Organized by Vijay Krishna

July 19 to July 23, 1999

Stony Brook, New York



Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Abraham Neyman
9:00-10:00 N. Vieille: Stochastic Games with Two Players

  1.A: Games and Equilibrium
Chair: Marco Mariotti
10:30-10:55 G. MacDonald, L. Marx, and M. D. Ryall:
Games as Abstractions of Reality
10:30-10:55 A. Brandenburger and H. J. Keisler:
An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games
11:30-11:55 J. Hillas:
On the Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

  1.B: Stochastic Games I
Chair: Rajiv Vohra
10:30-10:55 D. Rosenberg and S. Sorin:
An Operator Approach to Zero-Sum Repeated Games
11:00-11:25 D. Rosenberg:
Zero-Sum Absorbing Games With Incomplete Information on One Side: Asymptotic Analysis

  1.C: Auctions I
Chair: Eugene Friedman
10:30-10:55 M. Agastya and A. Daripa:
Joint Bidding Can Enhance the Seller's Revenue
11:00-11:25 T. Kaplan and S. Zamir:
The Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private Value Auctions
11:30-11:55 A. Hernando:
The Privilege of the Uninformed in Uniform Price Auctions

  1.D: Evolution I
Chair: John Nachbar
10:30-10:55 A. Robson:
The Evolution of Intelligence and the Red Queen
11:00-11:25 W. Sandholm:
The Evolution of Preferences and Rapid Social Change
11:30-11:55 P. Curry:
Decision Making Under Uncertainty and the Evolution of a Concern for Status

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Sylvain Sorin
2:00-3:00 E. Solan: Stochastic Games with More Than Two Players

  2.A: Experiments
Chair: Adam Brandenburger
3:30-3:55 Y. Nyarko and A. Schotter:
An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs
4:00-4:25 A. Riedl and J. Vyrastekova:
Social Comparison in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game
4:30-5:00 D. Herreiner:
Market Organization and Coordination: An Experimental Investigation

  2.B: Stochastic Games II
Chair: Eilon Solan
3:30-3:55 T. Parthasarathy and D. S. Raman:
A Generalization of Nash Equilibrium Theorem on Two-Person Stochastic Games
4:00-4:25 E. Altman, E. Feinberg, J. Filar and V. Gaitsgory:
Perturbed Zero-Sum Games With Applications to Stochastic and Repeated Games
4:30-5:00 R. Vohra:

  2.C: Bargaining I
Chair: Gus Stuart
3:30-3:55 P. Manzini and M. Mariotti:
Joint Outside Options
4:00-4:25 O. Kibris:
Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies

  2.D: Political Science
Chair: Ben Lockwood
3:30-3:55 A. Westermark:
Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity
4:00-4:25 K.-S. Chung:
Affirmative Action as an Implementation Problem
4:30-5:00 J. Dearden and D. Klotz:
Committee Decisions and Contracting II: The Incentives of Money, Minimum Requirements, and Voting Proxies


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Roger Myerson
9:00-10:00 G. Pollock: Subgame Imperfect Ants

  3.A: Learning in Games
Chair: James Jordan
10:30-10:55 J. Nachbar:
Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games
11:00-11:25 A. Sandroni, R. Smorodinsky, and R. Vohra:
Calibration with Many Checking Rules
11:30-11:55 N. Turdaliev:
Calibration and Bayesian Learning

  3.B: Political Science II
Chair: Joseph Harrington
10:30-10:55 S. Barberà and A. Perea:
Supporting Others and the Evolution of Power
11:00-11:25 A. Dhillon and B. Lockwood:
When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable?
11:30-11:55 M. Gallego and C. Pitchik:
An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover

  3.C: Cooperative Game Theory I
Chair: Pino Lopomo
10:30-10:55 M. Baucells and L. Shapley:
An Invariant Measure of Incomplete Group Preference
11:00-11:25 T. Solymosi:
On the Bargaining Set, Kernel and Core of Superadditive Games
11:30-11:55 W. Zwicker and N. Burani:
Vector Decompositions of Additively Separable Preferences

  3.D: Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Chair: Shmuel Zamir
10:30-10:55 R. Laraki
Repeated Games With Lack of Information on One Side: The Dual Differential Approach
11:00-11:25 X. Spinat:
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability
11:30-11:55 J. Chan:
On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects of Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Michihiro Kandori
2:00-3:00 S. Hart: Evolutionary Dynamics and Backwards Induction

  4.A: Auctions II
Chair: Leslie Marx
3:30-3:55 M. Perry and P. Reny:
Efficient Auctions With Interdependent Values
4:00-4:25 S. Brusco and P. Lopomo:
Collusion via Signaling in Open Ascending Auctions With Multiple Objects and Complementarities
4:30-5:00 M. Sotomayor:
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Non-identical Objects With Single-Unit Demands

