INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYOrganized by Vijay KrishnaJuly 19 to July 23, 1999Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
MONDAY, JULY 19
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
9:00-10:00 | N. Vieille:
Stochastic Games with Two Players
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1.A: Games and Equilibrium Chair: Marco Mariotti | |
10:30-10:55 | G. MacDonald, L. Marx, and M. D. Ryall:
Games as Abstractions of Reality |
10:30-10:55 | A. Brandenburger and H. J. Keisler:
An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games |
11:30-11:55 | J. Hillas:
On the Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium |
1.B: Stochastic Games I Chair: Rajiv Vohra | |
10:30-10:55 | D. Rosenberg and S. Sorin:
An Operator Approach to Zero-Sum Repeated Games |
11:00-11:25 | D. Rosenberg:
Zero-Sum Absorbing Games With Incomplete Information on One Side: Asymptotic Analysis |
1.C: Auctions I Chair: Eugene Friedman | |
10:30-10:55 | M. Agastya and A. Daripa:
Joint Bidding Can Enhance the Seller's Revenue |
11:00-11:25 | T. Kaplan and S. Zamir:
The Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private Value Auctions |
11:30-11:55 | A. Hernando:
The Privilege of the Uninformed in Uniform Price Auctions |
1.D: Evolution I Chair: John Nachbar | |
10:30-10:55 | A. Robson:
The Evolution of Intelligence and the Red Queen |
11:00-11:25 | W. Sandholm:
The Evolution of Preferences and Rapid Social Change |
11:30-11:55 | P. Curry:
Decision Making Under Uncertainty and the Evolution of a Concern for Status |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Sylvain Sorin | |
2:00-3:00 | E. Solan:
Stochastic Games with More Than Two Players
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2.A: Experiments Chair: Adam Brandenburger | |
3:30-3:55 | Y. Nyarko and A. Schotter:
An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Real Beliefs |
4:00-4:25 | A. Riedl and J. Vyrastekova:
Social Comparison in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game |
4:30-5:00 | D. Herreiner:
Market Organization and Coordination: An Experimental Investigation |
2.B: Stochastic Games II Chair: Eilon Solan | |
3:30-3:55 | T. Parthasarathy and D. S. Raman:
A Generalization of Nash Equilibrium Theorem on Two-Person Stochastic Games |
4:00-4:25 | E. Altman, E. Feinberg, J. Filar and V. Gaitsgory:
Perturbed Zero-Sum Games With Applications to Stochastic and Repeated Games |
4:30-5:00 | R. Vohra:
TBA |
2.C: Bargaining I Chair: Gus Stuart | |
3:30-3:55 | P. Manzini and M. Mariotti:
Joint Outside Options |
4:00-4:25 | O. Kibris:
Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies |
2.D: Political Science Chair: Ben Lockwood | |
3:30-3:55 | A. Westermark:
Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity |
4:00-4:25 | K.-S. Chung:
Affirmative Action as an Implementation Problem |
4:30-5:00 | J. Dearden and D. Klotz:
Committee Decisions and Contracting II: The Incentives of Money, Minimum Requirements, and Voting Proxies |
TUESDAY, JULY 20
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Roger Myerson | |
9:00-10:00 | G. Pollock:
Subgame Imperfect Ants
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3.A: Learning in Games Chair: James Jordan | |
10:30-10:55 | J. Nachbar:
Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games |
11:00-11:25 | A. Sandroni, R. Smorodinsky, and R. Vohra:
Calibration with Many Checking Rules |
11:30-11:55 | N. Turdaliev:
Calibration and Bayesian Learning |
3.B: Political Science II Chair: Joseph Harrington | |
10:30-10:55 | S. Barberà and A. Perea:
Supporting Others and the Evolution of Power |
