INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYOrganized by John Hillas
July 10 to July 14, 2000Stony Brook, New York
PROGRAM
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MONDAY, JULY 10 |
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
9:00-10:00 | R. Anderson: Genericity with Infinitely Many
Parameters Chair: A. Neyman |
1.A: Industrial Organization Theory I Chair: E. Einy |
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10:30-10:55 | S.-C. Chiang: Dynamic R&D Competition with Previous-Generation Production Experience |
10:30-10:55 | R. Axtell: The Emergence of Firms in a Population of Agents. Local Increasing Returns, Unstable Nash Equilibria, and Skewed Size Distributions |
11:30-11:55 | P. Dubey: Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces More Effort (with C.-w. Wu) |
1.B: Repeated Games Chair: J. Vila |
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10:30-10:55 | K. Abhyankar: Smale Strategies for Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Type Games |
11:00-11:25 | I. Arribas: Repeated Games with Probabilistic Horizon (with A. Urbano) |
11:30-12:00 | A. Urbano: Pseudorandom Processes: Entropy and Automata (with P. Hernandez) |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
2:00-3:00 | J. Geanakoplos: Default and Crashes in General
Equilibrium Chair: R. Aumann |
2.A: Contracts Chair: J. Geanakoplos |
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3:30-3:55 | H.-C. Chen: The Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract with no Commitment to Auditing |
4:00-4:25 | O. Haimanko: Optimal Scrutiny for Multi-Period Promotion Tournaments (with P. Dubey) |
2.B: Industrial Organization Applications I Chair: R. Axtell |
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3:30-3:55 | C. Kuo: Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behaviors in the Long-Distance Telecommunications Industry in the U.S. |
4:00-4:25 | E. Maasland: Procuring Universal Telecommunications Services |
4:30-5:00 | C. Mazón: E-Commerce, Consumer Search and Cost Reduction (with P. Pereira) |
2.C: Agreements, Groups, and Rationalizability Chair: M. Burgin |
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3:30-3:55 | E. Diamantoudi: Binding Agreements |
4:00-4:25 | I. Milchtaich: Stability and Segregation in Group Formation (with E. Winter) |
4:30-4:55 | L. Xue: A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability: Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability |
TUESDAY, JULY 11 |
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
9:00-10:00 | K. Bagwell: The Theory of the WTO Chair: R. Anderson |
3.A: Industrial Organization Theory II Chair: C. Kuo |
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10:30-10:55 | E. Catilina: Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets: A Three-Stage Approach |
11:00-11:25 | I. Linnosmaa: Competition, Quality and Corporate Structure |
11:30-11:55 | M. Ryan: Conditional Strategic Equivalence and Frame Restricted Choice with Applications to Regulatory Risk and Uncertainty |
3.B: Incentives/Mechanism Design I Chair: O. Haimanko |
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10:30-10:55 | S. Basov: Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents |
11:00-11:25 | Z. Forshner: Agency Spaces |
11:30-11:55 | G. Giraud: Universal and Strong Coalition-Proof Nash Implementation of Walras Equilibria |
3.C: Social/Political Models Chair: D. Wettstein |
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10:30-10:55 | D. Filipovich: Why Is There So Much Fraud in Transition Economies? |
11:00-11:25 | R. Harbaugh: Reputable Discrimination (with T. To) |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
2:00-3:00 | C. Harris: Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption Chair: D. Samet |
4.A: Complexity and Bounded Rationality Chair: A. Urbano |
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3:30-3:55 | E. Solan: Randomization and Simplification (with E. Kalai) |
4:00-4:25 | J. Vila: The Complexity of a Strategy (with P. Hernandez and A. Urbano) |
4:30-5:00 | J. Smith: Kolmogorov Complexity and the Difficulty of Carrying out Strategies |
4.B: Industrial Organization Theory III Chair: E. Catilina |
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3:30-3:55 | E. Prado: Survival of Technologies: An Evolutionary Game Approach (with Décio K. Kadota and Jorge E. de C. Soromenho) |
4:00-4:25 | D. Herreiner: The Decision to Seek or to be Sought |
4:30-5:00 | I. Obara: Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited |
WEDNESDAY, JULY 12 |
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
9:00-10:00 | D. Samet: Between Liberalism and Democracy Chair: S. Brams |
5.A: Special Games Chair: R. Harbaugh |
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10:30-10:55 | S. Brams: Yankee Trading (with J. Lax and T. Kaplan) |
11:00-11:25 | I. Luski: Contests with Variable Rewards (with A. Sela, T. Kaplan, and D. Wettstein) |
11:30-11:55 | V. Mazalov: Two-Card Poker Models (with Igor S. Makhankov) |
5.B: Industrial Organization Applications II Chair: C. Mazón |
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10:30-10:55 | H. Benchekroun: On the Effects of Unilateral Quotas on the Harvesting of a Renewable Resource |
11:00-11:25 | X. Más-Mańez: Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model |
11:30-11:55 | R. McKelvey: Fish-Wars on the High Seas: Erecting Economic Barriers to Entry |
5.C: Incentives/Mechanism Design II Chair: Z. Forshner |
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10:30-10:55 | S. Severinov: Sustaining Cooperation Through Delegation |
11:00-11:25 | V. Skreta: Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
2:00-3:00 | P. Dubey: Inside and Outside Money, Gains to Trade and
IS-LM Chair: A. Brandenburger |
6.A: Industrial Organization Applications III Chair: I.