  4.B: Repeated Games I
Chair: Olivier Gossner
3:30-3:55 V. Bhaskar:
The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring
4:00-4:25 T. Sekiguchi:
Collusion in a Secret Price Cutting Model
4:30-5:00 M. Kandori:
Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization

  4.C: Strategic Form Games I
Chair: John Hillas
3:30-3:55 M. Mariotti:
Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability and Coordination
4:00-4:25 J. McNamara, J. Webb, E. Collins, T. Szekely and A. Houston:
A General Technique for Computing ESS

  4.D: Evolution II
Chair: Arthur Robson
3:30-3:55 X. Tieman and O. Kaarboe:
Evolutionary Selection With Different Modes of Learning in Supermodular Games
4:00-4:25 D. Heller:
An Evolutionary Analysis of the Returns to Learning in a Changing Environment
4:30-5:00 A. Matros:
Clever Agents in Stochastic Coordination 2x2 Games


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Yair Tauman
9:00-10:00 B. Allen: An Introduction to Game Theory and Engineering

  5.A: Complexity
Chair: Rajiv Sarin
10:30-10:55 P. Hernández and A. Urbano:
Cryptographic Automata and Efficient Outcomes
11:00-11:25 M. Johnson:
The Structure and Complexity of Strategy Implementing and Choice Learning Automata
11:30-11:55 N. Al-Najjar, R. Casadesus-Masanell, and E. Ozdenoren:
Subjective Representation of Complexity

  5.B: Industrial Organization
Chair: Rabah Amir
10:30-10:55 M.-H. Chang and J. Harrington:
Decentralized Business Strategies in a Multi-Unit Firm
11:00-11:25 T. Kaplan, I. Luski, and D. Wettstein:
Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost
11:30-11:55 J.-L. Hu, Y.-H. Chiu, and R. Aoki:
The Choice Between Patent and Trade Secret with Product Life Considered

  5.C: Coalition Formation
Chair: Anne van den Nouweland
10:30-10:55 C.-Y. Huang and T. Sjostrom:
The p-Core
11:00-11:25 E. Iñarra, J. Kuipers, and N. Olaizola:
Absorbing Sets in Coalition Formation Systems

  5.D: Non-Standard Preferences
Chair: Geir Asheim
10:30-10:55 J. Gyntelberg, L. Jebjerg, and B. Sloth
Explaining Incomplete Contracts by Ambiguity Aversion
11:00-11:25 C. Harris and D. Laibson:
Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers
11:30-11:55 D. Filipovich:
Choosing One's Identity

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Motty Perry
2:00-3:00 R. Myerson: Analysis of Voting in Large Poisson Games

  6.A: Cooperative Game Theory II
Chair: Hervé Moulin
3:30-3:55 J. Zhao:
Dual Bargaining, Cost Sharing and the Talmud Bankruptcy Problem
4:00-4:25 T. Hokari:
Consistency Implies Equal Treatment

  6.B: Extensive Form Games I
Chair: Karl Schlag
3:30-3:55 F. Squintani:
Games with Infinitesimal Forgetfulness
4:00-4:25 S. Muto and A. Suzuki:
Far Sighted Stability in the n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
4:30-5:00 S. Huck and R. Sarin:
Games with Infinitesimal Forgetfulness

  6.C: Bargaining II
Chair: Paola Manzini
3:30-3:55 H. Eraslan and A. Merlo:
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
4:00-4:25 S.-C. Suh and Q. Wen:
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining
4:30-4:55 H. Houba, K. Sneek, and F. Várdy:
Can Negotiations Prevent Fish Wars?

  6.D: Game Theory and Engineering
Chair: Beth Allen
3:30-3:55 A. Thornton:
Variation Risk Management in the Extended Enterprise
4:00-4:25 M. Marston:
Strategic Engineering Design: A Game Theoretic Approach
4:30-5:00 B. Allen:
Strategic Quality Choice and Product Failure


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Pradeep Dubey
9:00-10:00 H. Moulin: On the Random Assignment of Indivisible Objects

  7.A: Dynamics
Chair: Birgitte Sloth
10:30-10:55 R. Cressman and K. Schlag:
Extensive-Form Game Dynamics When Learning From Play
11:00-11:25 H. Haller and A. Outkin:
Best Response Dynamics and Neural Networks
11:30-11:55 A. Barriuso and J. Uriarte:
Perception Dynamics

  7.B: Cooperative Game Theory III
Chair: Ezra Einy
10:30-10:55 R. McLean and T. Ye:
Semivalues of Games with Coalition Structures
11:00-11:25 I. Dragan:
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
11:30-11:55 J. Arin and V. Feltkamp:
About the Non-comparability of the Egalitarianism of the Prenucleolus and the Shapley Value. The Weighted Coalition-Lorenz Solutions

