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Monday, July 9 |
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08:30 - 09:00 |
Breakfast
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09:00 - 09:45 |
Jeffrey Ely
(Northwestern University)
Critical Types
Chair: Dilip Abreu
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09:45 - 10:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair:Yuk-fai Fong
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Session B:
Chair: Elena Inarra
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Session C:
Chair: Van Kolpin
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Session D:
Chair: Ori Haimanko
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Session E:
Chair: Gwenael Piaser
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10:00 - 10:25 |
Joao Montez
(University of Lausanne)
Efficient and Inefficient Durable-goods Monopolies
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Jordi Masso
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
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Troels Bjerre Sørensen
(University of Aarhus)
Normal Form Proper Equilibria of Two-player Zero-sum Extensive Games
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Marek Pycia
(Penn State)
Optimal Bundling
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10:30 - 10:55 |
Robert Driskill
(Vanderbilt University)
Monopoly and Oligopoly Supply of a Durable Good with Network Externalities
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Joana Pais
(ISEG/ Technical University of Lisbon)
Giving Advice and Perfect Equilibria in Matching Markets
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Andrew Gilpin
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Gradient-based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games
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Jingfeng Lu
(National University of Singapore)
Auction Design with Opportunity Cost
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11:00 - 11:25 |
Yuk-fai Fong
(Northwestern University)
Using Aftermarket Power to Soften Foremarket Competition
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Elena Inarra
(University of the Basque Country)
The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited
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Van Kolpin
(University of Oregon)
Endogenous Sharing Rules with Atomic and Nonatomic Players: Application to Subgame Perfection
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Ori Haimanko
(Ben-Gurion University)
On the Existence of Bayesian Cournot Equilibrium
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Gwenael Piaser
(Université du Luxembourg)
On Multiple-principal Multiple-agent Models of Moral Hazard
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11:30 - 11:45 |
Coffee Break
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11:45 - 12:30 |
Daijiro Okada
(Rutgers University)
Evolution of Human Cooperation
Chair: Dino Gerardi
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12:30 - 02:00 |
Lunch Break
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02:00 - 02:45 |
Dilip Abreu
(Princeton University)
Reputational Values for Dynamic Games
Chair: Jeffrey Ely
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02:45 - 03:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair: Lloyd Shapley
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Session B:
Chair: Ron Peretz
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Session C:
Chair: Ying Chen
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Session D:
Chair:Juan Fernando Escobar
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Session E:
Chair: Zhen Liu
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03:00 - 03:25 |
Noah Stein
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Characterization and Computation of Correlated Equilibria in Infinite Games
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Marco Scarsini
(LUISS)
Playing Off-line Games with Bounded Rationality
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Sidartha Gordon
(University of Montreal)
Informative Cheap Talk Equilibria as Fixed Points
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Huan Xie
(University of Pittsburgh)
Social Norms and Trust Among Strangers
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Filomena Garcia
(ISEG Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa)
Endogenous Heterogeneity in Strategic Models: Further Results
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03:30 - 04:00 |
Lloyd Shapley
(University of California, Los Angeles)
On the Number of Equilibria
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Ron Peretz
(Institute of Mathematics,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.)