11:00-11:25 | A. Dhillon and B. Lockwood:
When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable? |
11:30-11:55 | M. Gallego and C. Pitchik:
An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover |
3.C: Cooperative Game Theory I Chair: Pino Lopomo | |
10:30-10:55 | M. Baucells and L. Shapley:
An Invariant Measure of Incomplete Group Preference |
11:00-11:25 | T. Solymosi:
On the Bargaining Set, Kernel and Core of Superadditive Games |
11:30-11:55 | W. Zwicker and N. Burani:
Vector Decompositions of Additively Separable Preferences |
3.D: Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Chair: Shmuel Zamir | |
10:30-10:55 | R. Laraki
Repeated Games With Lack of Information on One Side: The Dual Differential Approach |
11:00-11:25 | X. Spinat:
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Approachability |
11:30-11:55 | J. Chan:
On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects of Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Michihiro Kandori | |
2:00-3:00 | S. Hart:
Evolutionary Dynamics and Backwards Induction
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4.A: Auctions II Chair: Leslie Marx | |
3:30-3:55 | M. Perry and P. Reny:
Efficient Auctions With Interdependent Values |
4:00-4:25 | S. Brusco and P. Lopomo:
Collusion via Signaling in Open Ascending Auctions With Multiple Objects and Complementarities |
4:30-5:00 | M. Sotomayor:
Efficient Sealed-Bid Auctions for Non-identical Objects With Single-Unit Demands |
4.B: Repeated Games I Chair: Olivier Gossner | |
3:30-3:55 | V. Bhaskar:
The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring |
4:00-4:25 | T. Sekiguchi:
Collusion in a Secret Price Cutting Model |
4:30-5:00 | M. Kandori:
Check Your Partners' Behavior by Randomization |
4.C: Strategic Form Games I Chair: John Hillas | |
3:30-3:55 | M. Mariotti:
Maximum Games, Dominance Solvability and Coordination |
4:00-4:25 | J. McNamara, J. Webb, E. Collins, T. Szekely and A. Houston:
A General Technique for Computing ESS |
4.D: Evolution II Chair: Arthur Robson | |
3:30-3:55 | X. Tieman and O. Kaarboe:
Evolutionary Selection With Different Modes of Learning in Supermodular Games |
4:00-4:25 | D. Heller:
An Evolutionary Analysis of the Returns to Learning in a Changing Environment |
4:30-5:00 | A. Matros:
Clever Agents in Stochastic Coordination 2x2 Games |
WEDNESDAY, JULY 21
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Yair Tauman | |
9:00-10:00 | B. Allen:
An Introduction to Game Theory and Engineering
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5.A: Complexity Chair: Rajiv Sarin | |
10:30-10:55 | P. Hernández and A. Urbano:
Cryptographic Automata and Efficient Outcomes |
11:00-11:25 | M. Johnson:
The Structure and Complexity of Strategy Implementing and Choice Learning Automata |
11:30-11:55 | N. Al-Najjar, R. Casadesus-Masanell, and E. Ozdenoren:
Subjective Representation of Complexity |
5.B: Industrial Organization Chair: Rabah Amir | |
10:30-10:55 | M.-H. Chang and J. Harrington:
Decentralized Business Strategies in a Multi-Unit Firm |
11:00-11:25 | T. Kaplan, I. Luski, and D. Wettstein:
Innovative Activity and Sunk Cost |
11:30-11:55 | J.-L. Hu, Y.-H. Chiu, and R. Aoki:
The Choice Between Patent and Trade Secret with Product Life Considered |
5.C: Coalition Formation Chair: Anne van den Nouweland | |
10:30-10:55 | C.-Y. Huang and T. Sjostrom:
The p-Core |
11:00-11:25 | E. Iñarra, J. Kuipers, and N. Olaizola:
Absorbing Sets in Coalition Formation Systems |
5.D: Non-Standard Preferences Chair: Geir Asheim | |
10:30-10:55 | J. Gyntelberg, L. Jebjerg, and B. Sloth
