Organized by John Hillas

July 19 to July 23, 1993

Stony Brook, New York



Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
9:30-10:30 P. Milgrom: Comparing Optima and Equilibria: The New Foundation of Comparative Statics
11:00-12:00 R. Myerson: Game Theoretic Analysis of Political Institutions

Matching -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
2:00-2:40 Y. Blum: Quasi Stability and Algorithms for Finding a Stable Matching
2:45-3:25 K. Krishna (joint with S. Collins): The Harvard Housing Lottery: Rationality and Reform
3:30-4:10 T. Quint: Restricted House-Swapping Games

Repeated Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
2:00-2:40 R. Simon: A Proof of the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Undiscounted Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games of Incomplete Information on One Side
2:45-3:25 R. Simon: An Extension of the Borsuk-Ulam Theorem
3:30-4:10 R. Amir: Continuous Markov/Stationary Strategies for Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions

Coalition-Proof Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
2:00-2:40 B. Chakravorti (joint with W. Sharkey): Consistency, Un-Common Knowledge and Coalition-Proofness
2:45-3:25 C. Kahn (joint with D. Mookherjee): Coalition-Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy
3:30-4:10 R. Vohra (joint with D. Ray): Equilibrium Binding Agreements

Cooperative Games I -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
4:30-5:10 W. Thomson: The Replacement Principle in Private Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences
5:15-5:55 A. van den Nouweland: Monotonic Games are Spanning Network Games

Cake Division -- Harriman Hall, Room 112
4:30-5:10 S. Brams and A. Taylor: An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
5:15-5:55 J. Barbanel: Game-Theoretic Algorithms, Cake Division, Fairness and Strong Fairness

Overlapping Generations and Bankruptcy -- Harriman Hall, Room 116
4:30-5:10 O. Gossner: Folk Theorems for Overlapping Generations Games
5:15-5:55 R. Serrano (joint with N. Dagan and O. Volij): A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001 -- Chair: Sergiu Hart
9:30-10:30 D. Fudenberg: Learning in Extensive-Form Games

2:00-3:00 Poster Session 1 -- Alliance Room

R. Aumann: Common Knowledge of Rationality and Backwards Induction
D. Balkenborg: An Experiment on Forward- Versus Backward Induction
S. Brams and A. Taylor: Divide the Dollar: Three Solutions and Extensions
B. Feldman: The Fair Hierarchical Value
M. Maschler (joint with D. Granot): The Kernel and Nucleolus of a Tree Game
D. Monderer: Fictitious Play
T. Tranaes (joint with E. Hendon and B. Sloth): Decentralized Trade with Bargaining and Voluntary Matching
X. Xu: Power and Private Good
L. Zhou: A Theorem on Open Coverings of a Simplex and Scarf's Core Existence Theorem Through Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem

3:00-4:00 Poster Session 2 -- Alliance Room

R. Aoki (joint with T. Prusa): On the Timing of Information Disclosure in U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems
K.-P. Chen: Compensation Principle in Repeated Games
S. Ching: The Uniform Rule, Strategy-Proofness, and Median Voter
M. Cronshaw (joint with J. Alm): Uncertain Audit Policies and Tax Compliance
L. Liu: Subjectivity and Reality in Multistage Games I
J. Ma: Repeated Bertrand and Cournot Competition with Incomplete Information
J. Naeve: The Walras Approach to Bargaining with Incomplete Information
P. Shenoy: Game Trees for Decision Analysis
W. Zame (joint with D. Levine): Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets

Bargaining -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
4:30-5:10 E. Bennett (joint with H. Houba): Odd Man Out: Bargaining Among Three Players
5:15-5:55 J. Watson: Dominance and Equilibria in Alternating Offer Bargaining

Foundations -- Harriman Hall, Room 112
4:30-5:10 G. Bonanno: A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium in Terms of Minimal Belief Revision
5:15-5:55 S. Tijs (joint with B. Peleg): The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form

The Core I -- Harriman Hall, Room 116
4:30-5:10 W. Sharkey (joint with R. McLean): Potential, Consistency and Cost Allocation Prices
5:15-5:55 M. Wooders: On Aumann's Markets with a Continuum of Traders


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
9:30-10:30 J. Greenberg: Applications of the Theory of Social Situations to Extensive Form Games
11:00-12:00 A. Mas-Colell: Are Value Allocations in Large Economies Competitive?

