Organized by Beth Allen

July 12 to July 15, 1994

Stony Brook, New York



Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Welcome: Beth Allen
9:30-10:30 Chair: Abraham Neyman
B. Shitovitz (joint with E. Einy and R. Holzman): Core and Stable Sets of Large Games
11:00-12:00 Chair: John Hillas
G. Mailath (joint with L. Samuelson and J. Swinkels): How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?

Implementation Theory -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Roger Myerson
2:00-2:30 S. Brusco: Implementing Action Profiles When Agents Collude
2:30-3:00 Z. Forshner: Implementation Theory with Complete and Incomplete Information: Statics, Dynamics and Unification of the Theory
3:00-3:30 R. Lagunoff: On the Dynamic Selection of Mechanisms as Clubs for the Provision of a Public Good

Learning in Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Birgitte Sloth
2:00-2:30 J. Oechssler: An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
2:30-3:00 D. Kraines (joint with V. Kraines): Pavlov: An Adaptive Strategy for the Prisoner's Dilemma
3:00-3:30 C.-L. Yang: Evolution of Cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma Game with a Knowledgeable Mutant

Coalition Proof Equilibrium -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181
Chair: Michael Maschler
2:00-2:30 H. Keiding: Existence of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium
2:30-3:00 J. Wooders (joint with D. Moreno): Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
3:00-3:30 I. Ray: Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition

Values -- Physics, Room S-240
Chair: Joseph Greenberg
2:00-2:30 R. van den Brink: An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure
2:30-3:00 T.S.H. Driessen (joint with Y. Funaki): The Egalitarian Non-Average Contribution Method for Cooperative Games
3:00-3:30 B. Feldman: The Value of a Coalition Game

Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181

D.G. Arce: The Economics and Sociology of Latin American Inflation: A Game Theoretic Approach
K.-P. Chen: Information Processing in Random Matching Games
S. Ching (joint with S. Serizawa): Maximal Domains for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules
M. Crowley (joint with C. Graham): A Three-Sided Assignment Game Graphic Display
A. Dhillon: Extended Pareto Rules and Relative Utilitarianism
T. Kara (joint with T. Sonmez): Implementation of College Admission Rules
A. Morkeliunas: The Independence Axiom and Social Ordering
R. Myerson: Poisson Games and Voting Models

Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183

T. Radzik (joint with A.S. Nowak): Solidarity-type Modifications of the Shapley Value
C. Rafels Pallarola (joint with N. Ybern): Fixed Points and Convex Cooperative Games
J. Ratliff: A Note on the Test of Dominated Messages and the Intuitive Criterion in Sender-Receiver Games
C. Schultz: Reputation for Honesty in Repeated Games with One Long-Run Player
S. Serizawa: Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees is Strategy-Proof
S. Steinmetz: Sustainability and Efficiency in a Spatial Oligopoly: An Approach à la Eaton Lipsey
T. Storcken: Effectivity Functions and Simple Games
Y. Tauman (joint with I. Cho): No Sale is Final
P. Vanderschraaf: Inductive Learning, Knowledge Asymmetries and Convention

Network Games -- Physics, Room S-240
Chair: William Sharkey
4:30-5:00 D. Skorin-Kapov: On the Core of the Minimum Cost Steiner Tree Game in Networks
5:00-5:30 V. Gurvich (joint with E. Boros and P.L. Hammer): Game Theoretic Proof of Berge-Duchet Perfect Graph Conjecture
5:30-6:00 W. R. Zhu (joint with D. and F. Granot): Circular Network Games
6:00-6:30 D. Salant (joint with L. Cabral and G. Woroch): Monopoly Pricing With Network Externalities

Refinement of Equilibria -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: George Mailath
4:30-5:00 B. Sloth (joint with E. Hendon, H. J. Jacobsen and T. Tranaes): Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities
5:00-5:30 H. Suehiro: A "Mistaken Theories" Refinement
5:30-6:00 D. Vermeulen (joint with M.J.M. Jansen): On Strictly Proper Equilibria

Repeated Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181
Chair: Sylvain Sorin
4:30-5:00 V. Domansky: Repeated Games and Multinomial Distributions
5:00-5:30 J. E. Gata: Random Matching Repeated Games under Restricted Information: Equilibria and Complexity
5:30-6:00 J. Nachbar: On Learning and Optimization in Discounted Supergames

