The 18th International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 9-13, 2007

Schedule of Talks

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Monday, July 9

08:30 - 09:00

Breakfast

09:00 - 09:45

Jeffrey Ely  (Northwestern University)
Critical Types
Chair: Dilip Abreu

09:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair:Yuk-fai Fong

Session B:
Chair: Elena Inarra

Session C:
Chair: Van Kolpin

Session D:
Chair: Ori Haimanko

Session E:
Chair: Gwenael Piaser

10:00 - 10:25

Joao Montez  (University of Lausanne)
Efficient and Inefficient Durable-goods Monopolies  

Jordi Masso  (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information  

Troels Bjerre Sørensen  (University of Aarhus)
Normal Form Proper Equilibria of Two-player Zero-sum Extensive Games  

 

Marek Pycia  (Penn State)
Optimal Bundling  

10:30 - 10:55

Robert Driskill  (Vanderbilt University)
Monopoly and Oligopoly Supply of a Durable Good with Network Externalities  

Joana Pais  (ISEG/ Technical University of Lisbon)
Giving Advice and Perfect Equilibria in Matching Markets  

Andrew Gilpin  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Gradient-based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games  

 

Jingfeng Lu  (National University of Singapore)
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost  

11:00 - 11:25

Yuk-fai Fong  (Northwestern University)
Using Aftermarket Power to Soften Foremarket Competition  

Elena Inarra  (University of the Basque Country)
The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited  

Van Kolpin  (University of Oregon)
Endogenous Sharing Rules with Atomic and Nonatomic Players: Application to Subgame Perfection  

Ori Haimanko  (Ben-Gurion University)
On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium  

Gwenael Piaser  (Université du Luxembourg)
On Multiple-principal Multiple-agent Models of Moral Hazard  

11:30 - 11:45

Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30

Daijiro Okada  (Rutgers University)
Evolution of Human Cooperation
Chair: Dino Gerardi

12:30 - 02:00

Lunch Break

02:00 - 02:45

Dilip Abreu  (Princeton University)
Reputational Values for Dynamic Games
Chair: Jeffrey Ely

02:45 - 03:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair: Lloyd Shapley

Session B:
Chair: Ron Peretz

Session C:
Chair: Ying Chen

Session D:
Chair:Juan Fernando Escobar

Session E:
Chair: Zhen Liu

03:00 - 03:25

Noah Stein  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Characterization and Computation of Correlated Equilibria in Infinite Games  

Marco Scarsini  (LUISS)
Playing Off-line Games with Bounded Rationality  

Sidartha Gordon  (University of Montreal)
Informative Cheap Talk Equilibria as Fixed Points  

Huan Xie  (University of Pittsburgh)
Social Norms and Trust Among Strangers  

Filomena Garcia  (ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Further Results  

03:30 - 04:00

Lloyd Shapley  (University of California, Los Angeles)
On the Number of Equilibria  

Ron Peretz  (Institute of Mathematics,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
The Value of Recall  

Ying Chen  (Arizona State University)
Partially-informed Decision Makers in Games of Communication  

Juan Fernando Escobar  (Stanford University)
Cooperation and Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Communities  

Zhen Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Justify Cursed Equilibria via Partial Awareness  

04:00 - 04:15

Coffee Break

04:15 - 05:00

Dino Gerardi  (Yale University)
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past
Chair: Daijiro Okada

 

Tuesday, July 10

08:30 - 09:00

Breakfast

09:00 - 09:45

Johannes Horner  (KSM-MEDS, Northwestern)
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence
Chair: Efe Ok

09:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair:Nelson Uhan

Session B:
Chair: Duozhe Li

Session C:
Chair: Liad Blumrosen

Session D:
Chair: Peter Biro

Session E:
Chair: Javier Rivas

10:00 - 10:25

Holger Ingmar Meinhardt  (University of Karlsruhe)
A Dual Pre-Kernel Representation Based on the Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation of the Characteristic Function  

Martin Meier  (Instituto de Analisis Economico)
Unawareness, Beliefs and Games  

Richard Steinberg  (University of Cambridge)
Unbundled Auction Procurement over Multiple Periods  

Ismail Saglam  (Bogazici University)
One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences  

Peter Engseld  (Lund University)
The Role of Observational Skill in Coordination Games  

10:30 - 10:55

Nelson Uhan  (MIT)
Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs  

Tai-Wei Hu  (Pennsylvania State University)
Logic for Games of Perfect Information and Epistemic Conditions for Backward Induction and Subgame Perfectness  

Marion Ott  (University of Karlsruhe)
Multiple Internet Auctions of Heterogenous Goods under Single-Unit Demand  

Hanna Halaburda  (Harvard Business School)
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences  

Christoph Kuzmics  (Kellogg School of Management)
On the Elimination of Dominated Strategies in Stochastic Models of Evolution with Large Populations  

11:00 - 11:25

 

