Organized by Robert Weber

July 24 to July 27, 1995

Stony Brook, New York



10:00-12:15 R. Weber: The Basic Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

2:15-4:30 J. Riley: Mechanism Design and Bidder Heterogeneity


10:00-12:15 R. Weber: Multiple-Object Auctions

2:15-4:30 R. Marshall: Collusion

Issues in Practice


10:00-12:15 P. Cramton: The FCC Spectrum Auctions

2:15-3:45 V.R. Reinhart (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, joint with R.A. Feldman, IMF): Auction Format Matters: Evidence on Bidding Behavior and Seller Revenue

4:15-5:00 ESS, Room 001
N. Gandal: Sequential Auctions of Israeli Cable Television Licenses: An Empirical Test for Interdependent Valuations

4:15-5:00 ESS, Room 181
R. Tenorio (joint with L. Goldberg): Strategic Behavior in Two-Sided Foreign Exchange Auctions


9:30-10:15 ESS, Room 001
A. Alkan: Price Rule and Volatility in Auctions with Resale Markets

9:30-10:15 ESS, Room 181
J. Swinkels (joint with W. Pesendorfer): The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

10:15-11:00 ESS, Room 001
R. Wang: Competitive Contingent Procurement Contracts

10:15-11:00 ESS, Room 181
S. Zamir (joint with M. Landsberger and E. Wolfstetter): Private Value Auctions When Ranking of Bidder Types is Common Knowledge

11:30-12:15 ESS, Room 001
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (joint with C.M. Kahn): Multi-Good Auctions with Private Values

11:30-12:15 ESS, Room 181
M.A. Arnold (joint with S.A. Lippman): Selecting a Selling Institution: Auctions vs. Sequential Search

2:15-3:00 ESS, Room 001
R. Burguet (joint with J. Sakovics): Reserve Prices Without Commitment

2:15-3:00 ESS, Room 181
J. Swinkels: Asymptotic Efficiency for Large Auctions

3:00-3:45 ESS, Room 001
A. Artale: Rings in Auctions: An Experimental Approach

3:00-3:45 ESS, Room 181
S. Bose (joint with G. Deltas): Limiting Competition in Auctions with Retailers and End Users

4:15-5:00 ESS, Room 001
B. Lebrun: First-Price Auction in the Asymmetric N-Bidder Case

4:15-5:00 ESS, Room 181
M. Bhiladwalla: A Bilateral Trading Mechanism: Sequential Rationality and Ex-Post Efficiency
4:15-5:00 ESS, Room 183
R. Rosenthal (joint with V. Krishna): Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies