International Conference on Game TheoryOrganized by Dov Samet and David SchmeidlerJuly 7 to July 11, 1997Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
MONDAY, JULY 7
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Yair Tauman | |
9:30-10:30 | D. Okada (joint with A. Neyman):
Non Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Myrna Wooders | |
11:00-12:00 | T. Ichiishi (joint with R. Radner and M.R. Sertel):
Ex-Ante and Interim Contracts Signed by the
Divisions of Chandler's M-Form Firm
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Non-Cooperative Bargaining Chair: Richard McLean | |
2:00-2:25 | A. Riedl (joint with J. Zweimueller): Redistributional Concessions Versus Keeping the Status Quo |
2:30-2:55 | L. Smith: Rethinking Bargaining Theory
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Information Structure and Equilibrium Chair: Dov Samet | |
2:00-2:25 | O. Gossner: Comparison of Information Structures |
2:30-2:55 | V. Karguine: A Note on the Relationship of Common and Mutual Knowledge |
3:00-3:25 | U. Dulleck: Bounded Rationality and
Induction: The Email Game Revisited
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Value Theory for TU Games Chair: René van den Brink | |
2:00-2:25 | D. Housman: Values for Partition Function Form Games |
2:30-2:55 | I. Dragan: On a Generalized Consistency of a Pair of Values for Cooperative TU Games |
3:00-3:25 | D. Butnariu (joint with I. Markowicz):
Connections Between the Values of N-Person Games with Crisp and Fuzzy Coalitions
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Large Markets Chair: Tatsuro Ichiishi | |
2:00-2:25 | M. Wooders (joint with J. Conley): Tiebout Economies with a Continuum of Traders |
2:30-2:55 | B. Shitovitz: The Bargaining Set of an Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders |
3:00-3:25 | E. Einy (joint with B. Shitovitz):
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stability of the Symmetric Pareto-Optimal Allocations in
Pure Exchange Economies
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Assignment Games Chair: Michael Maschler | |
4:00-4:25 | C. Graham: Multi-Sided Assignment Games: Frequency of Nonempty Cores |
4:30-4:55 | W. Lucas (joint with H.A. Hamza): The Bargaining Simplex for Multi-Sided Assignment Games |
5:00-5:25 | B. Peleg (joint with S.-C. Suh):
Implementation of the Core of a Marriage Problem
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Auctions Chair: Dov Monderer | |
4:00-4:25 | N.A. Zenkevich (joint with S.N. Voznyuk): A Stable Solution of Dynamic Auction |
4:30-4:55 | K. Fieseler: Bidding for Unit-Price Contracts -- How Craftsmen Should Bid |
5:00-5:25 | J. Ma:
English Auctions and Walrasian Equilibria with Multiple Objects: A Dynamic
Approach
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Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Chair: Olivier Gossner | |
4:00-4:25 | D. Rosenberg (joint with B. de Meyer): The Cav u Theorem Through Dual Games |
4:30-4:55 | T. Tomala: Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Signals |
5:00-5:25 | J. Renault:
On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Signals
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Equilibrium in Economies Chair: Benyamin Shitovitz | |
4:00-4:25 | C.-W. Liu: Where Bertrand Meets Walras: An Equivalence Result |
4:30-4:55 | N. Dagan (joint with R. Serrano and O. Volij):
Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition
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TUESDAY, JULY 8
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: William Lucas | |
9:30-10:30 | E. Kalai (joint with M.O. Jackson):
False Reputation in a Society of Players
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Sylvain Sorin | |
11:00-12:00 | R. Aumann:
Equilibrium Points in the Ultimatum Game
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Stochastic Games I Chair: Nicolas Vieille | |
2:00-2:25 | J. Flesch (joint with F. Thuijsman and O.J. Vrieze): Maxmin for Stationary and Markov Strategies in Stochastic Games |
2:30-2:55 | Z. Syed (joint with T.E.S. Raghavan): An Algorithm for Solving Zero-Sum Two Person Stochastic Games of Perfect Information |
3:00-3:25 | M. Kosfeld: Stochastic Strategy Adjustment in
Coordination Games
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Firm Competition Chair: Dan Butnariu | |
2:00-2:25 | C. Schenk: Exchange Agreements between Competitors with Different Efficiency Levels |
2:30-2:55 | P. Olivella (joint with M.P. Gosalvez): Cost Reducing Strategies |
3:00-3:25 | T. Doganoglu (joint with Y. Tauman): Network
Competition with Reciprocal Proportional Access Charge Rules
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Application of Cooperative Game Theory to Economics Chair: Sergei Pechersky | |
2:00-2:25 | A. Mauleon (joint with F. Grafe): Externalities and Free Trade Agreements |
