INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY

Organized by Michael Maschler


July 16 to July 20, 2001

Stony Brook, New York


PROGRAM
  MONDAY, JULY 16

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001

9:15-10:00

P. Reny:
Rationalizing mixed strategy as strictly optimal yet potentially randomized bahavior.

 10:00-10:45

 H. Moulin:
Random Assignment and Time-sahring under dichotomous preferences.

  10:45-11:15

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

C. Freeman and A. Shmida:
Plant sex: Futures, options, and iNformation.

2:00-2:45

T. J. de Jong:
Games planst play.

2:45-3:15

 Coffee Break
1.A: Evolutionary Horesses
Chair: J. Hofbauer

3:15-3:40

 A. Shmida and C. Freeman:
Sex types in plants --- game within and between gender

3:45-4:10

 C. Freeman, A. Shmida and K. J. Miglia:
Sex: Futures, options and information

4:15-4:40

 A. Possajennikov:
Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens: Evolution of strategies and preferences.

4:45-5:10

 J. Hofbauer and W. H. Sandholm:
Default and Crashes in General Equilibrium
  1.B: Cost Sharing
Chair: A. van den Nouweland

3:15-3:40

 V. Kolpin and D. Aadland:
Environmental determinants of cost sharing an application to irrigation.

3:45-4:10

 G. Stamatopoulos:
Strategy-proof cost allocation schemes

4:15-4:40

 Y. Yu:
Multiple units public goods provision: Generalizing Jackson-Moulin Mechanism

4:45-5:10

 A. van den Nouweland , S. Tijs and M. H. Wooders:
Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies.
  1.C: Coalition Formation
Chair: M. A. Ball

3:15-3:40

 M. A. Ball:
A new solution for n-person games using coalitional theory.

3:45-4:10

 G. Stamatopoulos:
Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

4:15-4:40

 M. Burgin and L. Shapley
Optimization principle for coalition

4:45-5:10

 F. Bloch and S. Rottier:
Agenda Control in Coalition Formation.
  1.D: Markets/Pricing
Chair: Markets/Pricing

3:15-3:40

 M. Blouin:
Equilibrium in decentralized market with adverse selection.

3:45-4:10

 A. Bogomolnia and R. Deb:
The priority rule: a solution to strategy-proof allocation problem for indivisible goods in the presence of indifference.

4:15-4:40

 S. Giraud, and S. Weyers:
Strategic market games with a finite horizon and incomplete markets.

4:45-5:10

 J. Bergin and L. Zhou:
Optimal monopolistic non-discriminatory pricing
   

TUESDAY, JULY 17

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001

9:15-10:00

V. Smith:
Controlling Market Power and Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-side Bidding.

 10:00-10:45

 P. Hammerstein:
Evolution of cooperation in biological games and markets

  10:45-11:15

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

R. J. Aumann:
Backward Induction without Counterfactuals.

2:00-2:45

S. Hart:
Adaptive Strategies.

2:45-3:15

 Coffee Break
2.A: Evolutionary Processes
Chair: O. Volij

3:15-3:40

 A. Heifetz and E. Segev:
The evolutionary role of emotions in bargaining

3:45-4:10

 J.S. Garcia:
On Evolutionary Bargaining.

4:15-4:40

 A. Poulsen:
Preference evolution, reciprocity and efficiency.

4:45-5:10

O. Volij:
In defense of DEFECT
2.B: Implementations
Chair: S. McDonald

3:15-3:40

 R. Beard and S. McDonald:
Evolutionary Implementation.

3:45-4:10

 E. Miyagawa:
Generalized implementation and a characterization of Walras equilibrium.

4:15-4:40

 N. Watanabe:
A noncooperative bargaining foundation of nucleolus: The nucleolus equivalence.

4:45-5:10

 R. Beard and S. McDonald:
Evolutionary Implementation.
2.C: Coalition Formation
Chair: S. Muto

3:15-3:40

 E. Diamantoudi and L. Xue:
Stability in coalition formation games with externalities

3:45-4:10

 E. Diamantoudi and L. Xue:
Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games

4:15-4:40

 J.F. Nash:
Agencies and coalitions, a method for reduction of formally cooperative games to formally non-cooperative games and some computational research on a project of study based on this method.

