INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORYOrganized by Phil Reny
July 22 to July 26, 2002Stony Brook, New York
PROGRAM
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MONDAY, JULY 22 |
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Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100 Chair: P. Dubey |
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9:15-9:55 |
J. Geanakoplos: Insurance equilibrium in perfect competition. |
10:00-10:40 |
B. Peleg: Weakly acceptable representations of constitutions. |
10:45-11:10 |
Coffee Break |
11:15-12:00 |
A. Neyman: Stationary cardinal utilities and equilibrium. |
2:00-2:45 |
M. Satterthwaite: Dynamic double auctions. |
2:45-3:10 |
Coffee Break |
Session 1.A Chair: S. Lee. |
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3:15-3:45 |
C. Kuzmics: Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games. |
3:50-4:20 |
C. Ruebeck: Robust cooperation in imitation dynamics. |
4:25-4:55 |
S. Lee: Endogenous assorting. |
Session 1.B Chair: E. Einy. |
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3:15-3:45 |
A. Zapechelnyuk: Power of ruler. |
3:50-4:20 |
B. von Stengel: The value of commitment in two-player games. |
4:25-4:55 |
E. Einy: The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. |
Session 1.C: Chair: O. Birulin. |
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3:15-3:45 |
D. McAdams Isotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions. |
3:50-4:20 |
O. Birulin: Efficiency of the N-Bidder English auction. |
TUESDAY, JULY 23 |
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Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100 Chair: A. Neyman |
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9:15-9:55 |
D. Fudenberg: Interpreting Bayesian equilibria as the steady states of a learning process. |
10:00-10:40 |
J. F. Nash. Further work on computational study of models of cooperation in games. Study of standard three person games in terms of "agencies". |
10:45-11:10 |
Coffee Break |
11:15-12:00 |
R. Aumann: When all is said and done, how should you play and what may you expect? |
2:00-2:45 |
A. Robson: Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: A unification of the classical and Bayesian views. |
2:45-3:10 |
Coffee Break |
Session 2.A Chair: T. J. Lambert III. |
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3:15-3:45 |
J. Golbeck: Evolving strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma. |
3:50-4:20 |
D. Leslie: Learn quickly, adapt slowly - Convergent learnign algorithms for normal form games. |
4:25-4:55 |
T. J. Lambert III: A fictitious play approach for optimization. |
Session 2.B Chair: S. Ashworth |
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3:15-3:40 |
R.
Harbaugh: Skill reputation, prospect theory, and regret theory. |
3:45-4:10 |
T.
Kornienko: Running to keep in the same place: Consumer choice as a game of status. |
4:15-4:40 |
S.
Ashworth: Welfare analysis in campaign finance with incumbency advantages. |
Session 2.C Chair: H. W."Woody" Brook. |
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3:15-3:40 |
B. Feldman: A dual model of cooperative value. |
3:45-4:10 |
H. W. Brook: To each according to his needs: Four theorems. |
Session 2.D Chair: M. Walker. |
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3:15-3:40 |
Z.
