July 15 to July 18, 1991

Stony Brook, New York



Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Beth Allen
9:30-10:45 T. Bewley: Knightian Decision Theory
11:00-12:15 R. Aumann and A. Brandenburger: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

Learning and Bayesian Models -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Sylvain Sorin
2:30-3:00 M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob: Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games
3:00-3:30 N. Shimkin: Asymptotically Efficient Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
3:30-4:00 B. Sloth, E. Hendon, H.J. Jacobson, and M.T. Nielsen: A Learning Process for Games
4:30-5:00 H. Haller, J. Eichberger, and F. Milne: Naive Bayesian Learning in 2 x 2 Matrix Games
5:00-5:30 D. Monderer and D. Samet: Stochastic Common Learning
5:30-6:00 R. Rosenthal: Rules of Thumb in Games

Shapley Value and Fair Division -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Stef Tijs
2:30-3:00 T.E.S Raghavan and C. Hsiao: Shapley Value for Multi-Choice Cooperative Games (I)
3:00-3:30 A. Nowak and T. Radzik: Weighted Values for n-Person Games
3:30-4:00 I. Dragan: An Alternative Algebraic Definition of the Weighted Shapley Value
4:30-5:00 Y. Chun: On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Value
5:00-5:30 W. Thomson: Manipulation and Implementation of Solutions to Fair Division
5:30-6:00 J. Legut, J. Potters, and S. Tijs: Economies with Land: The NTU-Case

6:15-6:45 Harriman Hall, Room 137
Special Lecture

Professor Sun Juan
Director, Research Center
Beijing Institute of Management
Chinese Academy of Sciences

"Reforming the Chinese Economy: Two Major Problems"


Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
9:30-10:45 E. Kohlberg: Rationale for Perfect Equilibrium
11:00-12:15 S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell: N-Person Non-Cooperative Bargaining

Refinement of Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: John Hillas
2:30-3:00 J. Swinkels: Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants
3:00-3:30 S. Elmes: Equally Informative Games: A Definition and Characterization
3:30-4:00 B. Chakravorti and C. Kahn: Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium

Issues in Cooperative Games-- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Olga Bondareva
2:30-3:00 M. Chwe: A Far-Sighted Approach to Coalitional Stability
3:00-3:30 E. Einy and B. Peleg: Linear Measures of Inequality for Cooperative Games
3:30-4:00 C. Chang and F.C. Hsiag: An Example on Quasi-Zero-Monotonic Games

Repeated Games and Bounded Rationality -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Abraham Neyman
4:30-5:00 J. Gata: A Note on Decision-Making Complexity in the Context of the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
5:00-5:30 S. Chakrabarti: Finite Complexity, Bounded Recall and the Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
5:30-6:00 F. Thuijsman: Repeated Games with Restricted Memory Size

The Nucleolus -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Michael Maschler
4:30-5:00 T.S.H. Driessen: Coincidenc of and Collinearity Between Game Theoretic Solutions
5:00-5:30 P. Sudholter and J. Rosenmüller: The Nucleolus of Homogeneous Games with Steps
5:30-6:00 Y. Yanovskaya: The Excess Functions and Nucleoli in Cooperative Games

Issues in Noncooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Thomas Muench
4:30-5:00 J. Abdou: Solvability of Game Forms, Some Results in the Infinite Case
5:00-5:30 M. Sobel: Discounting and Risk Neutrality
5:30-6:00 E. Feinberg and A. Schwartz: Markov Decision Models with Weighted Discounted Criteria


Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Robert Aumann
9:30-10:45 B. Peleg and A. Shmida: Short-Run Stable Matching Between Bees and Flowers
11:00-12:15 M. Sotomayor: Stability Versus Pairwise Stability in the Two-Sided Many-to-Many Matching

Issues in Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Irinel Dragan
2:30-3:00 S.H. Tijs, I.J. Curiel, J.A.M. Potters, V.R. Prasad, and B. Veltman: Sequencing and Cooperation
3:00-3:30 T. Quint: Lattices and Two-Sided Matching Markets
4:00-4:30 J. Zhao: The Hybrid Solutions of an N-Person Game
4:30-5:00 Y. Zhou: Strategy Domination and the Related Cores
5:00-5:30 L. Zhou: An 'Average' Lyapunov-Type Convexity Result and Some Core Equivalence Results

