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Monday, July 11 |
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8:30 - 9:15 |
Breakfast
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9:15 - 10:05 |
Philip J. Reny
(University of Chicago)
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
Chair: Abraham Neyman
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10:10 - 11:00 |
Matthew Jackson
(California Institute of Technology)
Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Chair: Abraham Neyman
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Contracts
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Session B:
Auctions
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Session C:
Incomplete Information
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Session D:
Networks
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Session E:
Repeated Games
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11:30 - 11:55 |
Amrita Dhillon
(University of Warwick)
Games of Status and Discriminatory Contracts
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Luciano I. De Castro
(IMPA)
Pure Strategy Equilibria of Single and Double Auctions with Interdependent Values
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Elias Tsakas
(University of Göteborg)
Mixed Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
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Virginie Masson
(University of Pittsburgh)
You and Your Neighbors: Stubborn or Altruistic?
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Harry French
Property Defining and Property Defying Games (PD)
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(University of Tokyo)
Auctions with Package Bidding: An Experimental Study
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Nathanael Hyafil
(University of Toronto)
Regret Minimizing Equilibria of Games with Strict Type Uncertainty
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Sylvain Béal
(CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)
Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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Session A:
Cooperative Games
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Session B:
Solution Concepts
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Session C:
Voting
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Session D:
Learning
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2:00 - 2:25 |
Barry Feldman
(Prism Analytics and DePaul University)
Lost in Translation? Ex Ante Utility and Proportionality in Games
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Xiao Luo
(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games
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Jean-Francois Laslier
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Strategic approval voting in a large electorate
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Yuichi Noguchi
(Kanto Gakuin University)
Merging with a Set of Probability Measures
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2:30 - 2:55 |
Yuan Ju
(Keele University)
The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form
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Marzena J. Rostek
(Yale University)
Fatalistic Choice Rules
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Eyal Beigman
(Hebrew University)
Characterizing Neutral Aggregation on Restricted Domains
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Jeff Shamma
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Calibrated forecasts: Efficiency versus Universality
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3:00 - 3:30 |
Coffee Break
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3:30 - 4:20 |
Eric Maskin
(Institute for Advanced Study and Princeton University)
Majority Rule and Strategic Voting
Chair: Amrita Dhillon
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4:25 - 5:15 |
Shmuel Zamir
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Chair: Amrita Dhillon
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Tuesday, July 12 |
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8:30 - 9:15 |
Breakfast
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9:15 - 10:05 |
Stephen Morris
(Yale University)
Robust Mechanism Design
Chair: Jean-Francois Laslier
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10:10 - 11:00 |
Oliver Hart
(Harvard University and LSE)
Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In
Chair: Jean-Francois Laslier
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Knowledge and Expectations
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Session B:
Bargaining
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Session C:
Incomplete Information
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Session D:
Voting
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Session E:
Finance and Market Games
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11:30 - 11:55 |
Itai Arieli
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Towards a Characterization of Rational Expectations
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Francesca Flamini
(University of Glasgow)
Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games
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Ming Li
(Concordia University)
Combining Expert Opinions
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Samer Salame
(City University of New York)
Some Results on Adjusted Winner
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Fan Wang
(Stony Brook University)
Adaptive Learning and Evolutionary Dynamics in Financial Market
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Dov Samet
(Tel Aviv University)
Deriving Knowledge from Belief
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Federico Valenciano
(Universida del Pais Vasco)
Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees
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Jérôme Mathis
(Laboratoire THEMA-Univ. de Cergy-Pontoise)
Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
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Chun-Hsien Yeh
(Academia Sinica)
Reduction-consistency and the Condorcet principle in collective choice probelms
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Yutian Chen
(Stony Brook University)
Outsourcing Spurred by Strategic Competition
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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Session A:
Pie Cutting
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Session B:
Voting
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Session C:
Social and Political Models
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Session D:
Complexity
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Session E:
IO and Market Games
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2:00 - 2:25 |
Michael A. Jones
(Montclair State University)
Proportional Pie Cutting
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Leonard Wantchekon
(New York University)
Does Ethnic Solidarity Facilitate Electoral Support for Nation-Building Policies?