  7.C: Fair Division
Chair: Ahmet Alkan
10:30-10:55 S. Brams and M. Kilgour::
Competitive Fair Division
11:00-11:25 F. Su:
Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
11:30-11:55 Y. Chun:
The Separability Principle in Economies With Single-Peaked Preferences

  7.D: Repeated Games II
Chair: Q. Wen
10:30-10:55 S. Athey and K. Bagwell
Collusion With Private Information
11:00-11:25 T. Doganoglu:
Dynamic Price Competition With Persistent Consumer Tastes
11:30-11:55 E. Bond and J.-H. Park:
Gradualism in Trade Agreements With Asymmetric Countries

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: John Nash, Jr.
2:00-3:00 A. McLennan: On the Number of Equilibria of a Game

  8.A: Information I
Chair: Susan Athey
3:30-3:55 R. Serrano and R. Vohra:
On the Impossibility of Implementation Under Incomplete Information
4:00-4:25 M. Ottaviani and P. Sørensen:
A Model of Professional Advice
4:30-4:55 M. Janssen and E. Maasland:
Information Acquisition in the Stackelberg Model

  8.B: Strategic Form Games II
Chair: Shigeo Muto
3:30-3:55 Y. Rinot and M. Scarsini:
On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games
4:00-4:25 P. Herings and R. Peeters:
A Differentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games
4:30-5:00 O. Gossner and N. Vieille:
How to Play with a Biased Coin?

  8.C: Cooperative Game Theory IV
Chair: Hans Haller
3:30-3:55 J. Jordan:
Pillage and Property
4:00-4:25 X. Luo:
Stability and Rationality
4:30-4:55 M. Montero:
Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel

  8.D: Value Allocations
Chair: Richard McLean
3:30-3:55 E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz:
Fine Value Allocations in Large Exchange Economies with Differential Information
4:00-4:25 O. Haimanko:
Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Finite-Type Economies
4:30-5:00 E. Eguiazarova:
The Shapley Value in a Game of Information Trading


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Sergiu Hart
9:00-10:00 J. Nash, Jr.: A Bargaining Type Game with Three Players

  9.A: Networks
Chair: Marco Ottaviani
10:30-10:55 A. van den Nouweland and M. Slikker:
Network Formation With Costs for Establishing Links
11:00-11:25 V. Bala and S. Goyal:
A Strategic Analysis of Network Reliability
11:30-11:55 M. Jackson and A. Watts:
The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

  9.B: Strategic Form Games III
Chair: James Bergin
10:30-10:55 J.-P. Beaud:
Antagonistic Games
11:00-11:25 R. Amir:
Ordinal Versus Cardinal Complementarity: The Case of Cournot Oligopoly
11:30-11:55 M. Frank:
Two-Tiered Games

  9.C: Bargaining III
Chair: Tomas Sjostrom
10:30-10:55 A. Calvó Armengol:
On Bargaining Partner Selection When Communication is Restricted
11:00-11:25 V. Calabuig, A. Cunyat and G. Olcina:
Concessions and Choice of Partners in a Bargaining Game
11:30-11:55 A. Banerji:
Sequencing Strategically: Wage Negotiations Under Oligopoly

  9.D: Matching Problems
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
10:30-10:55 A. Alkan
On Preferences Over Subsets and the Lattice Structure of Stable Matchings
11:00-11:25 S. Lee:
Assortative Matching and Endogenous Stratification
11:30-11:55 F. Klijn:
An Algorithm for Envy-Free Allocations in an Economy with Indivisible Objects and Money

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
Chair: Chris Harris
2:00-3:00 R. Aumann: Game Theory in the Real World

  10.A: Repeated Games III
Chair: Vankataraman Bhaskar
3:30-3:55 P. Dutta:
Common Interest Games
4:00-4:25 J. Renault and T. Tomala:
Communication Equilibria in Supergames
4:30-4:55 T. O'Connell and R. Stearns:
On Finite Strategy Sets for Finitely Repeated Zero-sum Games: Lower Bounds and Discounting

  10.B: Power Indices
Chair: Benyamin Shitovitz
3:30-3:55 A. Khmelnitskaya:
Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom
4:00-4:25 T. Quint:
Measures of Powerlessness in Simple Games
4:30-5:00 B. Feldman:
The Proportional Value of a Cooperative Game

  10.C: Knowledge and Beliefs
Chair: Mark Johnson
3:30-3:55 G. Asheim:
Common Knowledge of Proper Consistency
4:00-4:25 J. Bergin:
Common Knowledge With Monotone Statistics
4:30-4:55 H. Hu and H. Stuart:
An Epistemic Analysis of the Harsanyi Transformation

  10.D: Information II
Chair: Venkatesh Bala
3:30-3:55 B. Moldovanu and A. Sela:
Allocations of Prices in All-Pay Contests
4:00-4:25 O. Volij:
Utility Equivalence in Sealed-Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
4:30-5:00 R. Orzach:
Tacit Coordination in a Multisender Signalling Game