International Conference on Game Theory

Organized by William Thomson

July 20 to July 24, 1998

Stony Brook, New York



Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Lloyd S. Shapley
9:00-10:00 M.O. Jackson, E. Kalai, and R. Smorodinsky: Endogenous Representations of Priors in Bayesian Learning

Dynamic Games
Chair: Abraham Neyman
10:30-10:55 D. Bergmann and J. Valimaki: Learning and Efficient Matching
11:00-11:25 V. Bala and J. Greenberg: Sequential Bargaining with Elimination
11:30-11:55 P.K. Dutta and R. Radner: A Strategic Analysis of Global Warming

Interdependent Preferences
Chair: Motty Perry
10:30-10:55 L. Kockesen, E.A. Ok, and R. Sethi: On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences
11:00-11:25 G. Lopomo and E.A. Ok: Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division
11:30-11:55 M. Baucells and L.S. Shapley: A Theory of Multi-Person Utilities

TU Games
Chair: Youngsub Chun
10:30-10:55 T.S.H. Driessen, and T. Radzik: Consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell of Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values for TU-Games
11:00-11:25 L.A. Liu and S. Luo: On the Shapley and Banzhaf Values
11:30-11:55 M. Grabisch and M. Roubens: An Axiomatic Approach to the Concepts of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games

Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: William Thomson
2:00-3:00 L.S. Shapley: Multiperson Utilities

Stochastic Games
Chair: Prajit K. Dutta
3:30-3:55 T. Parthasarathy: Ordered Field Property and Linear Complementarity in Stochastic Games
4:00-4:25 J. Wooders and M. Walker: Minimax Play in Binary Markov Games
4:30-4:55 E. Maskin: Markov Perfect Equilibria II: Imperfect Observability

Economic Applications I
Chair: Efe A. Ok
3:30-3:55 D. Filipovich: Prices and Reputation
4:00-4:25 K. Krishna and T. Winston: A New Model of Quality
4:30-4:55 E.J. Friedman: Reputations, Impersistent Identities, and the Internet

Axiomatic Bargaining and Social Choice
Chair: Eiichi Miyagawa
3:30-3:55 R.P. McLean: Utopian Point Solution for Multi-Objective Choice Problems
4:00-4:25 Y. Chun: Egalitarian Solutions for Quasi-Linear Social Choice Problems


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Kala Krishna
9:00-10:00 P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin: Efficient Auctions

Repeated Games I
Chair: Jim Bergin
10:30-10:55 A. Neyman: N-Person Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automaton
11:00-11:25 P. Hernández and A. Urbano: Communication and Automata
11:30-11:55 M.R. Johnson: Choice Learning Automata

Selected Topics I
Chair: Beth Allen
10:30-10:55 K. C. Lo: Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs
11:00-11:25 T. Kamihigashi: Necessity of Transversality Conditions for Infinite Horizon Problems
11:30-11:55 W. Thomson: On the Axiomatic Method

TU Games II
Chair: Anne van den Nouweland
10:30-10:55 B. Feldman: The Powerpoint
11:00-11:25 A.B. Khmelnitskaya: Marginalist and Efficient Values for TU Games
11:30-11:55 M.J. Ryan: Frame Related Restrictions, Cores and Shapley Values

Learning and Evolution I
Chair: Ehud Kalai
2:00-2:25 A.F. Tieman, H. Houba and G. van der Laan: Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model
2:30-2:55 J. Oechssler and F. Riedel: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces
3:00-3:25 A. Neyman and D. Okada: Two-Person Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Equilibrium in Economies
Chair: David Wettstein
2:00-2:25 J. Ma: Competitive Equilibrium in a Production Economy
2:30-2:55 M. Perry and K. Krishna: Efficient Mechanism Design
3:00-3:25 B. Shitovitz: On the Notion of Von Neumann and Morgenstern Stability in Edgeworth Markets

Coalition Structure and Networks
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
2:00-2:25 A. Watts: A Dynamic Model of Network Formation
2:30-2:55 E. Calvo, J. Perez, and A. Urbano: A Noncooperative Approach to the Coalitional Structure Value
3:00-3:25 A.J. Potter and I. Dragan: A Generalization of the Potential Function of the Shapley Value for Games in Partition Function Form

Oligopoly and Evolution
Chair: Yair Tauman
4:00-4:25 A. Possajennikov: Optimality of Imitative Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets
4:30-4:55 J. Bergin: Survival of the Fittest as a Paradigm for Economic Dynamics
5:00-5:25 C. Ni: Simulating the Adaptive Behavior of Oligopolists: An Application of Genetic Algorithms

Topics on Strategic Games
Chair: Eric Maskin
4:00-4:25 A. Urbano and J.E. Vila: Unmediated Communication in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-Standard Information
4:30-4:55 E. Altman, E.A. Feinberg, and J. Filar: Perturbed Zero-Sum Games with Application to Dynamic Games
5:00-5:25 L. Kockesen: Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregate Games

Economic Mechanisms
Chair: Sang-Chul Suh
4:00-4:25 H. Konishi, R. Quint, and J. Wako: On the Shapley-Scarf Economy: The Case of Multiple Types of Indivisible Goods
4:30-4:55 E. Miyawaga: Mechanisms for Providing a Menu of Public Objects: Strategy-Proofness and Nash Implementation
5:00-5:25 A. van den Nouweland: Designing Mechanisms for Inducing Cooperative Behavior in Non-Cooperative Environments: Theory and Applications


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Karl Vind
9:00-10:00 Robert J. Aumann: If

Extensive Form Games
Chair: Stephen J. Willson
10:30-10:55 M. Dufwenberg and G. Kirchsteiger: A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity
11:00-11:25 X. Luo and C. Ma: Stable Equilibrium in Beliefs in Extensive Games with Perfect Information
11:30-11:55 G.B. Asheim: On the Epistemic Foundation of Backward Induction

