International Conference on Game TheoryOrganized by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-ColellJuly 14 to July 18, 1996Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
SUNDAY, JULY 14
| |
Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
9:30-10:30 | M. Kandori:
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private
Monitoring: Recent Developments and Open
Questions
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Robert Rosenthal | |
11:00-12:00 |
A. Rapoport:
Equilibrium Play and Adaptive Learning in Two-Person
Bargaining
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Bargaining -- ESS, Room A Chair: Dilip Mookherjee | |
2:00-2:25 | V. Pasetta: Simple Divide the Money Game with Bribing |
2:30-2:55 | E. Groes: Asymptotically Finite Repetition of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game |
3:00-3:25 | V. Vannetelbosch: Bargaining with an
Endogenous Deadline
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Coalitional Games -- ESS, Room B Chair: Vladimir Gurvich | |
2:00-2:25 | M. Morelli: Payoff Distribution in Coalitional Games |
2:30-2:55 | J.M. Izquierdo (joint with C. Rafels): A Generalization of the Bankruptcy Game: Financial Cooperative Games |
3:00-3:25 | J.R. Uriarte (joint with J. Arin and E. Iñarra):
The Leximin Stable Allocation
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Auctions -- ESS, Room C Chair: Amparo Urbano | |
2:00-2:25 | R. Ramer: Efficient Mechanisms for Cooperation Games |
2:30-2:55 | T.D. Jeitschko: Learning in Sequential
Games
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Legal Models -- ESS, Room 001 Chair: Andres Perea y Monsuwe | |
2:00-2:25 | P.-S. Kuo: Defaults, Bidding, and Participation in the Rotating Credit Association: An Equilibrium Analysis |
2:30-2:55 | J.-L. Hu (joint with R. Aoki): The Time Factors to Patent Litigation and Licensing |
3:00-3:25 | A. Mukherjee (joint with S. Marjit and H. Shi):
Cooperation in R&D: The Case of Patent Infringement Agreements
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Experiments -- ESS, Room A Chair: Steven J. Brams | |
4:00-4:25 | M. Walker (joint with J.C. Cox and J. Shachat): An Experimental Test of Bayesian vs. Adaptive Learning in Normal Form Games |
4:30-4:55 | J.M. Shachat: Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis |
5:00-5:25 | B. Broseta (joint with V.P. Crawford):
What Price Coordination? Auctioning the Right to Play as a Form of Preplay
Communication
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Coalitional Games II -- ESS, Room B Chair: Norman Schofield | |
4:00-4:25 | V. Gurvich (joint with E. Boros): Perfect Graphs, Normal Hypergraphs, Stable Families of Coalitions, and Effectivity Functions |
4:30-4:55 | W. Zwicker: What is the "Right" Desirability Relation for Coalitions, and Which Weakening of Weightedness Does it Characterize? |
5:00-5:25 | Z. Huang:
On Compactness of the Core of Nonatomic Convex sigma-Continuous Measure Games
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Repeated Games I -- ESS, Room C Chair: Eugene A. Feinberg | |
4:00-4:25 | I. Arribas (joint with A. Urbano): Cyclical Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games |
4:30-4:55 | M.A. Jones: The Classification of Continuation Probabilities |
5:00-5:25 | T. Sekiguchi:
Efficiency in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring
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Public Goods and Indivisibilities -- ESS, Room D Chair: Jörg Oechssler | |
4:00-4:25 | J. Conley: Games and Economies with Crowding Types |
4:30-4:55 | R. Prasad (joint with P. Dubey and J. Geanakoplos): The Benefits From Digging Holes and Filling Them Up |
5:00-5:25 | J. Ma:
Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities: Price Discrimination and
Manipulation
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MONDAY, JULY 15
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Dov Samet | |
9:30-10:30 | S. Morris:
Higher Order Beliefs in Game Theory
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Amnon Rapoport | |
11:00-12:00 |
B. von Stengel:
Computation of Equilibria in Extensive and Normal Form Games
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Refinement of Non-Cooperative Equilibrium -- ESS, Room A Chair: Bernhard von Stengel | |
2:00-2:25 | G.B. Asheim (joint with M. Dufwenberg): Admissibility and Common Knowledge |
2:30-2:55 | S.J. Brams (joint with D.M. Kilgour): Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem |
3:00-3:25 | W. Elberfeld: Incentive Monotonicity and
Equilibrium Selection in Binary Choice Games
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Kernel and Nucleolus -- ESS, Room B Chair: Bezalel Peleg | |
2:00-2:25 | M. Maschler (joint with J. Potters and H. Reijnierse): Monotonicity Properties of the Nucleolus of a Tree Game |
2:30-2:55 | G. Orshan (joint with J.M. Zarzuelo): A New Approach of a Prekernel for NTU Games |