The Value of Recall
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Ying Chen
(Arizona State University)
Partially-informed Decision Makers in Games of Communication
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Juan Fernando Escobar
(Stanford University)
Cooperation and Self-Governance in Heterogeneous Communities
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Zhen Liu
(Stony Brook University)
Justify Cursed Equilibria via Partial Awareness
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04:00 - 04:15 |
Coffee Break
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04:15 - 05:00 |
Dino Gerardi
(Yale University)
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past
Chair: Daijiro Okada
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Tuesday, July 10 |
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08:30 - 09:00 |
Breakfast
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09:00 - 09:45 |
Johannes Horner
(KSM-MEDS, Northwestern)
Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence
Chair: Efe Ok
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09:45 - 10:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair:Nelson Uhan
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Session B:
Chair: Duozhe Li
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Session C:
Chair: Liad Blumrosen
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Session D:
Chair: Peter Biro
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Session E:
Chair: Javier Rivas
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10:00 - 10:25 |
Holger Ingmar Meinhardt
(University of Karlsruhe)
A Dual Pre-Kernel Representation Based on the Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation of the Characteristic Function
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Martin Meier
(Instituto de Analisis Economico)
Unawareness, Beliefs and Games
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Richard Steinberg
(University of Cambridge)
Unbundled Auction Procurement over Multiple Periods
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Ismail Saglam
(Bogazici University)
One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
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Peter Engseld
(Lund University)
The Role of Observational Skill in Coordination Games
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10:30 - 10:55 |
Nelson Uhan
(MIT)
Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
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Tai-Wei Hu
(Pennsylvania State University)
Logic for Games of Perfect Information and Epistemic Conditions for Backward Induction and Subgame Perfectness
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Marion Ott
(University of Karlsruhe)
Multiple Internet Auctions of Heterogenous Goods under Single-Unit Demand
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Hanna Halaburda
(Harvard Business School)
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
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Christoph Kuzmics
(Kellogg School of Management)
On the Elimination of Dominated Strategies in Stochastic Models of Evolution with Large Populations
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11:00 - 11:25 |
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Duozhe Li
(Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"Knowing Whether" and Unawareness
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Liad Blumrosen
(Microsoft Research)
Conversion Rates in Auctions for Sponsored Search
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Péter Biró
(University of Glasgow)
Higher Education Admission in Hungary by a Score-limit Algorithm
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Javier Rivas
(European University Institute)
Learning within a Markovian Environment
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11:30 - 11:45 |
Coffee Break
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11:45 - 12:30 |
Ichiro Obara
(University of California Los Angeles)
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budeget Balance
Chair: Bernard DeMeyer
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12:30 - 02:00 |
Lunch Break
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02:00 - 02:45 |
Bernard DeMeyer
(PSE-University of Paris I)
Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information
Chair: Johannes Horner
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02:45 - 03:00 |
Lunch Break
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Session A:
Chair:Chun-Hsiung Liao
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Session B:
Chair: Emanuele Bracco
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Session C:
Chair: Mauricio Bugarin
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Session D:
Chair: Rohit Parikh
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Session E:
Chair:Oscar Volij
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03:00 - 03:25 |
Ram Orzach
(Oakland University)
Inventor's Quandary: In-house or Start-up?
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Andrew B Rice
(Penn State University)
Pre-electoral Debate: The Case of a Large Election
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Cheng-Zhong Qin
(UC Santa Barbara)
Grossman Paradox Meets Hirshleifer Effect
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Deeparnab Chakrabarty
(Georgia Tech)
The Computational Aspect of Risk in Playing Non-Cooperative Games
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Rida Laraki
(Ecole Polytechnique and CNRS)
A New Theory of Social Choice
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03:30 - 03:55 |
Chun-Hsiung Liao
(National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, TAIWAN)
Strategic Selection of Direct Selling and Private Brand in Retail Market under Retailer Stackelberg
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Matias Nunez Rodriguez
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Approval Voting and the Poisson-Myerson Environment
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Barbara Bennie
(University of Wisconsin - La Crosse)
Strategic Market Games with Cyclic Production
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Mingyu Guo
(Duke University)
Improved VCG Redistribution Mechanisms
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Alan Daniel Miller
(California Institute of Technology)
A Model of the "Reasonable Man"
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03:55 - 04:30 |
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Emanuele Bracco
(University of Warwick (UK))
Elections and the Quality of Politicians
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Mauricio Bugarin
(Ibmec Sao Paulo)
Heterogeneity of Central Bankers and Inflationary Pressure
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Rohit Parikh
(City University of New York)
Knowledge and Structure in Social Algorithms
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Oscar Volij
(Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University)
Measuring Segregation
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04:30 - 04:45 |
Coffee Break
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04:45 - 05:30 |
Efe Ok
(New York University)
