INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY

Organized by Phil Reny


July 22 to July 26, 2002

Stony Brook, New York


PROGRAM



  MONDAY, JULY 22

Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100
Chair: P. Dubey

9:15-9:55

J. Geanakoplos:
Insurance equilibrium in perfect competition.

 10:00-10:40

B. Peleg:
Weakly acceptable representations of constitutions.

10:45-11:10

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

A. Neyman:
Stationary cardinal utilities and equilibrium.

2:00-2:45

M. Satterthwaite:
Dynamic double auctions.

2:45-3:10

Coffee Break
Session 1.A
Chair: S. Lee.

3:15-3:45

C. Kuzmics:
Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games.

3:50-4:20

C. Ruebeck:
Robust cooperation in imitation dynamics.

4:25-4:55

S. Lee:
Endogenous assorting.

Session 1.B
Chair: E. Einy.

3:15-3:45

A. Zapechelnyuk:
Power of ruler.

3:50-4:20

B. von Stengel:
The value of commitment in two-player games.

4:25-4:55

E. Einy:
The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.

Session 1.C:
Chair: O. Birulin.

3:15-3:45

D. McAdams
Isotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions.

3:50-4:20

O. Birulin:
Efficiency of the N-Bidder English auction.
 
TUESDAY, JULY 23


Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100
Chair: A. Neyman

9:15-9:55

D. Fudenberg:
Interpreting Bayesian equilibria as the steady states of a learning process.

 10:00-10:40

J. F. Nash.
Further work on computational study of models of cooperation in games. Study of standard three person games in terms of  "agencies".

10:45-11:10

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

R. Aumann:
When all is said and done, how should you play and what may you expect?

2:00-2:45

A. Robson:
Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: A unification of the classical and Bayesian views.

2:45-3:10

Coffee Break
Session 2.A
Chair: T. J. Lambert III.

3:15-3:45

J. Golbeck:
Evolving strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma.

3:50-4:20

D. Leslie:
Learn quickly, adapt slowly - Convergent learnign algorithms for normal form games.

4:25-4:55

T. J. Lambert III:
A fictitious play approach for optimization.
  Session 2.B
Chair: S. Ashworth

3:15-3:40

R. Harbaugh:
Skill reputation, prospect theory, and regret theory.

3:45-4:10

T. Kornienko:
Running to keep in the same place: Consumer choice as a game of status.

4:15-4:40

S. Ashworth:
Welfare analysis in campaign finance with incumbency advantages.

Session 2.C
Chair: H. W."Woody" Brook.

3:15-3:40

B. Feldman:
A dual model of cooperative value.

3:45-4:10

H. W. Brook:
To each according to his needs: Four theorems.

Session 2.D
Chair: M. Walker.

3:15-3:40

Z. Huang:
Oligopoly and iterative computation of Nash equilibrium.

3:45-4:10

M. Walker:
Reinforcement, belief learning, and information processing.

6:30-9:45

Reception Dinner.
Three Village Inn.
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24


Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100
Chair: L. Samuelson

9:15-9:55

A. Roth:
Combining theory and experiments: Equilibrium of zero sum games and other examples.

 10:00-10:40

V. Krishna:
The art of conversation.

10:45-11:10

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

M. Perry:
Toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equlibrium.

2:00-2:45

M. Shubik:
Is game theory at the beginning or end of the line?

2:45-3:10

Coffee Break
Session 3.A
Chair: J. Shachat.

3:15-3:45

E. Hopkins:
Adaptive learning models of consumer behavior.

3:50-4:20

T. Platkowski:
Experimental results on minority games.

4:25-4:55

J. Shachat:
Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence.
Session 3.B
Chair: V. Grimm.

3:15-3:45

U. Dulleck:
Committees, careers and communication.

3:50-4:20

V. Grimm:
Selling shares to retail investors: Auctions vs. Fixed price.
Session 3.C
Chair: J. J. Kline.

3:15-3:45

L. van Wesenbeeck:
Equilibrium selection in games: The Mollifier method.

3:50-4:20

Q. Wen:
Repeated games with asynchronous moves.

4:25-4:55

J. J. Kline:
Extensive games with time structures.
Session 3.D
Chair: R. Amir.

3:15-3:45

J. Vila:
Coordination on D-Day: The e-mail stochastic game.

3:50-4:20

I. Arribas:
Mixed bundling strategies and the package assignment problem.

4:25-4:55

R. Amir:
Market structure, scale economies and industty performance.
 
THURSDAY, JULY 25


Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100
Chair: A. Brandenburger

9:15-9:55

J. Swinkels:
Thick market and the efficiency of large doubel auctions.

 10:00-10:40

A. Postlewaite:
Informational side and incentive compatibility.

10:45-11:10

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

L. Samuelson:
Inefficient competitive markets.

2:00-2:45

L. Shapley:
TBA

2:45-3:10

Coffee Break
Session 4.A
Chair: B. C. Shipper.

3:15-3:45

H. Meinhard:
Stability of cartels and the incentive of merger in oligopoly situations without transferable technologies.

3:50-4:20

T. Kao:
Asymmetric information and R&D Competition.

4:25-4:55

B.C. Shipper:
Imitators and optimizers in symmetric n-firm Cournot monopoly.
Session 4.B
Chair: J. Dearden.

3:15-3:45

A. Westermark:
Wage bargaining and unequal treatment.

3:50-4:20

W. T. Juang:
Speculation and inside trading.

4:25-4:55

J. Dearden:
Pension plan portfolios: Why public plans have taken on more risk than private plans? Or, the mischief of teh exclusive benefit rule.
Session 4.C
Chair: S. J. Brams.

3:15-3:45

C. Kjaer:
Renegotiation, Efficiency, and the Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities.

3:50-4:20

O. Haimanko:
On Efficiency and Sustainability in a Collective Decision Problem with Heterogeneous Agents.

4:25-4:55

S.J. Brams:
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters.
 
FRIDAY, JULY 26


Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100
Chair: J. Swinkels

9:15-9:55

E. Maskin:
Auctions for pollution reduction.

 10:00-10:40

A. Brandenburger:
Epistemic Conditions For Iterated Admissibility.

10:45-11:10

Coffee Break

11:15-12:00

B. Lipman:
Finite Order Implications of Common Priors.

2:00-2:45

P. Dubey:
Strategic substitutes and potential games.

2:45-3:10

Coffee Break
Session 5.A
Chair: M. Saboya.

3:15-3:45

X. Luo:
Information, knowledge and stability.

3:50-4:20

M. Saboya:
The not-quite non-atomic game: The role of differentiability for the core of production games.
Session 5.B
Chair: F. S. Sanchez.

3:15-3:45

A. Urpano:
A communication protocol for random consensus in the coordinated attack problem.

3:50-4:20

T. Quint:
On houseswapping, the strict core, segmentation and linear programming.

4:25-4:55

F. S. Sanchez:
A salary system for the assignment problem.
Session 5.C
Chair: A. Vetta.

3:15-3:45

Y. Suzuki:
Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations.

3:50-4:20

A. Vetta:
Nash Equilibria in Competitive Societies with Applications to Facility Location,Traffic Routing and  Auctions.
 
 
Last updated by Hakan Timbil on July 20, 2002.