Stability of Equilibria

Organized by Srihari Govindan

July 18 to July 20, 2002

Stony Brook, New York

OFFICIAL PROGRAM
  THURSDAY, JULY 18

Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603
9:15-10:30 J. Hillas: Competitive prizes: When less scrutiny induces more effort.
11:00-12:15 J. Weibull: A Survey Talk on Evolutionary Game Theory.
2:00-3:15 B. von Stengel: Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games.
3:45-5:00

6:00-9:30

 D. Vermeulen: Computation of Stable Sets for Bimatrix Games Courts of law and unforseen contingencies.
Reception Dinner
  FRIDAY, JULY 19

Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603
9:15-10:30 J.F. Mertens: TBA.
11:00-12:15 J. Hillas: Two approaches to the relation between correlated and Nash equilibrium and one result on quasi-perfect equilibrium.
2:00-3:15 S. Hurkens: On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability.
3:45-5:00 Y. Feinberg: Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games.

  SATURDAY, JULY 20

Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603
9:15-10:30 J. Weibull: Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games.
11:00-12:15 J. Hofbauer: Dynamic Stability of Nash Equilibria contracts.
2:00-3:15 S. Morris: Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria.
3:45-5:00 Panel Discussion
 
  
Last updated on July 19, 2002 by Hakan Timbil.