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Monday, July 13 |
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8:45 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Yair Tauman
(SUNY Stony Brook and Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC))
The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence
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9:45 - 10:30 |
Francis Bloch
(Universite catholique de Louvain)
Dynamic assignment of durable objects
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10:30 - 11:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A: Solution Concepts
Chair: Charles Zheng
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Session B: Fairness
Chair: Artus Philipp Rosenbusch
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Session C: Market Games
Chair: Eiichiro Kazumori
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Session D: Knowledge and Expectations
Chair: Ziv Hellman
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11:15 - 11:35 |
Noah Stein
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Games on Manifolds
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Steven Brams
(New York University)
The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
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Tanguy Isaac
(Université Catholique de Louvain)
Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings : Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
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11:40 - 12:00 |
José Manuel Zarzuelo
(Basque Country University)
The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel and the Core on NTU Games and Exchange Economies
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Ahuva Mu'alem
(California Institute of Technology)
On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
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Itai Arieli
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Rationalizability in Continuous Games
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12:05 - 12:25 |
Charles Zheng
(Iowa State University)
A Noncooperative Reformulation of the Core
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Artus Philipp Rosenbusch
(Darmstadt University of Technology)
Satisfiable Fairness in Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(University of Tokyo)
Dynamic Limit Order Book Markets
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Ziv Hellman
(Hebrew University)
How Common are Common Priors?
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12:25 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
Pragmatic Languages and Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach
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Session A: Industrial Organization
Chair: Andriy Zapechelnyuk
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Session B: Bounded Rationality
Chair: Penelope Hernandez
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Session C: Voting
Chair: Suntak Kim
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Session D: Learning and Evolution
Chair: Javier Rivas
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Session E: Matching
Chair: Brijesh Preston Pinto
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Chun-Hui Miao
(University of South Carolina)
Sequential Innovation, Technology Leakage and the Duration of Technology Licensing
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Ying-Ju Chen
(University of California, Berkeley)
Contractual Traps
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Yaron Azrieli
(The Ohio State University)
Characterization of Multidimensional Spatial Models of Elections with a Valence Dimension
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Emerson Melo
(California Institute of Technology)
Congestion Pricing and Learning in Traffic Networks Games
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Emiliya Lazarova
(Queen's University Belfast)
Coalitional Matchings
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Evangelos Rouskas
(Athens University of Economics and Business)
Efficient Delay in Decision Making
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Russell Golman
(University of Michigan)
Quantal Response Equilibria with Heterogeneous Agents
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Sourav Bhattacharya
(University of Pittsburgh)
Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
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Marius-Ionut Ochea
(University of Amsterdam)
Evolution in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Perturbed Best-Reply Dynamics
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Ana Mauleon
(Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching
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15:40 - 16:00 |
Andriy Zapechelnyuk
(University of Bonn)
Bargaining Against a Status Quo: the Algebra of Strikes
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Penelope Hernandez
(University of Valencia)
Bounded Memory Equilibrium
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Suntak Kim
(University of Pittsburgh)
Divergence in Pre-Electoral Campaign Promises with Post-Electoral Policy Bargaining
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Javier Rivas
(University of Leicester)
Cooperation, Imitation and Correlated Matching
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Brijesh Preston Pinto
(University of Southern California)
Strongly Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
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16:00 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Dynamics and Equilibrium
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Tuesday, July 14 |
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8:45 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Olivier Gossner
(Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics)
A Reasoning Approach to Knowledge
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9:45 - 10:30 |
Herve Moulin
(Rice University)
Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network
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10:30 - 11:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:Auctions
Chair: Gagan Pratap Ghosh
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Session B:Mechanism Design
Chair: Rodrigo Velez
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Session C:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Fernando M. Louge
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Session D:Matching
Chair: Marco Scarsini
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11:15 - 11:35 |
Chia-Hui Chen
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Name Your Own Price at Priceline.com:
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Gwenael Piaser
(Université du Luxembourg)
Moral Hazard: Deterministic Indirect Mechanisms and Efficiency
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Nicolas (Alexandre) Klein
(University of Munich)
Free-Riding And Delegation In Research Teams
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11:40 - 12:00 |
Emel Filiz Ozbay
(University of Maryland)