Duozhe Li  (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"Knowing Whether" and Unawareness  

Liad Blumrosen  (Microsoft Research)
Conversion Rates in Auctions for Sponsored Search  

Péter Biró  (University of Glasgow)
Higher Education Admission in Hungary by a Score-limit Algorithm  

Javier Rivas  (European University Institute)
Learning within a Markovian Environment  

11:30 - 11:45

Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30

Ichiro Obara  (University of California Los Angeles)
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budeget Balance
Chair: Bernard DeMeyer

12:30 - 02:00

Lunch Break

02:00 - 02:45

Bernard DeMeyer  (PSE-University of Paris I)
Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information
Chair: Johannes Horner

02:45 - 03:00

Lunch Break

 

Session A:
Chair:Chun-Hsiung Liao

Session B:
Chair: Emanuele Bracco

Session C:
Chair: Mauricio Bugarin

Session D:
Chair: Rohit Parikh

Session E:
Chair:Oscar Volij

03:00 - 03:25

Ram Orzach  (Oakland University)
Inventor's Quandary: In-house or Start-up?  

Andrew B Rice  (Penn State University)
Pre-electoral Debate: The Case of a Large Election  

Cheng-Zhong Qin  (UC Santa Barbara)
Grossman Paradox Meets Hirshleifer Effect  

Deeparnab Chakrabarty  (Georgia Tech)
The Computational Aspect of Risk in Playing Non-Cooperative Games  

Rida Laraki  (Ecole Polytechnique and CNRS)
A New Theory of Social Choice  

03:30 - 03:55

Chun-Hsiung Liao  (National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, TAIWAN)
Strategic Selection of Direct Selling and Private Brand in Retail Market under Retailer Stackelberg  

Matias Nunez Rodriguez  (Ecole Polytechnique)
Approval Voting and the Poisson-Myerson Environment  

Barbara Bennie  (University of Wisconsin - La Crosse)
Strategic Market Games with Cyclic Production  

Mingyu Guo  (Duke University)
Improved VCG Redistribution Mechanisms  

Alan Daniel Miller  (California Institute of Technology)
A Model of the "Reasonable Man"  

03:55 - 04:30

 

Emanuele Bracco  (University of Warwick (UK))
Elections and the Quality of Politicians  

Mauricio Bugarin  (Ibmec Sao Paulo)
Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure  

Rohit Parikh  (City University of New York)
Knowledge and Structure in Social Algorithms  

Oscar Volij  (Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University)
Measuring Segregation  

04:30 - 04:45

Coffee Break

04:45 - 05:30

Efe Ok  (New York University)
Reference-Dependent Rational Choice Theory
Chair: Ichiro Obara

 

Wednesday, July 11

08:30 - 09:00

Breakfast

09:00 - 09:45

Alvaro Sandroni  (University of Pennsylvania)
Strategic and Ethical Voter Models
Chair: Massimiliano Amarante

09:45 - 10:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair:Laurent Lamy

Session B:
Chair: Steven Brams

Session C:
Chair: Virginie Masson

Session D:
Chair: Omer Edhan

Session E:
Chair:Santiago Oliveros

10:00 - 10:25

Shmuel Zamir  (The Hebrew University)
Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case  

Mihai Manea  (Harvard University)
Strategy-proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism in Large Random Assignment Problems  

Maximilian Mihm  (Cornell University)
Cooperation in a Dynamic Network Game  

Chih-Ru Hsiao  (Soochow University)
The Potential and Consistency Property for Multi-choice Shapley Value  

Esteban Klor  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout  

10:30 - 10:55

Zhiyong Yao  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Sequential First-Price Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands  

Ruben Juarez  (Rice University)
Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences  

Gabrielle Demange  (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques)
Sharing Information in Web Communities  

 

Cesar Martinelli  (ITAM)
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation  

11:00 - 11:25

Laurent Lamy  (Crest-Insee)
Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure  

Virginie Masson  (University of Adelaide)
The Survival of Altruistic Behavior in Public Good Games  

Omer Edhan  (The Hebrew University)
The Mertens and Neyman Values of Non-differentiable Vector Measure Games  

Santiago Oliveros  (Haas School of Business- UC Berkeley)
Who Abstains in Equilibrium?  