Strategic Oligopoly -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Amparo Urbano
4:30-5:00 R. Amir: Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games
5:00-5:30 J. Valimaki (joint with D. Bergemann): Learning and Strategic Pricing
5:30-6:00 G. Ying Luo: Irrationality and Competition


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 -- Chair: Sergiu Hart
9:30-10:30 Beth Allen
Robert Aumann
Roger Myerson
Dov Samet
David Schmeidler
11:00-12:00 Panel -- Continued

Cost Allocation -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Shigeo Muto
2:00-2:30 R.P. McLean (joint with W. Sharkey): Probabilistic Value Pricing
2:30-3:00 H. Hamers (joint with R. van de Leensel and S. Tijs): The Chinese Postman Problem and Delivery Games
3:00-3:30 V. Feldman (joint with S. Tijs and S. Muto): Minimum Cost Spanning Extension Games: The Irreducible Core

The Core -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Roger Lagunoff
2:00-2:30 E. Yanovskaya: One More Axiomatization of the Core
2:30-3:00 F.H. Page, Jr. (joint with M. Wooders): Arbitrage in Markets with Unbounded Short Sales: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonemptiness of the Core and Existence of Equilibrium
3:00-3:30 M. Holtz Wooders: Convergence of the Core to Competitive Outcomes in Economies with Public Goods

Stochastic Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181
Chair: Matthew Sobel
2:00-2:30 S.K. Chakrabarti: Pure Strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with Many Players
2:30-3:00 P. Dutta (joint with R. Sundaram): The Non-Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Infinite-State Stochastic Games
3:00-3:30 E. Altman (joint with M. Tidball): Finite State Approximation in Stochastic Games

Matching Games -- Physics, Room S-240
Chair: Myrna Wooders
2:00-2:30 F. Bloch (joint with A. de la Fuente and H. Ryder): Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers
2:30-3:00 M. Sotomayor: Bi-Polygamous Marriage is Unstable
3:00-3:30 D. Wu: Duopolistic Brokerage Market

The Nucleolus -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Bezalel Peleg
4:00-4:30 J.A.M. Potters (joint with M. Ansing and H. Reijnierse): Computing the Nucleolus by One Prolonged Simplex Algorithm
4:30-5:00 L.M. Ruiz (joint with F. Valenciano and J.M. Zarzuelo): The lambda-Prenucleolus and the lambda-Nucleolus: Two Values for T.U. Games Based on the Excess Vector

Auctions -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Richard McLean
4:00-4:30 V. Krishna (joint with J. Morgan): An Analysis of the War of Attrition
4:30-5:00 E. Amann (joint with W. Leininger): The All-Pay Auction with Incomplete Information: Existence and Uniqueness of Bayesian Equilibrium

Rationalizability -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181
Chair: Geir Asheim
4:00-4:30 A. Sela: The Fictitious Play Property for 2 x n Games
4:30-5:00 O. Volij (joint with N. Dagan and R. Serrano): A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

Computing Equilibria in Matrix Games -- Physics, Room S-240
Chair: Joseph Abdou
4:00-4:30 M.D. Grigoriadis (joint with L.G. Khachiyan): A Sublinear-Time Randomized Approximation Algorithm for Matrix Games
4:30-5:00 T. Quint (joint with M. Shubik): On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
9:30-10:30 Chair: Joachim Rosenmüller
D. Schmeidler: Case-Based Optimizer
11:00-12:00 Chair: Robert Aumann
S. Sorin: On the Impact of an Event

Social Situations -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Benyamin Shitovitz
2:00-2:30 J. Greenberg: Social Situations Without Commonality of Beliefs: Worlds Apart -- But Acting Together
2:30-3:00 G. B. Asheim: Defining Rationalizability in 2-Player Extensive Games
3:00-3:30 E. Einy (joint with B. Shitovitz): The Optimistic Stability of the Core Mapping in Public Goods Economies

Incentives -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Francis Bloch
2:00-2:30 A. Urbano (joint with G. Olcina): Signalling Games and Incentive Dominance
2:30-3:00 S. Hsiao-hsien Lin (joint with C.H. Tsai): Optimal Policy of Tax, Penalty and Auditing II - A Second Order Approach with Jumps in States
3:00-3:30 J. Dearden: Efficiency and Exclusion in Collective Action Negotiations

Cooperative Game Theory -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 181
Chair: Hans Keiding
2:00-2:30 H. Reijnierse (joint with M. Maschler, J. Potters and S. Tijs): Simple Flow Games
2:30-3:00 K.-I. Shimomura: A Bargaining Set of a Cooperative Game with Coalition Structure
3:00-3:30 H. Haller (joint with J. Derks): Null Players Out?

