Intensive Course on the Theory of Strategic Equilibrium

Organized by Robert J. Aumann, Jean-François Mertens, and Abraham Neyman


July 2 to July 9, 1990

Stony Brook, New York

PROGRAM



A. Neyman:
Games in Normal Form
S. Sorin:
Games in Extensive Form
A. Neyman:
The Minimax Theorem (in Normal Form Games)
S. Sorin:
Review and Examples
S. Sorin:
Minimax Theorem for Ordered Fields
J.-F. Mertens:
Equilibrium Points
S. Sorin:
The Manifold of Equilibria
J.-F. Mertens:
Tarski's Principle and Applications
S. Sorin:
Extensions of Equilibria
J.-F. Mertens:
Extensive Form Correlated and Communication Equilibria
S. Sorin:
Refinement of Nash Equilibria
J.-F. Mertens:
Ordinality
J.-F. Mertens:
Stable Sets of Equilibria
A. Neyman:
Ordered Fields
S. Sorin:
Use of Stability in Signaling Games