Multi‐unit Auctions with Resale
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Reinoud Joosten
(University of Twente)
Generalized Projection Dynamics in Evolutionary Game Theory
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Antonio Miguel Osorio-Costa
(University Carlos III Madrid)
Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time
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12:05 - 12:25 |
Gagan Pratap Ghosh
(University of Iowa)
Efficiency in a Class of Multi-Unit Auctions
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Rodrigo Velez
(University of Rochester)
Are Incentives against Justice
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Fernando M. Louge
(University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Evolution with Private Information: Caution, Contrarianism and Herding
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Marco Scarsini
(Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali)
Repeated Congestion Games with Local Information
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12:25 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Wolfgang Pesendorfer
(Princeton University)
Measurable Ambiguity
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Session A:Mechanism Design
Chair: Rida Laraki
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Session B:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Hsiao-Chi Chen
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Session C:Signaling
Chair: David Ong
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Session D:Bargaining
Chair: Uri Weiss
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Session E:Contracts
Chair: Bo Chen
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Daniele Condorelli
(UCL and Northwestern University)
Value, Willingness to Pay and the Allocation of Scarce Resources
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Christopher Byrne
(Penn State University)
Size Dependence in an Evolutionary Game Model of Self-Deception
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Rabah Amir
(Université catholique de Louvain)
Network E¤ects, Market Structure and Industry Performance
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Toshiji Miyakawa
(Osaka University of Economics)
On the Bilateral Contracting Process in Economies with Externalities
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Helena Aten
(Georgetown University)
Competing Informed Principals and Representative Democracy
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Siddhartha Sahi
(Rutgers University)
The Allocation of a Prize
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Christina Achampong
(Penn State University)
The Effect of Belief on Performance and of Encounter History on Beliefs in Hawk-Dove Competitions
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Wooyoung Lim
(University of Pittsburgh)
Communication in Bargaining over Decision Rights
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Uri Weiss
(The Center for The Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University)
The Robber Asks to be Punished
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Kristina Buzard
(University of California, San Diego)
Contracting Problems and the Technology of Trade: A Robustness Result with Application to Hold-Up
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15:40 - 16:00 |
Rida Laraki
(Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique)
Majority Judgment Strategic Analysis
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Hsiao-Chi Chen
(National Taipei University)
Imitation, Local Interaction, and Coordination
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David Ong
(University of California)
Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt
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Bo Chen
(Southern Methodist University)
Optimal Time-Contingent Contract Design
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16:00 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Peyton Young
(University of Oxford)
Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers: An Application of Game Theory to Finance
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18:00 - 22:00 |
Reception Dinner (Jasmine
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Wednesday, July 15 |
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8:45 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Amy Greenwald
(Brown University)
An Algorithm to Compute the Stochastically Stable Distribution of a Perturbed Markov Matrix
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9:45 - 10:30 |
Barry O'Neill
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Vagueness in Communication
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10:30 - 11:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:Solution Concepts
Chair: Elena Inarra
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Session B:Mechanism Design
Chair: Victor Naroditskiy
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Session C:Signaling
Chair: Younghwan In
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Session D:Bargaining
Chair: Ching-jen Sun
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Session E:Networks
Chair: Sunghoon Hong
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11:15 - 11:35 |
Paulo Barelli
(University of Rochester)
On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games
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Matthew Elliott
(Stanford University)
Inefficiencies in Trade Networks
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11:40 - 12:00 |
Grandjean Gilles
(university of Louvain (UCL))
Strongly Rational Sets for Normal Form Games
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Ruben Juarez
(University of Hawaii)
Monotonic Solutions to the Experts Aggregation Problem
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Wolf Gick
(Harvard University)
Like-Biased Experts And Noisy Signals
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Asha Sadanand
(University of Guelph)
Outside Options and Investment
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Miguel A Duran
(University of Malaga)
The Economics of Favoritism
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12:05 - 12:25 |
Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
Deriving Nash Equilibria as the Supercore for a Relational System
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Victor Naroditskiy
(Brown University)
Destroy to Save
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Younghwan In
(National University of Singapore)
Signaling Private Choices
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Ching-jen Sun
(Deakin University)
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions
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Sunghoon Hong
(Vanderbilt University)
Enhancing Transportation Security against Terrorist Attacks
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12:25 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Kfir Eliaz
(Brown University)
Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects
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Session A:Incomplete Information
