INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYJuly 10 to July 14, 1990Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
| TUESDAY, JULY 10
| |
| Alliance Room Chair: Bryce Hool | |
| 9:30-10:30 | E. Kalai and E. Lehrer: Rational Learning to Nash Equilibrium |
| 11:00-12:00 |
S. Shenker:
Allocation Mechanisms in Computer Networks
|
| Alliance Room Chair: John Hillas | |
| 2:00-3:00 | J. Greenberg: A Very Brief Overview of the
Theory of Social Situations
|
| Fair Division -- Alliance Room Chair: Joseph Greenberg | |
| 3:15-3:45 | W. Thomson: The Implementation of Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division |
| 3:45-4:15 | D. Housman, L. Jew, C. Martell, and H. Winn: Monotonicity of Values for Cooperative Games |
| 4:30-5:00 | Y. Sprumont: Population Monotonic
Allocation Schemes for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
|
| Topics of Noncooperative Game Theory I -- Alliance Room | |
| 5:00-5:30 | S. Chakrabarti: Equilibria of Large Games with Imperfect Observability |
| 5:45-6:15 | T. Parthasarathy: Minimax Value and
Q-Matrices
|
| Foundations of Game Theory -- Javits Room Chair: Ehud Kalai | |
| 3:15-3:45 | M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima: Final Decisions, the Nash Equilibrium Concept and Solvability in Noncooperative Games with Common Knowledge of Logical Abilities |
| 3:45-4:15 | S. Vassilakis: Economic Data Types |
| 4:30-5:00 | V. Gurvich: Nash-Solvable Game Forms |
| 5:00-5:30 | J. Abdou: Strategic Equivalence in
Coalitional Game Forms
|
| WEDNESDAY, JULY 11 | |
| Alliance Room Chair: Abraham Neyman | |
| 9:30-10:30 | Lloyd Shapley: TBA |
| 11:00-12:00 |
R. Anderson:
Large Square Economies: An Asymptotic Interpretation
|
| Alliance Room Chair: Pradeep Dubey | |
| 2:00-3:00 | C.-Z. Qin: The Inner Core and the Strongly
Inhibitive Set
|
| Issues in Economic Theory -- Alliance Room Chair: Robert Anderson | |
| 3:15-3:45 | V. Kolpin: Minimal Treatment in the Core of Pure Exchange Economies |
| 3:45-4:15 | Z. Fluck: Does a Little Envy Make Any Difference? |
| 4:30-5:00 | K. Lang and R. Rosenthal: The Contractors' Game |
| 5:00-5:30 | R. Rosenthal and R. Wang: An Explanation of
Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies
|
| Bargaining Models and Renegotiation -- Javits Room Chair: John Hillas | |
| 3:15-3:45 | C. Ma and M. Manore: Random Delays and Deadlines in a Model of Bargaining |
| 3:45-4:15 | J. Wooders: Matching Models of Small and Large Markets |
| 4:30-5:00 | C. Asilis, C. Kahn, and D. Mookherjee: A Unified Approach to -Proof Equilibria |
| 5:00-5:30 | A. Blume: Bargaining with Randomly Changing
Valuations
|
| THURSDAY, JULY 12 | |
| Alliance Room Chair: Yair Tauman | |
| 9:30-10:30 | R. Stearns: TBA |
| 11:00-12:00 |
E. Kohlberg:
The Rationale for Sequential Equilibrium
|
| Alliance Room Chair: Jean-François Mertens | |
| 2:00-3:00 | M. Wooders: Inessentiality of Large
Coalitions and the Approximate Core Property: Two Equivalence Theorems
|
| Refinement of Equilibria -- Alliance Room Chair: Elon Kohlberg | |
| 3:15-3:45 | D. Nachman and T. Noe: Design of Securities Under Asymmetric Information |
| 3:45-4:15 | K. Iorio and A. Manelli: Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games |
| 4:30-5:00 | Y. Zhou: Refinements of the Equilibrium
Points Based on the Subgroup Players' Satisfaction
|
| Biology and Game Theory -- Alliance Room Chair: Elon Kohlberg | |
| 5:00-5:30 | L. Samuelson and J. Zhang: Evolutionary Games and Dominated Strategies |
| 5:45-6:15 | R. Boylan: Equilibria Resistant to Mutation
|
| Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Javits Room Chair: Myrna Wooders | |
| 3:15-3:45 | T. Quint: Cores of Assignment Games |
| 3:45-4:15 | J. Potters and S. Tijs: The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli |
| 4:30-5:00 | D. Monderer and I. Gilboa: Quasi-Values on Subspaces |
| 5:00-5:30 | M. Baruch: The Composition and Decomposition of Simple n-Person Games |
| 5:45-6:15 | M. Cantisani, E. Marchi, and G. Simonetti:
The Weighted Core with Distinguished Coalitions
|
| FRIDAY, JULY 13 | |
| Alliance Room Chair: Karl Vind | |
| 9:30-10:30 | D. Samet: Similarity of Information Structures |
| 11:00-12:00 |
J.-F. Mertens:
Nonexistence of the Shapley Value for Walrasian Economies (a
result of Françoise Lefevre)
|
| Topics in Noncooperative Game Theory II -- Alliance Room Chair: Stef Tijs | |
| 2:00-2:30 | B. De Meyer: Repeated Games and Multidimensional Normal Distribution |
| 2:30-3:00 | G. Demange: Rational Escalation |
| 3:15-3:45 | H. Chin: Applying Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Strategic-Level Matrix Games |
| 3:45-4:15 | R. Sundaram: How Different Can Strategic
Models Be? Non-Existence, Chaos, and Underconsumption in Markov-Perfect
Equilibria
|
| Applications of Non-Cooperative Games -- Alliance Room | |
| 4:30-5:00 | D. Hausch and L. Li: Auctions with Entry and Information Acquisition |
| 5:00-5:30 | S. Muto: On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition |
| 5:45-6:15 | R. Wang: Common-Value Auctions with
Discrete Private Information
|
| Issues in Economic Theory -- Javits Room Chair: Dov Samet | |
| 2:00-2:30 | A. Dasgupta: Learning by Competing |
| 2:30-3:00 | S. Skaperdas: Cooperation, Conflict, and
Power in the Absence of Property Rights
|
| Shapley Value and Applications -- Javits Room | |
| 3:15-3:45 | E. Petrakis: Voting for Taxes and Public Goods: Introduction of Government |
| 3:45-4:15 | R. Gilles and R. van den Brink: An Axiomatic Social Power Index for Hierarchically Structured Populations of Economic Agents |
| 4:30-5:00 | I. Dragan: On the Weighted Shapley Value and the Samet-Kalai Value |
| 5:00-5:30 | R. McLean: Customer Specific Cost Allocation Prices |
| 5:45-6:15 | Y. Tauman:
Incentive Compatible Balanced Schemes
|
| SATURDAY, JULY 14 | |
| Alliance Room Chair: Matthew Sobel | |
| 9:30-10:30 | S. Sorin: Values and Convergence in Dynamic Programming |
| 11:00-12:00 |
K. Shell and R. Wright:
Indivisibilities, Lotteries and Sunspot Equilibria
|
| Alliance Room Chair: Robert Rosenthal | |
| 2:00-2:30 | N. Vieille: Approachability
|
| Stochastic Games -- Alliance Room Chair: Sylvain Sorin | |
| 3:15-3:45 | N. Shimkin and A. Schwartz: Approachability in Stochastic Games with Vector Payoffs |
| 3:45-4:15 | M. Sobel: Risk Sensitive Sequential Games |
| 4:30-5:00 | V. Gurvich: Nash Equilibria in Stochastic
Games with Perfect Information
|
| Topics in Non-Cooperative Game Theory III -- Alliance Room | |
| 5:00-5:30 | R. Nau: Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information |
| 5:45-6:15 | G. Ravindran: Non-Zero-Sum Stopping Games
with Priority and Dynkin's Games
|
| Core and Stability -- Javits Room Chair: Cheng-Zhong Qin | |
| 3:15-3:45 | R. Lagunoff: Noncooperative Foundations for the Core of an Economy |
| 3:45-4:15 | B. Moldovanu: Nash and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining and the Core of Games in Characteristic Function Form |
| 4:30-5:00 | J. Heijmans: Insight in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions |
| 5:00-5:30 | J. Mo: Global Stability Analysis of Assignment Games |