INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY

Organized by Sylvain Sorin


July 13 to July 17, 1992

Stony Brook, New York


PROGRAM



  MONDAY, JULY 13

Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Joachim Rosenmüller
9:30-10:45 S. Hart: Polite Talk
11:00-12:15 C. Harris: Equilibria in Extensive Form Games

Information -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: John Hillas; Organizer: Beth Allen
2:00-2:45 B. Allen: Cooperative Game and Full Implementation with Asymmetric Information
2:50-3:35 S. Morris: Revising Knowledge and Beliefs: A Decision Theoretic Approach
4:00-4:45 S. Muto and M. Nakayame: The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard of Behavior: An Application of the Theory of Social Situations

Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair and Organizer: Jean-François Mertens
2:00-2:45 W. Leininger: Hotelling's Location Game Revisited
2:50-3:35 C.-Z. Qin: On a Potential Game for Endogenous Formation of Cooperations Structures
4:00-4:45 L. Zhou: The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game is a Complete Lattice

   
TUESDAY, JULY 14

Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Lloyd Shapley
9:30-10:45 D. Abreu: Implementation Theory: A Selective Survey of Recent Results
11:00-12:15 A. Maitra and W. Sudderth: Stochastic Games with Limsup Payoffs

Two-Sided Matching -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Dilip Abreu; Organizer: Marilda Sotomayor
2:00-2:45 A. Roth: First Jobs and College Bowl Bids: Problems and Pathologies in the Timing of Market Transactions
2:50-3:35 M. Sotomayor: Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching -- A Unified Treatment
4:00-4:45 S. Barberà and J. Alcade: Strategic Aspects in Matching Games

Learning and Renegotiation -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair and Organizer: Sylvain Sorin
2:00-2:45 E. Lehrer and E. Kalai: Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
2:50-3:35 V. Krishna: Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities
4:00-4:45 E. Einy and B. Peleg: Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria

 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 15

Contributed Papers

Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Beth Allen
9:30-10:00 C. d'Aspremont: Moral Hazard in Risk-Neutral Teams
10:05-10:35 A. Okada: Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an N-person Characteristic Function Game
10:55-11:25 G. Chichilnisky: Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choices
11:30-12:00 E. Winter and M. Wooders: An Axiomatization of the Core for Finite and Continuum Games

Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Ehud Kalai
9:30-10:00 J. Bergin and A. Sen: Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments
10:05-10:35 J. Abdou: Solvability of Game Forms -- The Infinite Case
10:55-11:25 N. Schofield: Probability and Convergence for Supra-Majority Rule with Euclidean Preferences
11:30-12:00 R. Gilles and G. Owen: Games with Permission Structures: The Disjunctive Approach

Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Michael Maschler
9:30-10:00 S. Pechersky: Core in Superlinear Fuzzy Games -- Axiomatic Approach
10:05-10:35 A. Nowak and T. Radzik: On Axiomatizations of the Weighted Shapley Values
10:55-11:25 J. Hirshleifer and J. Martinez-Coll: Selection, Mutation and the Preservation of Diversity in Evolutionary Games
11:30-12:00 J. Koza: Genetic Evolution and Co-Evolution of Game Strategies

Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Ehud Lehrer
2:00-2:20 S. Govindan: A Backward Induction Property of Stable Equilibria
2:25-2:45 O. Gossner: Folk Theorems with Mixed Strategies
2:50-3:10 J. Ma: Noncooperative Foundation of Strict Core in an Economy with Indivisibility

Chair: Joseph Abdou
3:30-3:50 A. Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens: Relative Utilitarianism
3:55-4:15 J.-M. Coulomb: Stochastic Games with Absorbing States and no Signals
4:20-4:40 M. Kaneko and J. Kline: Behavior Strategies, Mixed Strategies, and Perfect Recall: Part I

Chair: Jean-François Mertens
5:00-5:20 D. Balkenborg: The Notion of a Strict Outcome Path and Repeated Games with Common Interest
5:25-5:45 A. Blume: Equilibrium Refinement in Sender-Receiver Games: An Application of Persistence
5:50-6:10 R. van den Brink and R. Gilles: Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value for Games with Permission Structures