Explaining Incomplete Contracts by Ambiguity Aversion |
11:00-11:25 | C. Harris and D. Laibson:
Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers |
11:30-11:55 | D. Filipovich:
Choosing One's Identity |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Motty Perry | |
2:00-3:00 | R. Myerson:
Analysis of Voting in Large Poisson Games
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6.A: Cooperative Game Theory II Chair: Hervé Moulin | |
3:30-3:55 | J. Zhao:
Dual Bargaining, Cost Sharing and the Talmud Bankruptcy Problem |
4:00-4:25 | T. Hokari:
Consistency Implies Equal Treatment |
6.B: Extensive Form Games I Chair: Karl Schlag | |
3:30-3:55 | F. Squintani:
Games with Infinitesimal Forgetfulness |
4:00-4:25 | S. Muto and A. Suzuki:
Far Sighted Stability in the n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma |
4:30-5:00 | S. Huck and R. Sarin:
Games with Infinitesimal Forgetfulness |
6.C: Bargaining II Chair: Paola Manzini | |
3:30-3:55 | H. Eraslan and A. Merlo:
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining |
4:00-4:25 | S.-C. Suh and Q. Wen:
Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining |
4:30-4:55 | H. Houba, K. Sneek, and F. Várdy:
Can Negotiations Prevent Fish Wars? |
6.D: Game Theory and Engineering Chair: Beth Allen | |
3:30-3:55 | A. Thornton:
Variation Risk Management in the Extended Enterprise |
4:00-4:25 | M. Marston:
Strategic Engineering Design: A Game Theoretic Approach |
4:30-5:00 | B. Allen:
Strategic Quality Choice and Product Failure |
THURSDAY, JULY 22
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Pradeep Dubey | |
9:00-10:00 | H. Moulin:
On the Random Assignment of Indivisible Objects
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7.A: Dynamics Chair: Birgitte Sloth | |
10:30-10:55 | R. Cressman and K. Schlag:
Extensive-Form Game Dynamics When Learning From Play |
11:00-11:25 | H. Haller and A. Outkin:
Best Response Dynamics and Neural Networks |
11:30-11:55 | A. Barriuso and J. Uriarte:
Perception Dynamics |
7.B: Cooperative Game Theory III Chair: Ezra Einy | |
10:30-10:55 | R. McLean and T. Ye:
Semivalues of Games with Coalition Structures |
11:00-11:25 | I. Dragan:
On the Semivalues and the Power Core of Cooperative TU Games |
11:30-11:55 | J. Arin and V. Feltkamp:
About the Non-comparability of the Egalitarianism of the Prenucleolus and the Shapley Value. The Weighted Coalition-Lorenz Solutions |
7.C: Fair Division Chair: Ahmet Alkan | |
10:30-10:55 | S. Brams and M. Kilgour::
Competitive Fair Division |
11:00-11:25 | F. Su:
Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division |
11:30-11:55 | Y. Chun:
The Separability Principle in Economies With Single-Peaked Preferences |
7.D: Repeated Games II Chair: Q. Wen | |
10:30-10:55 | S. Athey and K. Bagwell
Collusion With Private Information |
11:00-11:25 | T. Doganoglu:
Dynamic Price Competition With Persistent Consumer Tastes |
11:30-11:55 | E. Bond and J.-H. Park:
Gradualism in Trade Agreements With Asymmetric Countries |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: John Nash, Jr. | |
2:00-3:00 | A. McLennan:
On the Number of Equilibria of a Game
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8.A: Information I Chair: Susan Athey | |
3:30-3:55 | R. Serrano and R. Vohra:
On the Impossibility of Implementation Under Incomplete Information |
4:00-4:25 | M. Ottaviani and P. Sørensen:
A Model of Professional Advice |
4:30-4:55 | M. Janssen and E. Maasland:
Information Acquisition in the Stackelberg Model |
8.B: Strategic Form Games II Chair: Shigeo Muto | |
3:30-3:55 | Y. Rinot and M. Scarsini:
On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games |