2:30-2:55 | Darin Lee (joint with O. Volij): Axiomatization of the Core in Economies with Asymmetric Information |
3:00-3:25 | A. Watts: Cooperative Production: A
Comparison of Lower and Upper Bounds
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Evolution I Chair: Nickolay A. Zenkevich | |
2:00-2:25 | W. Sandholm (joint with A. Pauzner): Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence |
2:30-2:55 | X. Tieman (joint with E. Droste): Evolution with a Varying Stage Game: An Economic Mutational Model |
3:00-3:25 | C. Wallace (joint with D.P. Myatt): Adaptive
Dynamics with Payoff Heterogeneity
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Implementations Chair: Jinpeng Ma | |
4:00-4:25 | A. Elbittar: King Solomon's Dilemma: An Experimental Study of Implementation |
4:30-4:55 | K. Einolf (joint with J. Dearden): Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Joint Ventures |
5:00-5:25 | T. Russo:
Quantity Selection of a Single Public Good
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Selected Topics I Chair: David Schmeidler | |
4:00-4:25 | M. Koster (joint with P. Borm and S. Tijs): Public Networks: Bilateral Division Problems |
4:30-4:55 | W. Elberfeld: The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market: Stigler's Hypothesis Reconsidered |
5:00-5:25 | V. Pasetta:
On Some Aspects of Noncommutativity in Games
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Value Theory for TU Games II Chair: Irinel Dragan | |
4:00-4:25 | E. Calvo Ramon (joint with J.C. Santos): The Multichoice Value: A Strategic Approach |
4:30-4:55 | O. Voshtina: A Value for Graph Restricted Games |
5:00-5:25 | R. van den Brink (joint with G. van der Laan):
Axiomatizations of the Normalized Banzhaf Value and the Shapley Value
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Signaling Chair: Akihiko Matsui | |
4:00-4:25 | A. Urbano (joint with J.E. Vila): Coordination Through Plain Conversation in Two-Player Games with Incomplete Information |
4:30-4:55 | A. van den Nouweland (joint with W.T. Harbaugh and E. Silva): Vacations and Absenteeism as Signals of Worker Quality |
5:00-5:25 | D. Wu:
Foreign Investment and the Asymmetric Information Caused by the Uncertainty of
Political Stability
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 | |
6:00-7:00 | PUBLIC LECTURE Steven J. Brams (with Christopher B. Jones): Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power |
WEDNESDAY, JULY 9
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Michael Maschler | |
9:30-10:30 | D. Monderer (joint with M. Tennenholtz):
Distributed (Parallel) Games
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Tatsuro Ichiishi | |
11:00-12:00 | S. Sorin:
Merging, Reputation and Repeated Games of
Incomplete Information
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Cooperative Games Chair: Nir Dagan | |
2:00-2:25 | S. Lahiri: Some Properties of Solutions for Two-Dimensional Choice Problems Reconsidered |
2:30-2:55 | S. Pechersky: An On "Gauge" Excess Function for NTU-Games: Axiomatic Approach |
3:00-3:25 | E. Iñarra (joint with J. Arin): Consistency
and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set
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Equilibrium Theory Chair: Geir Asheim | |
2:00-2:25 | J. Watanabe: Communication Can Ease Prisoners' Dilemma |
2:30-2:55 | J. Abdou: Tight and Effectively Rectangular Game Forms: A Nash Solvable Class |
3:00-3:25 | I. Milchtaich: Random-Player Games
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Economic Applications I Chair: Rabah Amir | |
2:00-2:25 | P. Davis: Estimating Equilibrium Models Using Count Data: Quantity Competition in the Presence of Indivisibilities and Heterogeneous Firms |
2:30-2:55 | Y. Halevy: Trade Between Rational Agents as a Result of Asymmetric Information |
3:00-3:25 | B. Lonergan: Private Provision of Social
Insurance
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Non-Cooperative Solutions for Cooperative Games Chair: Anne van den Nouweland | |
2:00-2:25 | S. Hart (joint with A. Gomes and A. Mas-Colell): Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field |
2:30-2:55 | M. Slikker (joint with A. van den Nouweland): A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division |
3:00-3:25 | M. Corominas: Perfect Equilibria of a
2-Person Bargaining Game
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Selected Topics II Chair: Arno Riedl | |
4:00-4:25 | S. Huck (joint with G. Kirchsteiger and J. Oechssler): Learning to Like What You Have: Explaining the Endowment Effect |
4:30-4:55 | S. Hart (joint with Y. Tauman):
Market Crashes with External Shocks
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Cooperative Models Chair: Joseph Abdou | |
4:00-4:25 | T. Quint (joint with M. Shubik): Games of Status and One-to-One Ordinal Preference Games |
