Workshop on Interactive Dynamics and LearningOrganized by Ehud KalaiJuly 13 to July 17, 1998Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
|
MONDAY, JULY 13
| |
| 10:00-12:50 | E. Kalai:
Concepts in Rational Learning
|
| 2:15-3:15 | J. Nachbar:
Rational Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games
|
| 3:30-4:15 | Y. Nyarko:
Equilibrium, Beliefs, and Rational Learning
|
| 4:45-5:30 | A. Sandroni:
Reciprocity and Cooperation
|
| 5:30-6:30 | R. Smorodinsky:
Dynamic Foundation of Equilibrium
|
|
TUESDAY, JULY 14
| |
| 10:00-12:50 | P. Young:
Microstrategy and Macrostructure: Learning and
Evolution in Games
|
| 2:15-3:15 | R. Vohra:
Calibration, Correlated Equilibrium and Utility
Maximization
|
| 3:30-4:15 | D. Okada:
Entropy Bounds and the Speed of Learning
|
| 4:45-5:30 | H.J. Jacobsen, M. Jensen (speaker), and B. Sloth:
Evolutionary Learning in Signaling Games
|
| 5:30-6:30 | R. Sarin:
Decision Rules with Bounded Memory
|
|
WEDNESDAY, JULY 15
| |
| 10:00-12:50 | S. Hart:
Adaptive Procedures
|
| 2:15-3:15 | A. Sela (speaker) and D. Herreiner:
Fictitious Play in Coordination Games
|
| 3:30-4:15 | J. Bendor, D. Mookherjee (speaker), and D. Ray:
Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Games
|
| 4:45-5:30 | R.E. Goodhue, G.C. Rausser, and Leo Simon (speaker):
Bayesian Market Learning
|
| 5:30-6:30 | E. Hopkins:
Modeling How People Play Games
|
|
THURSDAY, JULY 16
| |
| 10:00-11:15 | M. Jackson (speaker), E. Kalai, and R. Smorodinsky:
Endogenous Representation of Priors in Bayesian
Learning
|
| 11:35-12:50 | D. Fudenberg and G. Ellison (speaker):
Learning Purified Equilibria
|
| 2:15-2:45 | X. Tieman (speaker), H. Houba, and G. van der Laan:
Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local
Interaction Model
|
| 2:45-3:30 | S. Huck, H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (speaker):
Learning in Cournot Oligopoly -- An Experiment
|
| 3:45-4:15 | D. Herreiner:
The Structure of Interaction, Innovation, and
Learning
|
| 4:45-5:15 | U. Unver:
Evolution of Coordination and Strategic Behavior
for Early Interactions in Two-Sided Matching
Markets
|
| 5:30-6:00 | A. Greenwald (speaker), B. Mishra, and R. Parikh:
The Santa Fe Bar Problem Revisited
|
|
FRIDAY, JULY 17
| |
| 10:00-10:45 | P. Johnson, D. Levine, and W. Pesendorfer:
Evolution and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma
Game
|
| 11:00-11:45 | M. Chwe:
Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
|
| 12:00-12:45 | P. Jehiel and M. Yanelle (speaker):
When Being First is Being Late
|
| 2:15-2:45 | T. Sharma:
Robustness of Contracts: Inferring Strategies from
Past Play
|
| 2:45-3:30 | P.S. Hansen and O. Kaarboe (speaker):
On Equilibrium Selection Mechanisms in
Coordination Games with Simultaneous Play
|
| 3:45-4:15 | B. Taub (speaker) and H. Chade:
Segmented Risk Sharing in a Continuous-Time
Setting
|
| 4:30-5:00 | H.-C. Chen (speaker) and Y. Chow:
Long-Run Equilibrium in the Evolution with
Time-Varying Mutations
|
| 5:15-5:45 | W. Schnedler:
Trait-Dependent Imitation of Successful Agents
|