Physics, Room P 126
Chair: Christopher Harris
2:00-2:20 P. Coughlin: Concave-Convex Candidate Payoff Functions
2:25-2:45 D. Housman: Values for Partially Defined Games
2:50-3:10 A. Schotter: An Experimental Study of Learning in One- and Multi-Person Decision Problems
Chair: Ezra Einy
3:30-3:50 H. Chin: Advisory Group Games Based on Common Knowledge Using Evidential Reasoning
3:55-4:15 A. Taylor and W. Zwicker: Quasi-Weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games (I)
4:20-4:40 A. Taylor and W. Zwicker: Quasi-Weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games (II)

Chair: Abraham Neyman
5:00-5:20 T. E. Armstrong: Generalized Values
5:25-5:45 J. M. Esteban and J. Sakovics: Intertemporal Transfer Institutions
5:50-6:10 T. Driessen: Relationships Between Bankruptcy Games and Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games

Physics, Room P 128
Chair: Claude d'Aspremont
2:00-2:20 K. Nehring: Rational Decision with Vague Beliefs
2:25-2:45 G. Bonnano: Set-Theoretic Equivalence of Extensive-Form Games
2:50-3:10 C.-L. Yang: Cooperation by Credible Threats: On Social Cost of Transfer Contest under Uncertainty

Chair: Andrzej Nowak
3:30-3:50 I. Dragan: Multiweighted Shapley Values and Random Order Values
3:55-4:15 H. Haller: Collusion Properties of Values
4:20-4:40 C. Chang: The Bound of the Kernel

Chair: Pradeep Dubey
5:00-5:20 F. Bloch: Sequential Formation of Coalitions with Fixed Payoff Division
5:25-5:45 M. Shubik and D. Tsomokos: A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)
5:50-6:10 T. Radzik and A. Wieczorek: Measuring Initiative and Attraction by Means of Deviations from the Shapley Value

Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
2:00-2:20 S. Li: A Unified Framework for Implementation, Revelation Principle, and Optimal Approzimation
2:25-2:45 T. Quint and L. Quintas: The Shapley Value of Resale-Proof Trade
2:50-3:10 T. Solymosi: A Two-Phase Method for Finding the Nucleolus of Assignment Games

Chair: Robert Anderson
3:30-3:50 W. Guth and K. Ritzberger: On Durable Good Monopolies and the (Anti) Coase Conjecture
3:55-4:15 C.-P. Fan: Strategic Information Revelation in Duopoly Market Games
4:20-4:40 E. Hendon, B. Sloth, and T. Tranaes: Tie Stable Equilibria -- Threats and Promises in Strategic Form Games

Chair: Yair Tauman
5:00-5:20 B. Chakravorti, L.C. Corchon, and S. Wilkie: Credible Implementation
5:25-5:45 A. Manelli and D. R. Vincent: Optimal Procurement Mechanisms

 
THURSDAY, JULY 16

Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Robert Aumann

In Honor of Olga Bondareva
9:30-10:45 L. Shapley: The Structure of Authority in Organization
11:00-12:15 J. Rosenmüller: Equivalence Theorems via Nondegeneracy

Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair and Organizer: Yair Tauman
2:00-2:45 A. Sobolev: The Nucleolus of Cooperative Game with Arbitrary Bounds of Individual Rationality
2:50-3:35 R. McLean and W. Sharkey: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Internal Pricing of Computer Resources
4:00-4:45 M. Maschler: Application of the Reduced Game Property to Networks, Flows and General Linear Production Game

Incomplete Markets -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair and Organizer: Pradeep Dubey
2:00-2:45 D. Cass: Some Further Results on Sunspots with Incomplete Financial Markets
2:50-3:35 J. Geanakoplos: Monetary Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
4:00-4:45 P. Siconolfi: Incomplete Asset Market and the Information Revealed by Prices

 
FRIDAY, JULY 17

Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Sergiu Hart
9:30-10:45 D. Levine: Discounted Repeated Games with Signals
11:00-12:15 A. Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens: Perfect Correlated Equilibria

Game Theory and General Equilibrium Theory --
Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Myrna Wooder, Organizer: Robert Anderson
2:00-2:45 L. Zhou: Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
2:45-3:30 C. Shannon: Increasing Returns in Infinite Horizon Economies
3:45-4:30 M. Shubik: An Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Game with a Continuum of Traders: Trade with and without Banking
4:30-5:15 R. Anderson: An Example of a Non-Converging Bargaining Set

Repeated Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair and Organizer: Abraham Neyman
2:00-2:45 E. Lehrer: Repeated Games with Partial Monitoring
2:50-3:35 A. Nowak: Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games -- A Survey
4:00-4:45 N. Vieille: Equilibria in Stochastic Games