Reference-Dependent Rational Choice Theory
Chair: Ichiro Obara
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Wednesday, July 11 |
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08:30 - 09:00 |
Breakfast
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09:00 - 09:45 |
Alvaro Sandroni
(University of Pennsylvania)
Strategic and Ethical Voter Models
Chair: Massimiliano Amarante
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09:45 - 10:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair:Laurent Lamy
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Session B:
Chair: Steven Brams
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Session C:
Chair: Virginie Masson
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Session D:
Chair: Omer Edhan
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Session E:
Chair:Santiago Oliveros
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10:00 - 10:25 |
Shmuel Zamir
(The Hebrew University)
Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case
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Mihai Manea
(Harvard University)
Strategy-proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism in Large Random Assignment Problems
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Maximilian Mihm
(Cornell University)
Cooperation in a Dynamic Network Game
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Chih-Ru Hsiao
(Soochow University)
The Potential and Consistency Property for Multi-choice Shapley Value
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Esteban Klor
(The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout
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10:30 - 10:55 |
Zhiyong Yao
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Sequential First-Price Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
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Ruben Juarez
(Rice University)
Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
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Gabrielle Demange
(Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques)
Sharing Information in Web Communities
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Cesar Martinelli
(ITAM)
Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation
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11:00 - 11:25 |
Laurent Lamy
(Crest-Insee)
Contingent Auctions with Allocative Externalities: Vickrey versus the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction
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Steven Brams
(New York University)
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure
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Virginie Masson
(University of Adelaide)
The Survival of Altruistic Behavior in Public Good Games
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Omer Edhan
(The Hebrew University)
The Mertens and Neyman Values of Non-differentiable Vector Measure Games
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Santiago Oliveros
(Haas School of Business- UC Berkeley)
Who Abstains in Equilibrium?
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11:30 - 11:45 |
Coffee Break
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11:45 - 12:30 |
Martin W. Cripps
(UCL)
Common Learning
Chair: Aviad Heifetz
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12:30 - 02:00 |
Lunch Break
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02:00 - 02:45 |
Massimiliano Amarante
(Columbia University)
Toward a Rational Choice Foundation for Non-Additive Models
Chair: Alvaro Sandroni
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02:45 - 03:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair:Peyton Young
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Session B:
Chair: Laura Pontiggia
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Session C:
Chair: Anindya Bhattacharya
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Session D:
Chair:Humberto Moreira
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Session E:
Chair:Georgy Artemov
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03:00 - 03:25 |
Jason Marden
(UCLA)
Payoff Based Dynamics for Multi-Player Weakly Acyclic Games
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Jérôme Renault
(Ceremade, University Paris Dauphine)
Uniform Value in Dynamic Programming and in Markov Decision Processes
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Sylvain Béal
(University of Heidelberg)
Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games
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Tristan Tomala
(Université Paris Dauphine)
Correlation and Authentication in Repeated Games with Network Monitoring
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Laurent Alexandre Mathevet
(California Institute of Technology)
Supermodular Bayesian Implementation: Learning and Incentive Design
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03:30 - 04:00 |
Peyton Young
(Johns Hopkins University & University of Oxford)
Payoff-Based Learning Dynamics
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Laura Pontiggia
(University of the Sciences in Philadelphia)
N-person Non-constant Sum Red-and-black Games
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Anindya Bhattacharya
(University of York)
Dutta-Jackson-Le Breton Equilibria as Solution for Farsighted Stability of Bilateral Networks
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Humberto Moreira
(EPGE)
On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem
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Georgy Artemov
(Brown University)
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward Reinterpretation of Wilson's Doctrine
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04:00 - 04:15 |
Coffee Break
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04:15 - 05:00 |
Aviad Heifetz
(The Open University of Israel)
Game States
Chair: Martin Cripps
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Thursday, July 12 |
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08:30 - 09:00 |
Breakfast
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09:00 - 09:45 |
David Parkes
(Harvard University)
Computational Ironing to Achieve Monotonicity in Dynamic Mechanisms
Chair:Pradeep Dubey
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Session A:
Chair:Ilan Lobel
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Session B:
Chair: Jayant Ganguli
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Session C:
Chair: Alexander Matros
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Session D:
Chair:Uri Weiss
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Session E:
Chair:Arnaud Dellis
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10:00 - 10:25 |
Friederike Mengel
(University of Alicante)
Learning Across Games
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Dov Samet
(Tel Aviv)
Agreeing to Disagree: The Non-probabilistic Case
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(University of Tokyo)
A Strategic Theory of Markets
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Ignacio Esponda
(New York University)
Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
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James F. Ring
(Appellex Bargaining Solutions, Inc.)
Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Approaches to Non-Cooperative Bargaining
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10:30 - 10:55 |
Burkhard C Schipper
(University of California, Davis)
Strategic Control of Myopic Best Reply in Repeated Games
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Yi-Chun Chen
(Northwestern University)
Belief Operator in a Universal Space
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Rahul Jain
(IBM TJ Watson Research Centrer)
A Design for an Asymptotically Efficient Combinatorial Bayesian Market: Generalizing the Satterthwaite-Williams Mechanism
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Zafer Akin
(TOBB University of Economics and Technology)
Intertemporal Decision Making with Present Biased Preferences
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Jeremy Bertomeu
(Carnegie Mellon University)
A Theory of Risk Management with Applications to Executive Compensation and Earnings Management
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11:00 - 11:25 |
Ilan Lobel
(MIT)
Social Learning with Partial Observations
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Jayant Vivek Ganguli
(Cornell University)
Common P-belief and Uncertainty
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Alexander Matros
(University of Pittsburgh)
Chinese Auctions
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Uri Weiss
(The Rationality Center)
In Small Decisions It is Rational to Act like Bounded Rational – an Answer for Rabin and Behavioral Economists
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Arnaud Dellis
(Laval University)
Would Letting People Vote for Several Candidates Yield Policy Moderation?
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11:30 - 11:45 |
Coffee Break
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11:45 - 12:30 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Operational Measure of Riskiness
Chair:Yair Tauman
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Thursday, 2:00
pm - Friday, 12:50 pm
Day in honor of the 85th birthday of
David Gale
Program
followed by the dinner |
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Friday, July 13 |
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02:00 - 02:45 |
Susan Athey
(Harvard)
An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism
Chair:Richard McLean
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02:45 - 03:00 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Chair:John Nash
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Session B:
Chair: Pei-yu Lo
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Session C:
Chair:Bo Chen
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Session D:
Chair:Pietro Ortoleva
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Session E:
Chair:Paul J Healy
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03:00 - 03:25 |
Barry Feldman
(Prism Analytics / Russell Investment Group / DePaul University)
A Theory of Attribution
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Wolfgang Gick
(Dartmouth College)
Two Experts are Better than One
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Myeonghwan Cho
(Pennsylvania State University)
Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Local Interaction and Local Communication
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Sophie Bade
(PSU)
Ambiguous Act Equilibria
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Eduardo Faingold
(Yale University)
Reputation Effects and Equilibrium Degeneracy
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03:30 - 04:00 |
John Nash
(Princeton University)
Continuing Work of the Agencies Method for the Reductive Study of Cooperative Games; Developing a Modeling with Attorney Agents
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Pei-yu (Melody) Lo
(Brown University)
Language and Coordination Games
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Bo Chen
(University of Wisconsin - Madison)
Belief-Based Strategies in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Asymmetric Private Monitorin
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Pietro Salvatore Tommaso Ortoleva
(New York University)
Status Quo Bias, Ambiguity and Rational Choice
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Paul J Healy
(The Ohio State University)
Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in Repeated Games
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04:00 - 04:15 |
Coffee Break
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04:15 - 05:00 |
Ilya Segal
(Stanford University)
The Communication Cost of Selfishness
Chair:Susan Athey
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