3:00-3:25 | S. Pechersky:
Note on Two Excess Functions for Cooperative Games Without Side Payments
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Adaptive Processes I -- ESS, Room C Chair: Mark Walker | |
2:00-2:25 | R.W. Rosenthal (joint with D. Gale): Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability |
2:30-2:55 | A.F. Tieman: Bertrand Price Competition in Social Environment |
3:00-3:25 | J. Oechssler (joint with S. Huck):
The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
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Cost Sharing -- ESS, Room D Chair: Len Mirman | |
2:00-2:25 | D. Wettstein (joint with T. Kaplan): Cost Sharing -- Effficiency and Implementation |
2:30-2:55 | A. Watts: Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cost
Sharing Games
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Non-Cooperative Equilibrium I -- ESS, Room A Chair: Maxwell B. Stinchcombe | |
4:00-4:25 | A. Perea y Monsuwé (joint with M. Jansen and H. Peters): Characterization of Fully Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games |
4:30-4:55 | C. Ewerhart: Commonly Assumed Rationality
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Value Theory I -- ESS, Room B Chair: Pradeep Dubey | |
4:00-4:25 | R.P. McLean: Semivalues of Nonatomic Games with Coalition Structures |
4:30-4:55 | D. Housman: Linear and Symmetric Values for Partially Defined Cooperative Games |
5:00-5:25 | J.M. Bilbao:
Hart and Mas-Colell Potential for Restricted Games
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Repeated Bargaining -- ESS, Room C Chair: Andreas Blume | |
4:00-4:25 | M. Jackson (joint with T.R. Palfrey): Dynamic Efficiency and Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Matching |
4:30-4:55 | A. Riedl: Wage Bargaining: "Voice" and Organziation Costs May Lead to Social Partnership |
5:00-5:25 | V. Calabuig (joint with G. Olcina):
Forward Induction in a Repeated Wage Negotiation
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Organizations -- ESS, Room D Chair: David Wettstein | |
4:00-4:25 | K. Hausken: Repeated Within-Group Games with Discounting in a Multi-Group Environment |
4:30-4:55 | S.-F. Ueng: Corruption and Political Institution |
3:00-3:25 | R. Rob (joint with P. Zemsky):
Cooperation, Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity in Organizations
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8:00-9:00 PM | PUBLIC LECTURE
ESS, Room 001 Steven J. Brams (joint with Alan Taylor): Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution |
TUESDAY, JULY 16
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Michihiro Kandori | |
9:30-10:30 | T. Sonmez:
Can Pre-Arranged Matches be Avoided in Two-Sided
Matching Markets?
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Lloyd Shapley | |
11:00-12:00 |
A. Neyman (joint with D. Okada):
Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games
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Non-Cooperative Equilibrium II -- ESS, Room A Chair: Geir B. Asheim | |
2:00-2:25 | L. A. Liu: The Invariance of Best Reply Correspondences in Two-Player Games |
2:30-2:55 | B. von Stengel (joint with A. van den Elzen and D. Talman): Tracing Equilibria in Extensive Games by Complementary Pivoting Problem |
3:00-3:25 | M. B. Stinchcombe (joint with C.J. Harris and W. Zame):
Equilibrium Existence for Infinite Games: The Nearly Compact and Continuous
Case
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Core and Incomplete Information -- ESS, Room B Chair: Yair Tauman | |
2:00-2:25 | B. Allen: On the Existence of Core Allocations in a Large Economy with Incentive-Compatibility Constraints |
2:30-2:55 | G.R. Green: Market Institutions and Allocations |
3:00-3:25 | U. Schwalbe:
The Core of a Production Economy with Asymmetric Information
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Repeated Games II -- ESS, Room C Chair: James Bergin | |
2:00-2:25 | D. Mookherjee (joint with R. Karandikar, D. Ray, and F. Vega-Redondo): Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation |
2:30-2:55 | I.-K. Cho: Learning to Cooperate in Repeated Games |
3:00-3:25 | E.A. Feinberg (joint with E. Altman and A. Shwartz):
Weighted Discounted Stochastic Games with Perfect Information
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Economic Applications -- ESS, Room D Chair: Rabah Amir | |
2:00-2:25 | L.J. Mirman (joint with M. Datta): Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination |
2:30-2:55 | T. Temzelides (joint with B. Adao): Beliefs, Competition, and Bank Runs |
3:00-3:25 | C.-W. Liu:
Price Competition in a Distorted Price System Leads to Output Collapse in
Transition Economies
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Epistemology -- ESS, Room A Chair: Stephen Morris | |
4:00-4:25 | H. K. Hvide: Bounds to memory Loss |
4:30-4:55 | D. Samet (joint with A. Heifetz): Why Isn't
it Enough to be Coherent?
