Intensive Course on the Theory of Strategic EquilibriumOrganized by Robert J. Aumann, Jean-François Mertens, and Abraham NeymanJuly 2 to July 9, 1990Stony Brook, New YorkPROGRAM | |
| A. Neyman:
Games in Normal Form | |
| S. Sorin:
Games in Extensive Form | |
| A. Neyman:
The Minimax Theorem (in Normal Form Games) | |
| S. Sorin:
Review and Examples | |
| S. Sorin:
Minimax Theorem for Ordered Fields | |
| J.-F. Mertens:
Equilibrium Points | |
| S. Sorin:
The Manifold of Equilibria | |
| J.-F. Mertens:
Tarski's Principle and Applications | |
| S. Sorin:
Extensions of Equilibria | |
| J.-F. Mertens:
Extensive Form Correlated and Communication Equilibria | |
| S. Sorin:
Refinement of Nash Equilibria | |
| J.-F. Mertens:
Ordinality | |
| J.-F. Mertens:
Stable Sets of Equilibria | |
| A. Neyman:
Ordered Fields | |
| S. Sorin:
Use of Stability in Signaling Games | |