

## Workshop on Game Theory and Computer Science

Stony Brook, NY, July 20-22, 2005

### Schedule of Talks

Wednesday, July 20	
9:00 - 10:00	<b>Silvio Micali</b> (MIT) Universal Mechanism Design
10:00 - 10:30	<b>Éva Tardos</b> (Cornell University) Price of Anarchy for a Network Pricing Game for Selfish Traffic
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	<b>Sergiu Hart</b> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
12:00 - 3:00	<i>Lunch</i>
3:00 - 3:30	<b>Tuomas Sandholm</b> (Carnegie Mellon University) TBA
3:30 - 4:00	<b>Vincent Conitzer</b> (Carnegie Mellon University) Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance and Other Solution Concepts
4:00 - 4:30	<b>Andrew G. Gilpin</b> (Carnegie Mellon University) Finding Equilibria in Large Sequential Games of Incomplete Information
4:30 - 5:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
5:00 - 5:30	<b>Paul Valiant</b> (MIT) TBA
5:30 - 6:00	<b>Abhi Shelat</b> (MIT) TBA
6:00 - 6:30	<b>Matt Lepinski</b> (MIT) Collusion-Free Protocols
6:30 - 10:00	<i>Reception Dinner at University Caf�e</i>

**Thursday, July 21**

9:00 - 10:00	<b>Bernhard Von Stengel</b> (London School of Economics) Geometric Views of Linear Complementarity Algorithms and Their Complexity
10:00 - 10:30	<b>Rahul Savani</b> (London School of Economics) Hard-to-solve Bimatrix Games
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	<b>Yinyu Ye</b> (Stanford University) On Exchange Market Equilibria with Leontief's Utilities: Hardness Results and Hopeful Algorithms
12:00 - 3:00	<i>Lunch</i>
3:00 - 3:30	<b>Peter Bro Miltersen</b> (University of Aarhus) Computing Equilibrium Refinements for Zero-sum Games
3:30 - 4:00	<b>Kamal Jain</b> (Microsoft Research) TBA
4:00 - 4:30	<b>Amy Greenwald</b> (Brown University) TBA
4:30 - 5:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
5:00 - 5:30	<b>Richard Cole</b> (NYU) Toward Discrete Distributed Tatonnement Algorithms for Market Equilibria, part I
5:30 - 6:00	<b>Lisa K. Fleischer</b> (IBM) Toward Discrete Distributed Tatonnement Algorithms for Market Equilibria, part II
6:00 - 6:30	<b>Vahab S. Mirrokni</b> (MIT) Sink Equilibria and Convergence

**Friday, July 22**

9:00 - 10:00	<b>Ariel Orda</b> (Technion) Over Two Decades of Research on Networking Games
10:00 - 10:30	<b>Nahum Shimkin</b> (Technion) Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Routing
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:00 - 11:30	<b>Shie Mannor</b> (McGill University) TBA
11:30 - 12:00	<b>Ramesh Johari</b> (Stanford) TBA
12:00 - 1:30	<i>Lunch</i>
1:30 - 2:00	<b>Hisao Kameda</b> (University of Tsukuba) The Degree of a Braess-like Paradox in a Symmetric Network Can Increase without Bound
2:00 - 2:30	<b>Laura Wynter</b> (IBM Research) TBA
2:30 - 2:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>
2:45 - 3:15	<b>Parijat Dube</b> (IBM T. J. Watson Research Center) Capacity Planning, Quality of Service and Price Wars
3:15 - 3:45	<b>Nir Andelman</b> (Tel-Aviv University) Testing Truthfulness for Single Parameter Agents

