and Equilibrium Selection
Chair: Peyton Young

9:00-10:15 P. Young: Learning, Rationality, and Game Dynamics

10:30-11:45 L. Samuelson: Learning to do Backward and Forward Induction

  Models of Learning I
Chair: Ehud Kalai

1:00-1:40 F. Vega-Redondo: Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation

1:40-2:20 T. Borgers: Naive Reinforcement Learning with Endogenous Aspirations

2:20-3:00 K. Schlag: On the Evolution of Imitative Behavior

3:20-4:00 A.J. Robson: Adaptive Behavior, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Aggregate Uncertainty

4:00-4:40 S. Hart (joint with A. Mas-Colell): Correlated Learning

4:40-5:20 D. Foster (joint with P. Young): Learning with Hazy Beliefs


  Models of Learning II
Chair: George Mailath

8:30-9:45 E. Kalai: Rational Interactive Learning

10:00-11:15 D. Fudenberg: Word-of-Mouth Learning

11:15-11:55 D. Bergemann: Market Experimentation and Pricing

11:55-12:35 R. Burguet: Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition

  Experiments and Applications
Chair: Larry Blume

1:40-2:20 A. Blume: Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games: An Experiment

2:20-3:00 D.J. Cooper: Reinforcement-Based Learning vs. Bayesian Learning: A Comparison

3:20-4:00 P.M. Johnson: Money as a Social Convention: A Dynamic Bilateral Trade Game with a Single Intermediating Commodity

4:00-4:40 M. Agastya: Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations

4:40-5:20 J.E. Harrington: Social Learning and Rigid Behavior


  Local Interactions I
Chair: Larry Samuelson

8:30-9:45 L. Blume: Local Interactions

10:00-11:15 G. Mailath: Endogenous Relationships

11:15-12:00 E. Glaser: Crime and Social Interaction

  Local Interactions II
Chair: Peyton Young

1:00-1:40 R. Axtell: Growing Artificial Societies

1:40-2:20 M. Chwe: Structure and Strategy in Collective Action: Communication and Coordination in Social Networks

2:20-3:00 S. Morris: Strategic Behavior with General Local Interaction