Workshop on Interactive Dynamics and Learning

Organized by Ehud Kalai

July 13 to July 17, 1998

Stony Brook, New York



10:00-12:50 E. Kalai: Concepts in Rational Learning

2:15-3:15 J. Nachbar: Rational Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games

3:30-4:15 Y. Nyarko: Equilibrium, Beliefs, and Rational Learning

4:45-5:30 A. Sandroni: Reciprocity and Cooperation

5:30-6:30 R. Smorodinsky: Dynamic Foundation of Equilibrium


10:00-12:50 P. Young: Microstrategy and Macrostructure: Learning and Evolution in Games

2:15-3:15 R. Vohra: Calibration, Correlated Equilibrium and Utility Maximization

3:30-4:15 D. Okada: Entropy Bounds and the Speed of Learning

4:45-5:30 H.J. Jacobsen, M. Jensen (speaker), and B. Sloth: Evolutionary Learning in Signaling Games

5:30-6:30 R. Sarin: Decision Rules with Bounded Memory


10:00-12:50 S. Hart: Adaptive Procedures

2:15-3:15 A. Sela (speaker) and D. Herreiner: Fictitious Play in Coordination Games

3:30-4:15 J. Bendor, D. Mookherjee (speaker), and D. Ray: Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Games

4:45-5:30 R.E. Goodhue, G.C. Rausser, and Leo Simon (speaker): Bayesian Market Learning

5:30-6:30 E. Hopkins: Modeling How People Play Games


10:00-11:15 M. Jackson (speaker), E. Kalai, and R. Smorodinsky: Endogenous Representation of Priors in Bayesian Learning

11:35-12:50 D. Fudenberg and G. Ellison (speaker): Learning Purified Equilibria

2:15-2:45 X. Tieman (speaker), H. Houba, and G. van der Laan: Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model

2:45-3:30 S. Huck, H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (speaker): Learning in Cournot Oligopoly -- An Experiment

3:45-4:15 D. Herreiner: The Structure of Interaction, Innovation, and Learning

4:45-5:15 U. Unver: Evolution of Coordination and Strategic Behavior for Early Interactions in Two-Sided Matching Markets

5:30-6:00 A. Greenwald (speaker), B. Mishra, and R. Parikh: The Santa Fe Bar Problem Revisited


10:00-10:45 P. Johnson, D. Levine, and W. Pesendorfer: Evolution and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Game

11:00-11:45 M. Chwe: Communication and Coordination in Social Networks

12:00-12:45 P. Jehiel and M. Yanelle (speaker): When Being First is Being Late

2:15-2:45 T. Sharma: Robustness of Contracts: Inferring Strategies from Past Play

2:45-3:30 P.S. Hansen and O. Kaarboe (speaker): On Equilibrium Selection Mechanisms in Coordination Games with Simultaneous Play

3:45-4:15 B. Taub (speaker) and H. Chade: Segmented Risk Sharing in a Continuous-Time Setting

4:30-5:00 H.-C. Chen (speaker) and Y. Chow: Long-Run Equilibrium in the Evolution with Time-Varying Mutations

5:15-5:45 W. Schnedler: Trait-Dependent Imitation of Successful Agents