Tutorial and Workshop:
Knowledge and Game Theory

Organized by Dov Samet



July 20 to July 24, 1992

Stony Brook, New York

PROGRAM



 

Tutorial: R. Aumann and D. Samet

  MONDAY, JULY 20

9:00-12:00 The Partition Model of Knowledge

2:00-5:00 Knowledge and Probability


  TUESDAY, JULY 21

9:00-12:00 Game Equilibrium and Knowledge

2:00-5:00 The Syntactic Approach to Interactive Knowledge


  WEDNESDAY, JULY 22

9:00-12:00 Where Do We Go From Here?


 

Workshop

2:00-3:00 R. Nau: The Relativity of Subjective and Objective Correlated Equilibria

3:30-4:30 J. Rosenmüller: NTU-Games with Incomplete Information


  THURSDAY, JULY 23

9:30-10:30 I. Gilboa: Why the Empty Shells Were not Fired

11:00-12:00 D. Samet: A Syntactic Model of Interactive Beliefs

2:00-3:00 C. Bicchieri: Etude for: Can Free Choice be Known

3:30-4:30 M. Kaneko: Mere and the Specific Knowledge of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium


  FRIDAY, JULY 24

11:00-12:00 S. Ambroszkiewicz: Mutual Knowledge and Game Knowledge