4:30-4:55 | J. Suijs: A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games |
5:00-5:25 | L. Petrosjan:
Dynamic Cooperative Games
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Stochastic Games II Chair: Ezra Einy | |
4:00-4:25 | E. Solan: 3-Person Repeated Games with Absorbing States |
4:30-4:55 | N. Vieille: Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Recursive Games |
5:00-5:25 | F. Thuijsman (joint with J. Flesch and O.J. Vrieze):
Almost Stationary epsilon-Equilibria in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
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Equilibrium in Economic Applications Chair: Igal Milchtaich | |
4:00-4:25 | C. LaCasse (joint with V. Barham and C. Ponsati): Chores |
4:30-4:55 | J. Bergin: Social Planner Equilibrium |
5:00-5:25 | B. Klaus (joint with H. Peters and T. Storcken):
Strategy-Proof Division of a Private Good when Preferences are Single-Dipped
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THURSDAY, JULY 10
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: David Schmeidler | |
9:30-10:30 | Open Problems in Game Theory
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Robert Rosenthal | |
11:00-12:00 | A. Matsui (joint with M. Kaneko):
Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and
Prejudices I
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Repeated Games Chair: Sergiu Hart | |
2:00-2:25 | R.P. McLean (joint with A. Chaudhuri): Outside Options, Maxmin Payoffs and Undominated Equilibria in Repeated Games |
2:30-2:55 | F. Valenciano (joint with L.M. Ruiz): The Forgiving-Trigger Strategy: An Alternative to the Trigger Strategy |
3:00-3:25 | M. Angeles de Frutos (joint with R. Rosenthal):
On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions
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The Core of TU Games Chair: Michael Maschler | |
2:00-2:25 | G.A. Koshevoy (joint with V.I. Danilov): Cores of Cooperative Games, Superdifferentials of Functions and the Minkowski Difference of Sets |
2:30-2:55 | V. Zakharov: Selectors of the Core and Consistency Properties |
3:00-3:25 | A.K. Biswas (joint with G. Ravindran and T. Parthasarathy):
Stability and Largeness of Core for Symmetric Games
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Collective Decisions Chair: Tom Quint | |
2:00-2:25 | M. Maschler (joint with S. Barberà and J. Shalev): Electoral Evolution |
2:30-2:55 | K.O. Nti: Effort and Performance in Group Contests |
3:00-3:25 | G. Ravindran (joint with K.G. Ramamurthy): On
Weighted Majority Games
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Applications of Game Theory Chair: James Bergin | |
2:00-2:25 | A. Laruelle: The EU Decision-Making Procedures: Some Insight from Non-Cooperative Game Theory |
2:30-2:55 | E. Friedman (joint with S. Shenker): Learning and Implementation on the Internet |
3:00-3:25 | S.-F. Ueng: Love Your Neighbor as Yourself
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Evolution II Chair: Dov Monderer | |
4:00-4:25 | J. Gata (joint with N. Garoupa): An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach to the Theory of International Regimes |
4:30-4:55 | J. Ely (joint with E. Dekel-Tabak and O. Yilankaya): Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences |
5:00-5:25 | D.P. Myatt (joint with C. Wallace):
Sophisticated Play with Payoff Heterogeneity
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Economic Applications II Chair: Amparo Urbano | |
4:00-4:25 | J. Wako: Coalition-Proof Nash Allocation in a Barter Game with Multiple Kinds of Indivisible Goods |
4:30-4:55 | I. Luski (joint with D. Wettstein): Optimal Patent Length and Height in a Sequential Model of Innovation |
5:00-5:25 | J.-L. Hu (joint with R. Aoki):
Cross-Licensing of Substituting Technologies: A Patent Portfolio Approach
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Firm Theory Chair: Yoram Halevy | |
4:00-4:25 | N. Boccard (joint with X. Wauthy): On Hotelling's Model with Capacity Precommitment |
4:30-4:55 | R. Amir (joint with V.E. Lambson):
Quasi-Competitiveness and Profitability in Symmetric Cournot Oligopoly
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Refinements Chair: John Hillas | |
4:00-4:25 | G. Asheim (joint with M. Dufwenberg): Full Admissible Rationality in Games of Asymmetric Information |
4:30-4:55 | R. Ramer: Do Backward and Forward Induction Contradict Each Other? |
5:00-5:25 | V.J. Vannetelbosch (joint with J.J. Herings):
Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games
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FRIDAY, JULY 11
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Bezalel Peleg | |
9:30-10:30 | D. Samet:
What Priors and Common Priors Are
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
11:00-12:00 | R. Rosenthal:
Trust and Social Efficiencies
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