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Core Theory -- ESS, Room B Chair: Tayfun Sonmez | |
4:00-4:25 | E. Einy (joint with R. Holzman, D. Monderer, and B. Shitovitz): Core Equivalence Theorems for Infinite Convex Games |
4:30-4:55 | R. Garratt (joint with C.-Z. Qin): On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries |
5:00-5:25 | V. Zakharov:
About Selectors of the Core in Dynamic Games
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Adaptive Processes II -- ESS, Room C Chair: Rafael Rob | |
4:00-4:25 | D. Friedman (joint with J. Yellin): Evolving Landscapes in Population Games |
4:30-4:55 | P. Vanderschraaf: Inductive Belief Updating, Mutual Knowledge, and Equilibrium |
5:00-5:25 | M. Ottaviani (joint with G. Moscarini):
Social Learning and Competition
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Contracts -- ESS, Room D Chair: Ulrich Schwalbe | |
4:00-4:25 | L. Rigotti: A Principal-Agent Model with Incomplete Preferences and Inertia |
4:30-4:55 | J.A. Dearden (joint with D. Klotz): Committee Decisions and Contracting |
5:00-5:25 | A. Luporini:
Relative Performance Evaluation and Collusion
|
THURSDAY, JULY 18
| |
Value Theory II -- ESS, Room A Chair: Richard P. McLean | |
9:30-9:55 | T. Ui: A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games |
10:00-10:25 | M. Josune Albizuri Irigoien (joint with J.C. Santos and J.M. Zarzuelo):
A Value for Games with n Players and r Alternatives: Potential and Consistency
|
Markets and Games -- ESS, Room B Chair: Shigeo Muto | |
9:30-9:55 | J. Choi: Exchange Economy with Production Modelled as a Strategic Game |
10:00-10:25 | J. Bergin (joint with D. Bernhardt): Business Cycles, Thin Resale Markets and Darwinian Competition |
10:30-10:55 | K.O. Nti:
Potential Competition and Coordination in a Market Entry Game
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Learning I -- ESS, Room C Chair: Huw David Dixon | |
9:30-9:55 | E. Amann (joint with C.-L. Yang): The Robustness of a Sophisticated Mutant in an Evolutionary Model of Cooperation |
10:00-10:25 | Peter Sorensen (joint with L. Smith): Herding as Experimentation Déjà Vu |
10:30-10:55 | B.C. Cooper:
Copying Fidelity
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Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Models -- ESS, Room A Chair: Hervé Moulin | |
11:30-11:55 | B. Peleg: A Formal Approach to Nash's Program |
12:00-12:25 | S. Muto (joint with A. Suzuki): The Stable Standard of Behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma |
12:30-12:55 | N. Schofield:
Aggregation of Preferences in Social Choice and Voting
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Learning II -- ESS, Room B Chair: In-Koo Cho | |
11:30-11:55 | A. Possajennikov: An Analysis of a Learning Dynamics: Learning to Play an "Egalitarian" Equilibrium |
12:00-12:25 | H.D. Dixon: Keeping Up With the Joneses: Aspirations and Experiments Without Random Matching |
12:30-12:55 | C.S. Ruebeck:
Imitation Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: An Exploratory Example
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Pre-Play Communication and Information -- ESS, Room C Chair: John Hillas | |
11:30-11:55 | A. Blume: Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games |
12:00-12:25 | J.E. Vila (joint with A. Urbano): Ex-ante Communication and Nash Equilibrium |
12:30-12:55 | G.Y. Luo:
Economic Natural Selection and a Double Auction Market: The Market as a
Filtering Process of Information
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Oligopoly Theory -- ESS, Room D Chair: Beth Allen | |
11:30-11:55 | R. Amir (joint with J. Wooders): One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and RJV Performance |
12:00-12:25 | J. Zhang (joint with Z. Zhang): The Asymptotic Competitiveness in an Oligopolistic Market with Incomplete Information |
12:30-12:55 | A. Urbano (joint with D. Alepuz and R. Moner):
Communication and Leadership
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Michael Maschler | |
2:30-3:30 | H. Moulin:
Strategy-Proof Cost (or Surplus) Sharing
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Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 Chair: Robert Aumann | |
4:00-5:00 | L.S. Shapley: Nash-Equilibrium and Pareto Optimality |