Bargaining -- Physics, Room S-240
Chair: Vijay Krishna
2:00-2:30 C. Herrero: Endogenous Reference Points and the Adjusted Proportional Solution for Bargaining Problems with Claims
2:30-3:00 T. Tranaes (joint with E. Hendon): Decentralized Trade in a Small Market
3:00-3:30 E. Bennett: A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining

Topics in Mathematical Economics -- ESS, Room 001
Chair: William Zame
4:00-4:30 J. Abdou: Exact and Rectangular Game Forms
4:30-5:00 B. Peleg (joint with A. van den Nouweland, P. Borm, G.J. Otten, S. Tijs, and O. Volij): Axiomatic Characterization of the Walras Correspondence for Generalized Economies
5:00-5:30 N. Al-Najjar: Decomposition and Characterization of Risk with a Continuum of Random Variables

Dynamic Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Vladimir Gurvich
4:00-4:30 S. Hurkens: Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to Persistent Retracts
4:30-5:00 M. Lutsenko: On New Methods to Solving of Infinite Antagonistic Games
5:00-5:30 M. Maschler (joint with E. Bennett and W. Zame): Dynamic Systems that Converge to Aspirations

Topics in Cooperative Games -- ESS, Room 181
Chair: Carmen Herrero
4:00-4:30 R. Holzman (joint with Y. Marcus and D. Peleg): Load Balancing in Committees
4:30-5:00 S. Muto: Voters' Power in Indirect Voting Systems with Political Parties: The Square Root Effect
5:00-5:30 C. Graham (joint with M. Crowley): Core of the 2 x 2 x 2 Assignment Game


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
9:30-10:30 Chair: Pradeep Dubey
R. Elul: Welfare and Financial Innovation When Markets are Incomplete
11:00-12:00 Chair: Suzanne Scotchmer
W. Zame (joint with B. Ellickson): Economic Geography

Evolutionary Games and Equilibria -- ESS, Room 001
Chair: John Nachbar
2:00-2:30 S. Scotchmer (joint with E. Dekel): On the Evolution of Attitudes Toward Risk in Winner-Take-All Games
2:30-3:00 Y. Feinberg: Evolutionary Selection of an Equilibrium
3:00-3:30 J. Bergin (joint with B. Lipman): Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations

Values of Large Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Robert Aumann
2:00-2:30 D. Butnariu (joint with E.P. Klement): On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley
2:30-3:00 G. Diubin: Asymptotic Values for Cooperative Games with Infinitely Many Players Having Different "Weights"
3:00-3:30 J. Rosenmüller: The Shapley Value for Countably Many Players

Popular Control of Elected Officials -- ESS, Room 181
Chair: Joel Kaji
2:00-2:30 S. Ainsworth (joint with I. Sened): The Effects of Group Endorsement on Candidate Competition and Voter Turnout
2:30-3:00 T. Feddersen: The Swing Voter's Curse
3:00-3:30 S. Lohmann: Electoral Incentives, Political Intransparency, and the Policy Bias Towards Special Interests

Dynamics -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
Chair: Subir Chakrabarti
4:00-4:30 J. Zhang: On the Economics of Chain Reactions
4:30-5:00 V. Bala (joint with S. Goyal): Learning from Neighbors
5:00-5:30 K.H. Schlag: Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution

Knowledge and Beliefs -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 183
Chair: Dov Samet
4:00-4:30 C. Bicchieri (joint with G.A. Antonelli): Backwards Forward Induction
4:30-5:00 D. Holt: Coherent Belief Revision and Equilibrium Selection in Games
5:00-5:30 G. Bonanno (joint with P. Battigalli): Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games

A Comparative Analysis of Institutions -- ESS, Room 181
Chair: John Scholz
  Discussant: Tim Feddersen
4:00-4:30 D. Epstein (joint with S. O'Halloran): Common Agency and Representation
4:30-5:00 D. Baron: A Sequential Choice Theory of Collective Goods Programs
5:00-5:30 S.J. Brams (joint with A. Taylor): Fair Division by Point Allocation