4:45-5:10

 R. Ono and S. Muto
Stability of Japan's coalition cabinet.
2.D: Principal Agent Issues
Chair: I. C. Park

3:15-3:40

 G. Celik:
Mechanism design in the presence of supervision

3:45-4:10

 R. Deneckere and S. Severinov:
Communication costs and the revelation principle

4:15-4:40

 F. L. Laux:
Contracting for expertise: The single-agent case.

4:45-5:10

 I.U. Park:
Repeated moral hazard with renegotiation and free access to credit markets
2.E: Auctions
Chair: A. Gavious

3:15-3:40

 C. L. Chen:
A scheme for solving problems on collusion in one-shot auctions

3:45-4:10

 E. Einy, O. Haimanko, R. Orzach and A. Sela:
Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions

4:15-4:40

 T. Mathews:
Buyout options in internet auction markets

4:45-5:10

 A. Gavious and A. Sela:
Auctions with reservation prices
Reception Dinner, Three Village Inn
   

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001

9:15-10:00

S.H. Tijs:
Cooperative Game Theory in Action and Interaction.

 10:00-10:45

 A. Neyman:
Zero Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Public Uncertain Duration Process.

  10:45-11:15

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

L. Petrosjan:
Time-consistency Problem in Dynamic and Multystage Games.

2:00-2:45

E. Kalai:
Information-Proof Equilibria in Large Games.

2:45-3:15

 Coffee Break
3.A: Auctions
Chair: D. Wettstein

3:15-3:40

 M. Sotomayor:
A simultaneous ascending bid auction for multiple items and demands

3:45-4:10

 M. Peters and S. Severinov:
Internet auctions with many traders

4:15-4:40

 S. Izmalkov
English Auctions with reentry

4:45-5:10

 D. Perez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein:
Choosing wisely: A multi-bidding approach.
3.B: Stochastic/Repeated Processes
Chair: F. Thuijsman

3:15-3:40

 J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O.J. Vrieze:
n-person switching control stochastic games.

3:45-4:10

 R. Laraki:
The splitting game and applications

4:15-4:40

 K.H. Schlag:
How to choose -- A boundedly rational approach to repeated decision making.

4:45-5:10

 G. Schoenmakers, J. Flesh and F. Thuijsman:
Auctions with reservation prices
3.C: Coalition Formation
Chair: N. Olaizalo

3:15-3:40

 R. Garrat and C.Z. Qin:
On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals in three-player games.

3:45-4:10

 A. Gomes:
Externalities and renegotiatios in three-player coalitional bargaining

4:15-4:40

 A. Gomes:
Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions

4:45-5:10

 J. Kuipers and N.Olaizola:
Protocols in sequential formation of coalitions
3.D: Cooperative Games
Chair: F. Patrone

3:15-3:40

 T. Solymosi and T.E.S. Raghavan:
Assignment games with stable core.

3:45-4:10

 T. Solymosi:
The bargaining set of four-person balanced games

4:15-4:40

 V. Fragnelli, F. Patrone and A. Torre:
Tikhonov well-posedness for the nucleolus.

4:45-5:10

 A. Gavious and A. Sela:
Auctions with reservation prices
3.E: Equilibirum Analysis
Chair: P.Dubey

3:15-3:40

 J. Berg and A. McLennan:
An asymptotic growth rate of the mean number of equilibria of a two player game

3:45-4:10

 W.T. Juang:
A folk theorem on equilibrium selection in knowledgeable games.

4:15-4:40

R. Orzach, P.B. Overgaard and Y. Tauman:
Modest advertising signals strength

4:45-5:10

 P. Dubey and O. Haimanko:
Unilateral deviations with perfect information
   

THURSDAY, JULY 19

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001

9:15-10:00

B. Peleg and H. Keiding:
Stable representations of constitutions: A survey

 10:00-10:45

 R. Serrano:
The Evolution of Exchange.

  10:45-11:15

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

 L.S. Shapley:
On the rate of convergence of the strong epsilon-core.

2:00-2:45

 M. Shubik:
Information-Proof Equilibria in Large Games.

2:45-3:15

 Coffee Break
4.A: Incomplete Information
Chair: R. McLean

3:15-3:40

 G. Stamatopoulos:
Refinements of equilibria in games with incomplete information.

3:45-4:10

 J. Thijssen, K. Huisman and P.M. Kort:
Strategic investment under uncertainty and information spillovers

4:15-4:40

 L. Renou:
Financial architectures: the role of higher order beliefs.

4:45-5:10

 R. McLean, I. Obara and A. Postlewaite:
Informational smallness and private monitoring
4.B: Value Theory
Chair: Chair: F. Valenciano

3:15-3:40

 E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, R. van den Brink and A. Jimenez-Losada:
Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids.