11:30 - 11:45

Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30

Martin W. Cripps  (UCL)
Common Learning
Chair: Aviad Heifetz

12:30 - 02:00

Lunch Break

02:00 - 02:45

Massimiliano Amarante  (Columbia University)
Toward a Rational Choice Foundation for Non-Additive Models
Chair: Alvaro Sandroni

02:45 - 03:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair:Peyton Young

Session B:
Chair: Laura Pontiggia

Session C:
Chair: Anindya Bhattacharya

Session D:
Chair:Humberto Moreira

Session E:
Chair:Georgy Artemov

03:00 - 03:25

Jason Marden  (UCLA)
Payoff Based Dynamics for Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games  

Jérôme Renault  (Ceremade, University Paris Dauphine)
Uniform Value in Dynamic Programming and in Markov Decision Processes  

Sylvain Béal  (University of Heidelberg)
Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games  

Tristan Tomala  (Université Paris Dauphine)
Correlation and Authentication in Repeated Games with Network Monitoring  

Laurent Alexandre Mathevet  (California Institute of Technology)
Supermodular Bayesian Implementation: Learning and Incentive Design  

03:30 - 04:00

Peyton Young  (Johns Hopkins University & University of Oxford)
Payoff-Based Learning Dynamics  

Laura Pontiggia  (University of the Sciences in Philadelphia)
N-person Non-constant Sum Red-and-black Games  

Anindya Bhattacharya  (University of York)
Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton Equilibria as Solution for Farsighted Stability of Bilateral Networks  

Humberto Moreira  (EPGE)
On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem  

Georgy Artemov  (Brown University)
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward Reinterpretation of Wilson's Doctrine  

04:00 - 04:15

Coffee Break

04:15 - 05:00

Aviad Heifetz  (The Open University of Israel)
Game States
Chair: Martin Cripps

 

Thursday, July 12

08:30 - 09:00

Breakfast

09:00 - 09:45

David Parkes  (Harvard University)
Computational Ironing to Achieve Monotonicity in Dynamic Mechanisms
Chair:Pradeep Dubey

 

Session A:
Chair:Ilan Lobel

Session B:
Chair: Jayant Ganguli

Session C:
Chair: Alexander Matros

Session D:
Chair:Uri Weiss

Session E:
Chair:Arnaud Dellis

10:00 - 10:25

Friederike Mengel  (University of Alicante)
Learning Across Games  

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv)
Agreeing to Disagree: The Non-probabilistic Case  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (University of Tokyo)
A Strategic Theory of Markets  

Ignacio Esponda  (New York University)
Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection  

James F. Ring  (Appellex Bargaining Solutions, Inc.)
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Approaches to Non-Cooperative Bargaining  

10:30 - 10:55

Burkhard C Schipper  (University of California, Davis)
Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games  

Yi-Chun Chen  (Northwestern University)
Belief Operator in a Universal Space  

Rahul Jain  (IBM TJ Watson Research Centrer)
A Design for an Asymptotically Efficient Combinatorial Bayesian Market: Generalizing the Satterthwaite-Williams Mechanism  

Zafer Akin  (TOBB University of Economics and Technology)
Intertemporal Decision Making with Present Biased Preferences  

Jeremy Bertomeu  (Carnegie Mellon University)
A Theory of Risk Management with Applications to Executive Compensation and Earnings Management  

11:00 - 11:25

Ilan Lobel  (MIT)
Social Learning with Partial Observations  

Jayant Vivek Ganguli  (Cornell University)
Common P-belief and Uncertainty  

Alexander Matros  (University of Pittsburgh)
Chinese Auctions  

Uri Weiss  (The Rationality Center)
In Small Decisions It is Rational to Act like Bounded Rational – an Answer for Rabin and Behavioral Economists  

Arnaud Dellis  (Laval University)
Would Letting People Vote for Several Candidates Yield Policy Moderation?  

11:30 - 11:45

Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
Chair:Yair Tauman

 

Thursday, 2:00 pm - Friday, 12:50 pm

Day in honor of the 85th birthday of David Gale

Program

followed by the dinner

 

Friday, July 13

02:00 - 02:45

Susan Athey  (Harvard)
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
Chair:Richard McLean

02:45 - 03:00

Coffee Break

 

Session A:
Chair:John Nash

Session B:
Chair: Pei-yu Lo

Session C:
Chair:Bo Chen

Session D:
Chair:Pietro Ortoleva

Session E:
Chair:Paul J Healy

03:00 - 03:25

Barry Feldman  (Prism Analytics / Russell Investment Group / DePaul University)
A Theory of Attribution  

Wolfgang Gick  (Dartmouth College)
Two Experts are Better than One  

Myeonghwan Cho  (Pennsylvania State University)
Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction and Local Communication  

Sophie Bade  (PSU)
Ambiguous Act Equilibria  

Eduardo Faingold  (Yale University)
Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy  

03:30 - 04:00

John Nash  (Princeton University)
Continuing Work of the Agencies Method for the Reductive Study of Cooperative Games; Developing a Modeling with Attorney Agents  

Pei-yu (Melody) Lo  (Brown University)
Language and Coordination Games  

Bo Chen  (University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Belief-Based Strategies in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Asymmetric Private Monitorin  

Pietro Salvatore Tommaso Ortoleva  (New York University)
Status Quo Bias, Ambiguity and Rational Choice  

Paul J Healy  (The Ohio State University)
Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in Repeated Games  

04:00 - 04:15

Coffee Break

04:15 - 05:00

Ilya Segal  (Stanford University)
The Communication Cost of Selfishness
Chair:Susan Athey

 

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