Linnosmaa |
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3:30-3:55 | S. Mahuteau: On the Reliability of Reciprocal Behaviors in a Wage Setting Game. Econometric Analysis on a French Firm Survey |
4:00-4:25 | O. Richard: An Empirical Model of Entry for Multimarket Industries with Incomplete Information and Demand Synergies (with O. Armantier) |
4:30-5:00 | J. Voola: Game Theory and Reality: An Explanation of the Structure of the Petroleum Industry |
6.B: Noncooperative Solution Concepts I Chair: J. Hillas |
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3:30-3:55 | O. Armantier: Nash Equilibrium Approximation in Games of Incomplete Information (with J.-P. Florens and J.-F. Richard) |
4:00-4:25 | A. Brandenburger: Epistemic Conditions for Iterated Admissibility (with H. J. Keisler) |
4:30-4:55 | P. Brown: Influence Diagrams to Model and Classify Game Theoretic Problems |
6.C: Cooperative Games I Chair: L. Kóczy |
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3:30-3:55 | R. Bhattacharjee: Polytope Games (with F. Thuijsman and O.J. Vrieze) |
4:00-4:25 | M. Jones: The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions (with S. Brams and M. Kilgour) |
4:30-4:55 | M. Burgin: Axiomatic Representation of the Enhanced Banzhaf Power Index (with L. Shapley) |
THURSDAY, JULY 13 |
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
9:00-10:00 | B. Nalebuff: Business Strategy and Game Theory Chair: Y. Tauman |
7.A: Experiments and Tests Chair: S. Mahuteau |
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10:30-10:55 | A. Simon: TBA |
11:00-11:25 | M. Walker: Minimax Play at Wimbledon (with J. Wooders) |
7.B: Learning Chair: A. Matros |
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10:30-10:55 | T. Fujiwara-Greve: Learning to Coordinate by Forward Looking Players (with C. Krabbe Nielsen) |
11:00-11:25 | M. Shor: Learning in Limited Information Environments |
11:30-11:55 | E. Einy: Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly (with D. Moreno and B. Shitovitz) |
7.C: Auctions I Chair: B. Lebrun |
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10:30-10:55 | A. Chakraborty: First Impression in a Sequential Auction (with R. Harbaugh and N. Gupta) |
11:00-11:25 | K.-S. Chung: Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Values (with J. Ely) |
11:30-11:55 | F. Menezes: Synergies and Price Trends in Sequntial Auctions (with P. Monteiro) |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
2:00-3:00 | R. Rob: Product Innovation by a Durable Good Monopoly Chair: R. McLean |
8.A: Cooperative Games II Chair: E. Friedman |
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3:30-3:55 | L. Kóczy: Consistent Refinements of the Core of a Partition Function Game |
4:00-4:25 | R. McLean: Informational Size Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (with A. Postlewaite) |
4:30-4:55 | M. Widgren: Inferior Players in Simple Games (with S. Napel) |
8.B: Learning/Evolution Chair: T. Fujiwara-Greve |
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3:30-3:55 | A. Matros: Stochastic Imitation in Extensive Form Games |
8.C: Auctions II Chair: A. Chakraborty |
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3:30-3:55 | B. Lebrun: First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model |
4:00-4:25 | C.-L. Chen: Collusion in One-Shot Second-Price Auctions: The Simultaneous Offers Case (with Y. Tauman) |
4:30-4:55 | R. Orzach: Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information (with E. Einy and A. Sela) |
FRIDAY, JULY 14 |
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Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
9:00-10:00 | L. Shapley: Discrete Cournot Chair: P. Dubey |
9.A: Value Theory and Cost Allocation Chair: R. Bhattacharjee |
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10:30-10:55 | E. Friedman: Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing |
11:00-11:25 | D. Wettstein: Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value (with D. Perez Castrillo) |
9.B: Political Topics and Auctions III Chair: R. Orzach |
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10:30-10:55 | J. Lax: Supreme Strategy: Signaling and Compliance in the U.S. Supreme Court |
11:00-11:30 | B. de Otto: Bidding in a Pool Mechanism with Contract Management |
Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001 | |
2:00-3:00 | D. Abreu: Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium
Selection in Repeated Games Chair: C. Harris |
Last updated on July 17, 2002 by Hakan Timbil.