Theory of Social Situations I -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001

2:00-2:40 D. Monderer: Multistage Situations
2:45-3:25 G. Asheim: Insurance Market Monopoly and Renegotiation
3:30-4:10 L. Xue (joint with M. Chwe): Conservative Farsighted Coalitions

Information, Contracts, and Search Algorithms -- Harriman Hall,
Room 104
2:00-2:40 R. Smorodinsky (joint with E. Lehrer): Converging to Equilibrium without Absolute Continuity
2:45-3:25 L. Felli (joint with L. Anderlini): Incomplete Written Contracts
3:30-4:10 E. Baum: How a Bayesian Plays Games Like Chess

Shapley Value I -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
2:00-2:40 I. Dragan: On the Computation of the Shapley Value
2:45-3:25 J. Sroka: The Value of Certain pNA Games Through Infinite-Dimensional Banach Spaces
3:30-4:10 R. van den Brink: Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games

Cooperative Games II -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
4:30-5:10 W. Zwicker: A Remarkable Class of Simple Games
5:15-5:55 S. Pechersky: On the Solution Concept for Generalized Multistage NTU-Games

Games with Restricted Coalitions -- Harriman Hall, Room 112
4:30-5:10 R. Gilles (joint with J. Derks): Hierarchical Organization Structures and Constraints on Coalition Formation
5:15-5:55 H. Peters: Shapley Values for Games with Restricted Coalitions

Exact Order Matrices -- Harriman Hall, Room 116
4:30-5:10 T. Parthasarathy: Degree Theory and Linear Complementarity Problems
5:15-5:55 L. Shapley: A 20-Player Game with Only Infinitely Flaky Stable Sets


Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
9:30-10:30 R. Blumenthal: Dynamic Bertrand-Style Duopoly Models
11:00-12:00 A. Neyman: Values of Non-Atomic Vector Measure Games

Noncooperative Games -- Earth and Space Sciences, Room 001
2:00-2:40 J. Bendor (joint with D. Mookherjee and D. Ray): Aspirations, Adaptive Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games
2:45-3:25 C.-Z. Qin: A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik
3:30-4:10 V.J. Baston: Infinite Deterministic Graphical Games

Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
2:00-2:40 E. Einy (joint with D. Wettstein): A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Bargaining Sets and the Core
2:45-3:25 N. Nagarajan: On Games with Leading Coalitions
3:30-4:10 P. Sudholter: Star-Shapedness of the Kernel for Homogeneous Games

Theory of Social Situations II -- Harriman Hall, Room 112
2:00-2:40 S. Tadelis: Optimistic Stability in Repeated Extensive Form Games
2:45-3:25 B. Shitovitz: Optimistic Stability in Games of Perfect Information
3:30-4:10 R. Gilles (joint with S. Weber): Optimistic Stability in Cooperative Economic Situations

Shapley Value II -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
4:30-5:10 C.-R. Hsiao: On the Weight Functions for the Shapley Value
5:15-5:55 V. Feltkamp: Simple Games and Solution Concepts

Stochastic Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 112
4:30-5:10 V. Kreps: On n-Person Games with Stochastically Dependent Strategies
5:15-5:55 V. Domansky (joint with V. Kreps): Eventually Revealing Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

The Core II -- Harriman Hall, Room 116
4:30-5:10 G.-J. Otten (joint with P. Borm, T. Storcken, and S. Tijs): Separable Effectivity Functions
5:15-5:55 C. Rafels (joint with N. Ybern): Unanimity Coordinates, Owen's and Lovasz's Extensions, Even and Odd Marginal Worth Vectors, Min-Modular Decompositions and Convex Games