3:45-4:10

 I. Dragan:
On semivalues and TU games on matroids

4:15-4:40

M. Haines and M.A. Jones:
Geometric implications of the Shapley-Shubik power index

4:45-5:10

 A. Laruelle and F. Valenciano:
A probabilistic refoundation of power measures.
4.C Applications
Chair: V. Milliou

3:15-3:40

 M. Morelli and M. Montero:
The stable demand set: General characterization and application to majority games.

3:45-4:10

 K. Kultti and H. Vartiainen:
Stable bargaining procedures

4:15-4:40

R. Branzei, S. Tijs and J. Timmer:
Entry Games arising from information collecting situations.

4:45-5:10

 V. Milliou
Vertical Integration and R&D Spillovers: Is there a need for 'firewalls'?
4.D Voting and elections
Chair: M. Kaminsky

3:15-3:40

 P. Coughlin:
 Electoral competition: Basic features and an extensive form?

3:45-4:10

 J. Miekisz:
Stochastic stability in spatial three-player games.

4:15-4:40

 M. Montero:
The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooperative Majority Games.

4:45-5:10

 M.M. Kaminski:
General equilibrium model of party competition.
4.E: Cooperative Games
Chair: H. Keiding

3:15-3:40

 S. Pechersky:
On 'proportional' excess function for NTU-games: Axiomatic approach.

3:45-4:10

 G. Ferrari, S. Moretti and F. Patrone:
On some game theoretical issues arising from waste management..

4:15-4:40

S. Tarashina:
The core in a cooperative time-optimal pursuit game.

4:45-5:10

 H. Keiding and B.Peleg:
Continuous representations of topological effectivity functions.

5:30 – 7:00

 Roundtable:    How applicable is Game Theory?

R. J. Aumann
E. Kalai
M. Maschler
J. Nash
A. van den Nouweland
F. Patrone
M. Shubik
Y. Tauman
S. H. Tijs
   

FRIDAY, JULY 20

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001

9:15-10:00

G.J. Mailath:
Coordination in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.

 10:00-10:45

 J.F. Mertens:
TBA.

  10:45-11:15

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

 B. Sudderth:
N-person Stochastic Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs.

2:00-2:45

 S. Brams:
Games that end in a Bang or a Whimper.

2:45-3:15

 Coffee Break
5.A Experiments
Chair: R.J. Cosana

3:15-3:40

O. Armantier:
Does wealth affect fairness consideration?.

3:45-4:10

M. Costa-Gomes and G. Weizsacker:
Stated second and first order beliefs and decisions in normal-form games..

4:15-4:40

B.P. Garza, F.J. Jimenez, A.V. Fernandez and R.J. Cosano:
Measuring competition among students through experimental beauty contest games: An example.

4:45-5:10

 B.P. Garza, F.J. Jimenez, A.V. Fernandez and R.J. Cosano:
Measuring competition among students through experimental beauty contest games: An overview of results.
5.B Duopoly
Chair: A. T. Yim

3:15-3:40

 Q. Liu and K. Serfes:
Endogenous acquisition of information on consumer willingness to pay in a product differentiated duopoly.

3:45-4:10

 I. Linnosmaa:
Corporate structure in duopoly firms.

4:15-4:40

 O. Haimanko and R. Steinberg:
Price symmetry in a duopoly with congestion.

4:45-5:10

 A.T. Yim:
Politically more viable tax audit strategy.
5.C.:Applications
Chair: P. Schweinzer

3:15-3:40

 S.J. Brams and D. King:
Efficient fair division: Help the worst off or avoid envy?

3:45-4:10

 K.H. Pham Do, H. Folmer and H. Norde:
Game Theory and fisheries management

4:15-4:40

 F.S. Sanchez:
About inheritance distribution.

4:45-5:10

 P. Schweinzer:
Bilateral uncertainty in a model of job-market screening with intermediaries..
5.D: Consistency
Chair: W. Thompson

3:15-3:40

 X. Luo:
Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic foundation.

3:45-4:10

 C.H. Yeh
Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems.

4:15-4:40

 W. Thompson
Consistency of solutions to claim problems, and bargaining solutions.
5.E:Applications/extensive and normal form games
Chair: T.Q.Pan

3:15-3:40

 F. Echenique
A characterization of strategic complementarities.

3:45-4:10

 M.D. Ryall
Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games.

4:15-4:40

 T.Q. Pan
A logistic method to games equilibriums solving.

4:45-5:10

 O.Gossner
The value of information in zero-sum games.
 
  
Last updated on July 17, 2002 by Hakan Timbil.