Chair: Fristan Tomala
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Session B:Bargaining
Chair: Daniel Quint
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Session C:Networks
Chair: Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Session D:Cooperative Games
Chair: Omer Edhan
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Session E:Auctions
Chair: Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Scott Woodroofe Cunningham
(Delft University of Technology)
Strategic Transmission of Information and the Framing of Environmental Regulation
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Louis Boguchwal
(University of St Andrews)
A System for Modeling Strategy Change, Demonstrated with the Ultimatum Game
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Maximilian Mihm
(Cornell University)
What Goes Around Comes Around: A theory of strategic indirect reciprocity in networks
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Josune Albizuri
(Basque Country University)
Values and Coalition Configurations
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Itai Sher
(University of Minnesota)
Optimal Shill Bidding in the VCG Mechanism
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Yehuda Levy
(Hebrew University)
Stochastic Games with Information Lag
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Wioletta Dziuda
(Northwestern University)
Dynamic Policy-Making with Endogenous Default
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Roland Pongou
(Brown University)
A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV/AIDS
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Yong Sui
(Shanghai Jiao Tong University)
All-pay Auctions with Private Values and Resale
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15:40 - 16:00 |
Tristan Tomala
(HEC Paris)
Existence of Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-own Payoffs
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Daniel Quint
(University of Wisconsin)
Bargaining with Endogenous Information
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Vincent Vannetelbosch
(CORE)
Connections among Farsighted Agents
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Omer Edhan
(The Hebrew University)
Continuous Values of Exact Market Games
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Cornelia F.A. Van Wesenbeeck
(VU University Amsterdam)
The Primal Auction: a New Design for Multi-commodity Double Auctions
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16:00 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Jeffrey Ely
(Northwestern University)
Sunk-cost Bias: A Memory Kludge
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Thursday, July 16 |
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8:45 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Jacob Goeree
(California Institute of Technology)
Threshold versus Exposure in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
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9:45 - 10:30 |
Francoise Forges
(Universite Paris Dauphine)
Core-stable bidding rings
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10:30 - 11:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:Repeated Games
Chair: Takako Fujiwara-Greve
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Session B:Networks
Chair: Dinko Dimitrov
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Session C:Cooperative Games
Chair: Nichalin Suakkaphong
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Session D:Experimental Economics
Chair: Ping Zhang
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Session E:Miscellaneous
Chair: Attila Ambrus
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11:15 - 11:35 |
Georgy Artemov
(University of Melbourne)
Finitely Repeated Bilateral Trade
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Mahmoud Farrokhi Kashani
(Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Coalition Formation in the Airport Problem
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Xiaojian Zhao
(University of Mannheim)
Strategic Mis-selling and Pre-Contractual Cognition
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11:40 - 12:00 |
Salomon Antoine
(LAGA Université Paris 13)
Large Bandit Games
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Kris De Jaegher
(Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics)
All Purpose Minimal Sufficient Networks in the Threshold Game
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Jason Marden
(California Institute of Technology)
Distributed Welfare Games
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Alexander Matros
(University of Pittsburgh)
Raising Revenue With Raffles: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
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Attila Ambrus
(Harvard University)
Hierarchical cheap talk
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12:05 - 12:25 |
Takako Fujiwara-Greve
(Keio University)
Cooperation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Outside Options
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Dinko Dimitrov
(University of Munich)
How to Connect under Incomplete Information
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Nichalin Suakkaphong
(University of Arizona)
Competition and Cooperation in Decentralized Distribution
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Ping Zhang
(University of Nottingham)
Collusion in Share Auctions: Mechanism Design and Communication among Bidders
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12:25 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Michihiro Kandori
(University of Tokyo)
Revision Games
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Session A:Applications
Chair: Ahmet Sahin
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Session B:Learning and Evolution
Chair: Burkhard C. Schipper
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Session C:Incomplete Information
Chair: Akira Yokotani
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Session D: Social and Political
Chair: Yukio Koriyama
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Session E:Auctions
Chair: Zhen Xu
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Andrey Garnaev
(Saint Petersburg State University)
Jamming in Wireless Networks with Cooperative Jammers
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Emin Dokumaci
(University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Schelling Redux: An Evolutionary Dynamic Model of Residential Segregation
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Min Kim
(University of Southern California)
Information Asymmetry and Incentives for Active Management
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Brent Hickman
(University of Iowa)
Effort, Achievement Gaps, and Affirmative Action: A New Look at College Admissions
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Ram Orzach
(Oakland University)
Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: Two Examples
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Shi-Miin Liu
(National Taipei University)
Commitment or No-Commitment to Monitoring in Emission Tax Systems?
