July 10 to July 14, 1990

Stony Brook, New York



Alliance Room
Chair: Bryce Hool
9:30-10:30 E. Kalai and E. Lehrer: Rational Learning to Nash Equilibrium
11:00-12:00 S. Shenker: Allocation Mechanisms in Computer Networks

Alliance Room
Chair: John Hillas
2:00-3:00 J. Greenberg: A Very Brief Overview of the Theory of Social Situations

Fair Division -- Alliance Room
Chair: Joseph Greenberg
3:15-3:45 W. Thomson: The Implementation of Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division
3:45-4:15 D. Housman, L. Jew, C. Martell, and H. Winn: Monotonicity of Values for Cooperative Games
4:30-5:00 Y. Sprumont: Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

Topics of Noncooperative Game Theory I -- Alliance Room
5:00-5:30 S. Chakrabarti: Equilibria of Large Games with Imperfect Observability
5:45-6:15 T. Parthasarathy: Minimax Value and Q-Matrices

Foundations of Game Theory -- Javits Room
Chair: Ehud Kalai
3:15-3:45 M. Kaneko and T. Nagashima: Final Decisions, the Nash Equilibrium Concept and Solvability in Noncooperative Games with Common Knowledge of Logical Abilities
3:45-4:15 S. Vassilakis: Economic Data Types
4:30-5:00 V. Gurvich: Nash-Solvable Game Forms
5:00-5:30 J. Abdou: Strategic Equivalence in Coalitional Game Forms


Alliance Room
Chair: Abraham Neyman
9:30-10:30 Lloyd Shapley: TBA
11:00-12:00 R. Anderson: Large Square Economies: An Asymptotic Interpretation

Alliance Room
Chair: Pradeep Dubey
2:00-3:00 C.-Z. Qin: The Inner Core and the Strongly Inhibitive Set

Issues in Economic Theory -- Alliance Room
Chair: Robert Anderson
3:15-3:45 V. Kolpin: Minimal Treatment in the Core of Pure Exchange Economies
3:45-4:15 Z. Fluck: Does a Little Envy Make Any Difference?
4:30-5:00 K. Lang and R. Rosenthal: The Contractors' Game
5:00-5:30 R. Rosenthal and R. Wang: An Explanation of Inefficiency in Markets and a Justification for Buy-and-Hold Strategies

Bargaining Models and Renegotiation -- Javits Room
Chair: John Hillas
3:15-3:45 C. Ma and M. Manore: Random Delays and Deadlines in a Model of Bargaining
3:45-4:15 J. Wooders: Matching Models of Small and Large Markets
4:30-5:00 C. Asilis, C. Kahn, and D. Mookherjee: A Unified Approach to -Proof Equilibria
5:00-5:30 A. Blume: Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations


Alliance Room
Chair: Yair Tauman
9:30-10:30 R. Stearns: TBA
11:00-12:00 E. Kohlberg: The Rationale for Sequential Equilibrium

Alliance Room
Chair: Jean-François Mertens
2:00-3:00 M. Wooders: Inessentiality of Large Coalitions and the Approximate Core Property: Two Equivalence Theorems

Refinement of Equilibria -- Alliance Room
Chair: Elon Kohlberg
3:15-3:45 D. Nachman and T. Noe: Design of Securities Under Asymmetric Information
3:45-4:15 K. Iorio and A. Manelli: Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
4:30-5:00 Y. Zhou: Refinements of the Equilibrium Points Based on the Subgroup Players' Satisfaction

Biology and Game Theory -- Alliance Room
Chair: Elon Kohlberg
5:00-5:30 L. Samuelson and J. Zhang: Evolutionary Games and Dominated Strategies
5:45-6:15 R. Boylan: Equilibria Resistant to Mutation

Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Javits Room
Chair: Myrna Wooders
3:15-3:45 T. Quint: Cores of Assignment Games
3:45-4:15 J. Potters and S. Tijs: The Nucleolus of a Matrix Game and Other Nucleoli
4:30-5:00 D. Monderer and I. Gilboa: Quasi-Values on Subspaces
5:00-5:30 M. Baruch: The Composition and Decomposition of Simple n-Person Games
5:45-6:15 M. Cantisani, E. Marchi, and G. Simonetti: The Weighted Core with Distinguished Coalitions


Alliance Room
Chair: Karl Vind
9:30-10:30 D. Samet: Similarity of Information Structures
11:00-12:00 J.-F. Mertens: Nonexistence of the Shapley Value for Walrasian Economies (a result of Françoise Lefevre)

Topics in Noncooperative Game Theory II -- Alliance Room
Chair: Stef Tijs
2:00-2:30 B. De Meyer: Repeated Games and Multidimensional Normal Distribution
2:30-3:00 G. Demange: Rational Escalation
3:15-3:45 H. Chin: Applying Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Strategic-Level Matrix Games
3:45-4:15 R. Sundaram: How Different Can Strategic Models Be? Non-Existence, Chaos, and Underconsumption in Markov-Perfect Equilibria

Applications of Non-Cooperative Games -- Alliance Room
4:30-5:00 D. Hausch and L. Li: Auctions with Entry and Information Acquisition
5:00-5:30 S. Muto: On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition
5:45-6:15 R. Wang: Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Private Information

Issues in Economic Theory -- Javits Room
Chair: Dov Samet
2:00-2:30 A. Dasgupta: Learning by Competing
2:30-3:00 S. Skaperdas: Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights

Shapley Value and Applications -- Javits Room
3:15-3:45 E. Petrakis: Voting for Taxes and Public Goods: Introduction of Government
3:45-4:15 R. Gilles and R. van den Brink: An Axiomatic Social Power Index for Hierarchically Structured Populations of Economic Agents
4:30-5:00 I. Dragan: On the Weighted Shapley Value and the Samet-Kalai Value
5:00-5:30 R. McLean: Customer Specific Cost Allocation Prices
5:45-6:15 Y. Tauman: Incentive Compatible Balanced Schemes


Alliance Room
Chair: Matthew Sobel
9:30-10:30 S. Sorin: Values and Convergence in Dynamic Programming
11:00-12:00 K. Shell and R. Wright: Indivisibilities, Lotteries and Sunspot Equilibria

Alliance Room
Chair: Robert Rosenthal
2:00-2:30 N. Vieille: Approachability

Stochastic Games -- Alliance Room
Chair: Sylvain Sorin
3:15-3:45 N. Shimkin and A. Schwartz: Approachability in Stochastic Games with Vector Payoffs
3:45-4:15 M. Sobel: Risk Sensitive Sequential Games
4:30-5:00 V. Gurvich: Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information

Topics in Non-Cooperative Game Theory III -- Alliance Room
5:00-5:30 R. Nau: Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information
5:45-6:15 G. Ravindran: Non-Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Priority and Dynkin's Games

Core and Stability -- Javits Room
Chair: Cheng-Zhong Qin
3:15-3:45 R. Lagunoff: Noncooperative Foundations for the Core of an Economy
3:45-4:15 B. Moldovanu: Nash and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining and the Core of Games in Characteristic Function Form
4:30-5:00 J. Heijmans: Insight in Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
5:00-5:30 J. Mo: Global Stability Analysis of Assignment Games