Economies with Asymmetric Information
Chair: Rajiv Vohra
10:30-10:55 J. Yazar: Ex Ante Contracting with Endogenously Determined Communication Plans
11:00-11:25 R. Serrano and O. Volij: Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior
11:30-11:55 N. Yannelis: On Coalitionally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocations

Social Choice
Chair: Mark R. Johnson
10:30-10:55 J. Duggan: Stationary Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model of Social Choice
11:00-11:25 D.E. Campbell: Research Grant Awards by Committee: Manipulation When More Than One Alternative is Selected
11:30-11:55 C. Ponsati and J. Sákovics: Randomly Available Options in Bargaining

Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Steven J. Brams
2:00-3:00 K. Vind: Uncertainty on Products

Non-Cooperative Bargaining
Chair: John Duggan
3:30-3:55 S.J. Brams and D.M. Kilgour: Fallback Bargaining
4:00-4:25 A. Westermark: A Firm Bargaining with Many Workers
4:30-4:55 M. Montero: A Bargaining Game with Coalition Formation

Selected Topics II
Chair: Licun Xue
3:30-3:55 S.-F. Ueng: Minor Players' Freedom and Major Players' Global Efficiency
4:00-4:25 S.J. Willson: Axioms for the Outcomes of Negotiation in Matrix Games
4:30-4:55 Z. Wiener and E. Winter: Gradual Nash Bargaining

TU Games III
Chair: Nicholas Yannelis
3:30-3:55 E. Einy, D. Moreno, and B. Shitovitz: The Asymptotic Nucleolus of Large Monopolistic Market Games
4:00-4:25 O. Haimanko: The Non-Symmetric Values of Cooperative Games
4:30-4:55 O. Voshtina: Earliness-Tardiness Scheduling Game


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Robert J. Aumann
9:00-10:00 J.F. Nash, Jr.: Reduction of Coalitions to Agencies: A Scheme for the Analysis of Cooperative Games

Repeated Games II
Chair: Jean-François Mertens
10:30-10:55 T. Sekiguchi: Robustness of Efficient Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
11:00-11:25 I. Arribas and A. Urbano: Repeated Games with Unknown Horizon
11:30-11:55 L. Xue: Credible Renegotiation and Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games

Political Economy
Chair: Donald E. Campbell
10:30-10:55 E. Hauk and M. Saez Marti: On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption
11:00-11:25 C. Yavas: Whistleblowing and False Accusations
11:30-11:55 J. Duggan and C. Martinelli: Jury Decision with Continuous Signals of Guilt

TU Games IV
Chair: Anna B. Khmelnitskaya
10:30-10:55 R. Garratt and C.-Z. Qin: On Market Games when Agents Cannot be Two Places at Once
11:00-11:25 I. Dragan: Some Recursive Definitions of the Shapley Value and Other Linear Values of Cooperative T.U. Games
11:30-11:55 T. Hokari: Weighted Dutta-Ray Solutions on Convex Games

Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: H. Peyton Young
2:00-3:00 M. Kandori: Long Terms Relationship and Information Accumulation

Learning and Evolution II
Chair: Amparo Urbano
3:30-3:55 B. Hehenkamp: Asymmetry and the Evolution of Behavior
4:00-4:25 E. Hopkins: Modelling How People Play Games: Some Analytic Results on Reinforcement Learning
4:30-4:55 D.P. Foster and H.P. Young: When Rational Learning Fails

Economic Applications II
Chair: Rabah Amir
3:30-3:55 G.-J. Fann: Advertising Competition: An Application on Voting Games
4:00-4:25 C.-H. Liao and Y. Tauman: Bundling in Oligopoly Competition
4:30-4:55 B. Allen: Capacity Precommitment as a Barrier to Entry: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Approach

Matching Problems
Chair: Simon Wilkie
3:30-3:55 M. Sotomayor: Existence of Stable Outcomes and the Lattice Property for a Unified Matching Market
4:00-4:25 S.-C. Suh: Games Implementing the Stable Rule of Marriage: Problems in Strong Nash Equilibria
4:30-4:55 E. Damiano and R. Lam: Self-Sustaining Stability in Dynamic Two-Sided Matching Markets


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Michihiro Kandori
9:00-10:00 J.-F. Mertens: TBA

Bayesian Games
Chair: Cesar Martinelli
10:30-10:55 K. Nygren: Generic Full Information-Revelation and Finiteness of Equilibria in Bayesian Games
11:00-11:25 D. Sonsino: On Cheap Talk and the Impossibility of Zero-Sum Betting
11:30-11:55 N. Feltovich and R. Harbaugh: Statement through Understatement: A Theory and Test of Countersignaling

Economic Applications III
Chair: Eric J. Friedman
10:30-10:55 V. Pasetta: On Simple Economic Property Rights Game
11:00-11:25 T. Kaplan, I. Luski, and D. Wettstein: Sunk Research Investments in Patent Races
11:30-11:55 R. Amir: Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers

Chair: Pradeep Dubey
10:30-10:55 S. Wilkie: Explaining Anomalies in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
11:00-11:25 K. Krishna and T. Tranaes: Allocating Multiple Units by Sealed-Bid Auctions
11:30-11:55 I.-K. Cho, K. Jewel, and R. Vohra: Auctions and Coalitions: Joint Bidding by Budget Constrained Buyers

Repeated Games
Chair: Clara Ponsati
10:30-10:55 M. Adler: What Makes Good Neighbors
11:00-11:25 T.C. O'Connel and R.E. Stearns: On Finite Strategy Sets for Finitely Repeated Zero-Sum Games