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Marek Kaminski
(University of California, Irvine)
Generalized Backward Induction
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Eduardo Perez
(Stanford University)
Competing with Equivocal Information: The Importance of Weak Candidates
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Matias Iaryczower
(California Institute of Technology)
Choosing Records: Flip-Flops and Cronies
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Brennan Platt
(Brigham Young University)
Pay-to-Bid Auctions
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15:40 - 16:00 |
Ahmet Sahin
(Kahramanmaras Sutcu Imam University)
An Application of Game Theory to Producers in Competition with Production and Market Price Risks: The Case of Turkey
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Burkhard C Schipper
(University of California, Davis)
Unbeatable Imitation
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Akira Yokotani
(University of Rochester)
The Sequential Belief Representation of Harsanyi Type Spaces with Redundancy
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Yukio Koriyama
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Freedom to Not Join: A Voluntary Participation Game of a Discrete Public Good
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Zhen Xu
(Stony Brook University)
The Contrary Effects of Listing Fee
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16:00 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:40 |
Round Table with participation of Robert Aumann/Sergiu Hart/Ehud Kalai/Eric Maskin/John Nash (moderator)/Roberto Serrano/Yair Tauman and Peyton Young
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Friday, July 17 |
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8:45 - 9:00 |
Breakfast
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9:00 - 9:45 |
Shmuel Zamir
(Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
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9:45 - 10:30 |
Drew Fudenberg
(Harvard University)
Repeated Unknown Games
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10:30 - 11:15 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:Social and Political
Chair: Guillermo Flores
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Session B: Contests
Chair: Subhasish Modak Chowdhury
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Session C: Solution Concepts
Chair: SangMok Lee
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Session D: Stochastic Games
Chair: Eran Shmaya
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Session E: Experimental Economics
Chair: Karl Schlag
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11:15 - 11:35 |
David Laurens Bijl
(Delft University of Technology)
A Model of Consensus in the European Commission
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Magnus Hoffmann
(University of Magdeburg)
Do I Want It All? A Simple Model of Satiation in Contests
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Konrad Grabiszewski
(Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
Procedural Type Spaces
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Nagarajan Krishnamurthy
(Chennai Mathematical Institute, India)
Orderfield Property of Stochastic Games via Dependency Graphs
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11:40 - 12:00 |
Micael Ehn
(Mälardalen University)
Why Social Stratification is to be Expected
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Dylan Minor
(University of California, Berkeley)
When Second Best is Best: on the Optimality of Offering a Larger Second Prize
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Kamalakar Karlapalem
(International Institute of Information Technology, Hyderabad, India)
Games with Minimalistic Agents
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Rida Laraki
(Centre national de la recherche scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique)
Explicit Formulas for Repeated Games with Absorbing States
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Dorothea Herreiner
(Loyola Marymount University)
Do Intentions Matter for Empowerment? Procedural Justice in Simple Bargaining Games
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12:05 - 12:25 |
Guillermo Flores
(Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Corruption Efficiency: Corruptible Bureaucratic Systems and Implementation of Governmental Solutions
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Subhasish Modak Chowdhury
(Purdue University)
The All-pay Auction with Non-monotonic Payoff
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SangMok Lee
(California Institute of Technology)
The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games
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Eran Shmaya
(Kellogg School of Management)
The Determinacy of Infinite Games with Eventual Perfect Monitoring
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Karl Schlag
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Can Sanctions Induce Pessimism? An Experiment
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12:25 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Ehud Kalai
(Northwestern University)
A cooperative/competitive solution to a class of strategic games
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Session A:Social Choice
Chair: Jung You
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Session B: Repeated Games
Chair: John Smith
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Session C: Miscellaneous
Chair: Duygu Yengin
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Geoffroy De Clippel
(Brown University)
Egalitarianism and Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
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Yakov Babichenko
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality.)
Completely Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
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Adam (Tauman) Kalai
(Microsoft Research)
Bargaining in Strategic Games with Private Information
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Jung You
(Rice University)
Envy-free and Incentive Compatible division of a commodity
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Nobue Suzuki
(Komazawa University)
Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Shared Belief
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Laurent Mathevet
(University of Texas at Austin)
Designing Stable Mechanisms in Economic Environments
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15:40 - 16:00 |
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John Smith
(Rutgers-Camden)
Not So Cheap Talk: A Model of Advice with Communication Costs
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Duygu Yengin
(University of Adelaide)
Appointment Games in Fixed-Route Traveling Salesman Problems and The Shapley Value
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16:00 - 16:30 |
Coffee Break
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16:30 - 17:15 |
Bernhard Von Stengel
(London School of Economics)
Pathways to Equilibria, Pretty Pictures and Diagrams (PPAD)
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