Huang: Oligopoly and iterative computation of Nash equilibrium. |
3:45-4:10 |
M. Walker: Reinforcement, belief learning, and information processing. |
6:30-9:45 |
Reception
Dinner. Three Village Inn. |
WEDNESDAY, JULY 24 |
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Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100 Chair: L. Samuelson |
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9:15-9:55 |
A. Roth: Combining theory and experiments: Equilibrium of zero sum games and other examples. |
10:00-10:40 |
V. Krishna: The art of conversation. |
10:45-11:10 |
Coffee Break |
11:15-12:00 |
M. Perry: Toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equlibrium. |
2:00-2:45 |
M. Shubik: Is game theory at the beginning or end of the line? |
2:45-3:10 |
Coffee Break |
Session 3.A Chair: J. Shachat. |
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3:15-3:45 |
E. Hopkins: Adaptive learning models of consumer behavior. |
3:50-4:20 |
T. Platkowski: Experimental results on minority games. |
4:25-4:55 |
J. Shachat: Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence. |
Session 3.B Chair: V. Grimm. |
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3:15-3:45 |
U. Dulleck: Committees, careers and communication. |
3:50-4:20 |
V. Grimm: Selling shares to retail investors: Auctions vs. Fixed price. |
Session 3.C Chair: J. J. Kline. |
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3:15-3:45 |
L. van Wesenbeeck: Equilibrium selection in games: The Mollifier method. |
3:50-4:20 |
Q. Wen: Repeated games with asynchronous moves. |
4:25-4:55 |
J. J. Kline: Extensive games with time structures. |
Session 3.D Chair: R. Amir. |
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3:15-3:45 |
J. Vila: Coordination on D-Day: The e-mail stochastic game. |
3:50-4:20 |
I. Arribas: Mixed bundling strategies and the package assignment problem. |
4:25-4:55 |
R. Amir: Market structure, scale economies and industty performance. |
THURSDAY, JULY 25 |
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Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100 Chair: A. Brandenburger |
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9:15-9:55 |
J. Swinkels: Thick market and the efficiency of large doubel auctions. |
10:00-10:40 |
A. Postlewaite: Informational side and incentive compatibility. |
10:45-11:10 |
Coffee Break |
11:15-12:00 |
L. Samuelson: Inefficient competitive markets. |
2:00-2:45 |
L. Shapley: TBA |
2:45-3:10 |
Coffee Break |
Session 4.A Chair: B. C. Shipper. |
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3:15-3:45 |
H. Meinhard: Stability of cartels and the incentive of merger in oligopoly situations without transferable technologies. |
3:50-4:20 |
T. Kao: Asymmetric information and R&D Competition. |
4:25-4:55 |
B.C. Shipper: Imitators and optimizers in symmetric n-firm Cournot monopoly. |
Session 4.B Chair: J. Dearden. |
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3:15-3:45 |
A. Westermark: Wage bargaining and unequal treatment. |
3:50-4:20 |
W. T. Juang: Speculation and inside trading. |
4:25-4:55 |
J. Dearden: Pension plan portfolios: Why public plans have taken on more risk than private plans? Or, the mischief of teh exclusive benefit rule. |
Session 4.C Chair: S. J. Brams. |
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3:15-3:45 |
C. Kjaer: Renegotiation, Efficiency, and the Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities. |
3:50-4:20 |
O. Haimanko: On Efficiency and Sustainability in a Collective Decision Problem with Heterogeneous Agents. |
4:25-4:55 |
S.J. Brams: Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters. |
FRIDAY, JULY 26 |
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Javits Lecture Center -- Room 100 Chair: J. Swinkels |
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9:15-9:55 |
E. Maskin: Auctions for pollution reduction. |
10:00-10:40 |
A. Brandenburger: Epistemic Conditions For Iterated Admissibility. |
10:45-11:10 |
Coffee Break |
11:15-12:00 |
B. Lipman: Finite Order Implications of Common Priors. |
2:00-2:45 |
P. Dubey: Strategic substitutes and potential games. |
2:45-3:10 |
Coffee Break |
Session 5.A Chair: M. Saboya. |
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3:15-3:45 |
X. Luo: Information, knowledge and stability. |
3:50-4:20 |
M. Saboya: The not-quite non-atomic game: The role of differentiability for the core of production games. |
Session 5.B Chair: F. S. Sanchez. |
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3:15-3:45 |
A. Urpano: A communication protocol for random consensus in the coordinated attack problem. |
3:50-4:20 |
T. Quint: On houseswapping, the strict core, segmentation and linear programming. |
4:25-4:55 |
F. S. Sanchez: A salary system for the assignment problem. |
Session 5.C Chair: A. Vetta. |
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3:15-3:45 |
Y. Suzuki: Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations. |
3:50-4:20 |
A. Vetta: Nash Equilibria in Competitive Societies with Applications to Facility Location,Traffic Routing and Auctions. |
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Last updated by Hakan Timbil on July 20, 2002. | |