4:00-4:25 | P. Herings and R. Peeters:
A Differentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games |
4:30-5:00 | O. Gossner and N. Vieille:
How to Play with a Biased Coin? |
8.C: Cooperative Game Theory IV Chair: Hans Haller | |
3:30-3:55 | J. Jordan:
Pillage and Property |
4:00-4:25 | X. Luo:
Stability and Rationality |
4:30-4:55 | M. Montero:
Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel |
8.D: Value Allocations Chair: Richard McLean | |
3:30-3:55 | E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz:
Fine Value Allocations in Large Exchange Economies with Differential Information |
4:00-4:25 | O. Haimanko:
Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Finite-Type Economies |
4:30-5:00 | E. Eguiazarova:
The Shapley Value in a Game of Information Trading |
FRIDAY, JULY 23
| |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Sergiu Hart | |
9:00-10:00 | J. Nash, Jr.:
A Bargaining Type Game with Three Players
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9.A: Networks Chair: Marco Ottaviani | |
10:30-10:55 | A. van den Nouweland and M. Slikker:
Network Formation With Costs for Establishing Links |
11:00-11:25 | V. Bala and S. Goyal:
A Strategic Analysis of Network Reliability |
11:30-11:55 | M. Jackson and A. Watts:
The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks |
9.B: Strategic Form Games III Chair: James Bergin | |
10:30-10:55 | J.-P. Beaud:
Antagonistic Games |
11:00-11:25 | R. Amir:
Ordinal Versus Cardinal Complementarity: The Case of Cournot Oligopoly |
11:30-11:55 | M. Frank:
Two-Tiered Games |
9.C: Bargaining III Chair: Tomas Sjostrom | |
10:30-10:55 | A. Calvó Armengol:
On Bargaining Partner Selection When Communication is Restricted |
11:00-11:25 | V. Calabuig, A. Cunyat and G. Olcina:
Concessions and Choice of Partners in a Bargaining Game |
11:30-11:55 | A. Banerji:
Sequencing Strategically: Wage Negotiations Under Oligopoly |
9.D: Matching Problems Chair: Marilda Sotomayor | |
10:30-10:55 | A. Alkan
On Preferences Over Subsets and the Lattice Structure of Stable Matchings |
11:00-11:25 | S. Lee:
Assortative Matching and Endogenous Stratification |
11:30-11:55 | F. Klijn:
An Algorithm for Envy-Free Allocations in an Economy with Indivisible Objects and Money |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 Chair: Chris Harris | |
2:00-3:00 | R. Aumann:
Game Theory in the Real World
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10.A: Repeated Games III Chair: Vankataraman Bhaskar | |
3:30-3:55 | P. Dutta:
Common Interest Games |
4:00-4:25 | J. Renault and T. Tomala:
Communication Equilibria in Supergames |
4:30-4:55 | T. O'Connell and R. Stearns:
On Finite Strategy Sets for Finitely Repeated Zero-sum Games: Lower Bounds and Discounting |
10.B: Power Indices Chair: Benyamin Shitovitz | |
3:30-3:55 | A. Khmelnitskaya:
Power Indices Without the Transfer Axiom |
4:00-4:25 | T. Quint:
Measures of Powerlessness in Simple Games |
4:30-5:00 | B. Feldman:
The Proportional Value of a Cooperative Game |
10.C: Knowledge and Beliefs Chair: Mark Johnson | |
3:30-3:55 | G. Asheim:
Common Knowledge of Proper Consistency |
4:00-4:25 | J. Bergin:
Common Knowledge With Monotone Statistics |
4:30-4:55 | H. Hu and H. Stuart:
An Epistemic Analysis of the Harsanyi Transformation |
10.D: Information II Chair: Venkatesh Bala | |
3:30-3:55 | B. Moldovanu and A. Sela:
Allocations of Prices in All-Pay Contests |
4:00-4:25 | O. Volij:
Utility Equivalence in Sealed-Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice under Risk |
4:30-5:00 | R. Orzach:
Tacit Coordination in a Multisender Signalling Game |