Evolutionary Stable Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Elon Kohlberg
2:30-3:00 S. Scotchmer and E. Dekel: On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior
3:00-3:30 J. Swinkels: On the Stability of Evolutionary Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg-Mertens

Repeated Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Joseph Abdou
3:30-4:00 B. De Meyer: Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem

Knowledge and Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Dov Monderer
4:30-5:00 G. Bonanno: Knowledge and Beliefs in Extensive Games
5:00-5:30 R. Nau: The Incoherence of Agreeing to Disagree

Imperfect Competition -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Israel Zang
3:30-4:00 A. Urbano: Duopoly Experimentation: Cournot and Bertrand Competition
4:30-5:00 S.J. Turnbull: Organizations as Teams of Automata
5:00-5:30 H. Peters, H. van der Stel, and T. Storcken: Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems

Harriman Hall, Room 137
5:30-7:00 Special Session:
Research Ideas by Students


Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Walter Trockel
9:30-10:45 B. Allen: Market Games with Asymmetric Information and Non-Transferable Utility: Representation Results and the Core

Industrial Organization I -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Reiko Aoki
11:00-11:30 S. Lippman and J. Mamer: Innovation with a Large First-Mover Advantage
11:30-12:00 W. Leininger: Patent Competition and Rent Dissipation: Do Incumbents Move First?

Fair Assignments and Exchange Economies --
Harriman Hall, Room 104
Chair: Olga Bondareva
11:00-11:30 L. Zhou: Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies
11:30-12:00 A. Alkan: Monotonicity and Fair Assignments

Bargaining -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: William Thomson
11:00-11:30 B. Bensaid and R. Gary-Bobo: An Exact Formula for the Lion's Share: A Model of Pre-Play Negotiation
11:30-12:00 O. Bondareva and T. Kulakovskaia: Extensive Coverings and Core-Stability in Cooperative Games

Strategic Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 137
Chair: Bezalel Peleg
2:00-2:30 M. Maschler, J.L. Ferreira, and Y. Gilboa: How to Play a Game When Utilities Change in Times
2:30-3:00 B. Shitovitz: On the Optimistic Stable Standards of Behavior for a Class of Continuous Game Trees with Finite Outdegree
3:00-3:30 P. Coughlin: Pure Strategy Equilibria in a Class of Systems Defense Games
4:00-4:30 O. Bondareva: The Simplest Dynamic Game-Theoretical Model of an Economy
4:30-5:00 J. Zhao and M. Shubik: A Stategic Market Game of a Finite Exchange Economy with a Mutual Bank
5:00-5:30 L. Kranich: Equity, Efficiency and Incentives

Repeated Games and Incomplete Information --
Harriman Hall,
Room 104
Chair: Frank Thuijsman
2:00-2:30 A. Dasgupta: Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Repeated Games with Nonstationary Discounting
2:30-3:00 A. Blume: Intra-Play Communication in Repeated Games
3:00-3:30 J. Sachs and J.P. Langlois: An Integrative Approach to Subgame Perfect Reaction Function Equilibria in Discounted Supergames
4:00-4:30 J. Bergin and D. Bernhardt: Anonymous Sequential Games with General State Space
4:30-5:00 R. Serrano and O. Yosha: Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One-Sided Information Case
5:00-5:30 A. Heifetz: Hierarchic Constructions of Incomplete-Information Models

Industrial Organization II -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Suzanne Scotchmer
2:00-2:30 I. Zang and M. Kamien: Merger by Repeated Acquisition
2:30-3:00 D. Salant and N. Gandal: Movie Wars: Competitition Between Telephone and CATV Companies for Programming
3:00-3:30 S. Govindan: Stability and the Chain-Store Paradox
4:00-4:30 N. Gandal, A. Fishman, and O. Shay: Planned Obsolescence as an Engine of Technological Progress

Issues in Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108
Chair: Ahmet Alkan
4:30-5:00 A. van den Nouweland: Cores and Related Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games
5:00-5:30 G. Engl and S. Scotchmer: The Core and the Hedonic Core: Equivalence and Comparative Statics