MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONSOrganized by Philip RenyJuly 16 to July 18, 2000
Official Program
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SUNDAY, JULY 16 |
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| 10:00 am - 11:00 am | Efficient Mechanism Design |
| Vijay Krishna, Penn State University (with M. Perry, Hebrew University) |
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| 11:15 am - 12:15 pm | An Efficient Simultaneous Multi-Unit Auction |
| Philip Reny, University of Chicago (with M. Perry, Hebrew University) |
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| 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm | Properties of Large Auctions |
| Jeroen Swinkels, Washington University |
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| 3:15 pm - 4:15 pm | Collusion in Repeated Auctions and Pricing Games |
| Susan Athey, MIT |
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MONDAY, JULY 17 |
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| 10:00 am - 11:00 am | Optimal Bidding in Multi-Unit Discriminatory Auctions |
| S. Viswanathan, Duke University (with J. Wang, Duke University, and T. Witelski, Duke University) |
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| 11:15 am - 12:15 pm | Multi-Unit Demand Auctions with Synergies: Behavior in Sealed-Bid Versus Ascending-Bid Auctions |
| John Kagel, Ohio State University (with Dan Levin, Ohio State University) |
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| 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm | Correlated Signals Against Monotone Equilibria |
| Michael Landsberger, Haifa University (with B. Tsirelson, Tel Aviv University) |
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| 3:15 pm - 4:15 pm | Existence in Discontinuous Bayesian Games With Applications to Auctions |
| Jeroen Swinkels, Washington University (with M. Jackson, CALTECH) |
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TUESDAY, JULY 18 |
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| 10:00 am - 11:00 am | An Efficient Ascending Multi-Unit Auction |
| Philip Reny, University of Chicago (with M. Perry, Hebrew University) |
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| 11:15 am - 12:15 pm | On Generalizing the English Auction |
| Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland |
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| 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm | Asymmetric English Auctions |
| Vijay Krishna, Penn State University |
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| 3:15 pm - 4:15 pm | The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities |
| Ennio Stachetti, University of Maryland (with F. Gul, Princeton University) |
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