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Claudia M. Landeo
(University of Alberta)
Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors
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Guillaume Lacôte
(Université Paris 6)
Boundedly complex Turing strategies play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: some results
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Sjaak Hurkens
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in "Linear" Cournot Models with Private Information About Costs
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2:30 - 2:55 |
Steven Brams
(New York University)
Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake
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Parikshit Ghosh
(University of British Columbia)
Efficient Equilibria and Information Aggregation in Common Interest Voting Games
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Tiberiu Dragu
(Stanford University)
Presidential Veto Power and its Consequences for Information
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Penelope Hernandez
(University of Alicante)
Secret correlation with pure automata
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Bertrand Gobillard
(University Paris 10 Nanterre)
Non-Walrasian Equilibria and the Law of One Price: The Wash-Sales Assumption
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3:00 - 3:25 |
Christian Klamler
(University of Graz)
Better ways to cut a cake
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Kfir Eliaz
(New York University)
A Decision Theoretic Basis for Choice Shifts in Groups
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Daijiro Okada
(Rutgers University)
Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall
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3:30 - 4:00 |
Coffee Break
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4:00 - 4:50 |
Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Optimal Use of Communication Resources
Chair: Sergiu Hart
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4:55 - 5:15 |
Martin Shubik
(Yale University)
On Endogenizing Bureaucracy in a Strategic Market Game
Chair: Sergiu Hart
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7:00 - 10:00 |
Reception Dinner at Three Village Inn
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Wednesday, July 13 |
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8:30 - 9:15 |
Breakfast
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9:15 - 10:05 |
Andrew Postlewaite
(University of Pennsylvania)
Aggregation of Expert Opinions
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
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10:10 - 11:00 |
Tristan Tomala
(Université Paris Dauphine)
Measuring the value of monitoring in repeated decision problems and in repeated games
Chair: Marilda Sotomayor
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Solution Concepts
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Session B:
Cognitive Models
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Session C:
Networks
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Session D:
Cooperative Games
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Session E:
Repeated Games
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11:30 - 11:55 |
Attila Ambrus
(Harvard University)
Theories of coalitional rationality
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Zhen Liu
(Stony Brook University)
Agreement of opinions and trade with unawareness
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Frank H. Page, Jr.
(University of Alabama)
Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and Network Formation Games
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Wei-Torng Juang
(Academia Sinica)
Learning through Aspiration to Play the Mixed Equilibrium in Zero-Sum Games
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Eduardo Faingold
(Univ of Pennsylvania)
Building a Reputation Under Frequent Decisions
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Stefano Demichelis
(University of Pavia)
On use and misuse of topology in game theory
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Giorgos Stamatopoulos
(University of Cyprus)
Cognitive hierarchy and two-stage location games
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Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
Isolation and redundancy on information dissemination in dynamic networks
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Joachim Rosenmuller
(IMW, University of Bielefeld)
Convex Geometry and Superadditive Solutions
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Galit Ashkenazi-Golan
(Tel-Aviv University)
Confession and Pardon in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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Session A:
Evolution and Learning
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Session B:
Bounded Rationality
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Session C:
Stochastic Games
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Session D:
Mechanism Design
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Session E:
Pricing
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2:00 - 2:25 |
Peter Engseld
(Lund University)
Choosing Opponents in Games of Cooperation and Coordination
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Zafer Akin
(Pennsylvania State University)
Time Inconsistency And Learning In Bargaining Games
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Anthony C. Brooms
(Birkbeck College)
A stochastic game model for a FCFS queue with load-increasing service rate
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Juergen Bracht
(University of Aberdeen)
Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment
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Karl H. Schlag
(European University Institute)
Robust Monopoly Pricing - The Case of Regret
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2:30 - 2:55 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
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Topi Miettinen
(University College London)
Agreeing on Play when Players are Prone to Guilt
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Krishna Ladha
(New York University)
The Paradox Of Unbiased Public Information
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David Wettstein
(Ben-Gurion University)
Efficient Bidding with Externalities
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Massimo A. De Francesco
(University of Siena)
Pricing and matching under duopoly with imperfect buyer mobility
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3:00 - 3:30 |
Coffee Break
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3:30 - 4:20 |
Peyton Young
(Johns Hopkins University)
Learning and Equilibrium in Games
Chair: Philippe Jehiel
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4:25 - 5:15 |
Robert John Aumann
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Consciousness
Chair: Philippe Jehiel
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6:00 - 8:00 |
Soccer Game
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Thursday, July 14 |
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8:30 - 9:15 |
Breakfast
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9:15 - 10:05 |
Philippe Jehiel
(University College London and PSE)
Towards a Theory of Deception
Chair: Tristan Tomala
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10:10 - 11:00 |
Srihari Govindan
(University of Iowa)
Some Recent Results on Computing Equilibria
Chair: Tristan Tomala
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Auctions
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Session B:
Coalition Formation
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Session C:
Equilibrium Computation I
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Session D:
Networks
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Session E:
Social and Political Models
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11:30 - 11:55 |
Alexander Matros
(University of Pittsburgh)
Contests with Thresholds
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Isa Emin Hafalir
(Pennsylvania State University)
Stability of Marriage with Externalities
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Andrew G. Gilpin
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria
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Coralio Ballester
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Optimal Targets in Peer Networks
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Jamele Rigolini
(University of Warwick)
On the Role of Formal and Informal Institutions in Development
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Andriy Zapechelnyuk
(Stony Brook University)
Internet Auctions: Sellers, Bidders, and Auction Houses
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Elena Iñarra
(Basque Country University)
Admissible Hierarchic Sets
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Vincent Conitzer
(Carnegie Mellon University)
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It
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Juan Miguel Benito
(Universidad Pública de Navarra)
Neighborhood Segregation: Schelling-CA Model
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Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
(University of Colorado at Boulder)
Does it Take a Tyrant to Implement a Good Reform?
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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Session A:
Cooperative Games
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Session B:
Complexity
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Session C:
Equilibrium Computation II
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Session D:
Industrial Organization
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Session E:
Implementation
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2:00 - 2:25 |
Marilda Sotomayor
(Universidade de São Paulo)
An Elementary Non-Constructive Proof of the Non-Emptiness of the Core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf
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Peter Bro Miltersen
(University of Aarhus)
Finding Sequential Equilibria Using Lemke's Algorithm
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Elif Incekara
(Pennsylvania State University)
Time Inconsistency of Consumers and Excessive Upgrades in the Software Market
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Kurt Annen
(University of Guelph)
Lies and Slander: The Implementation of Truth-telling in Repeated Matching Games with Private Monitoring
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2:30 - 2:55 |
Johannes Rene Van den Brink
(Free University Amsterdam)
Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games
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Mark R. Johnson
(Tulane University)
A complexity partial order for strategy implementing automata
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Christopher Cotton
(Cornell University)
Seller preferences for risk seeking and limited information in an evolutionary price demand game
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Sergio Parreiras
(The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Smooth Ex-Post Implementation with Multi-Dimensional Information
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3:00 - 3:30 |
Coffee Break
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3:30 - 4:20 |
Myrna Wooders
(Vanderbilt University and University of Warwick)
Market games, inequality and the equal treatment property of the core of a game
Chair: Bernhard Von Stengel
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4:25 - 5:15 |
Lloyd Shapley
(University of California, Los Angeles)
Stable Sets Revisited: Some Reduction Theorems
Chair: Bernhard Von Stengel
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Friday, July 15 |
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8:30 - 9:15 |
Breakfast
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9:15 - 10:05 |
Drew Fudenberg
(Harvard University)
Superstition and Rational Learning
Chair: Srihari Govindan
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10:10 - 11:00 |
Bernhard Von Stengel
(London School of Economics)
Geometry of Nash equilibria for two-player games
Chair: Srihari Govindan
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Session A:
Mechanisms and the Chinese Postman
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Session B:
Applications
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Session C:
Equilibrium Computation III
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Session D:
Information Transmission
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Session E:
Cooperative Games
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11:30 - 11:55 |
Michael Maschler
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Recent results concerning the core and the nucleolus on a class of the Chinese Postman game
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Timothy Mathews
(California State University - Northridge)
Participation Incentives in Rank Order Tournaments with Endogenous Entry
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Gabriel Darren Rosenberg
(London School of Economics)
Computation of Nash Equilibria for Bimatrix Games with Integer Pivoting
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Frederic Koessler
(Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)
Long Persuasion in Sender-Receiver Games
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Marco Scarsini
(Universita di Torino)
Large Newsvendor Games
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12:00 - 12:30 |
Thomas Gresik
(University of Notre Dame)
The Economics of Yardstick Regulations without External Benchmarks
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Andrey Garnaev
(Saint Petersburg State University)
The Kuhn-Tucker Theorem and Resource Allocation Games
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Rahul Savani
(London School of Economics)
Challenge Games for Computing a Nash Equilibrium
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Dragan Filipovich
(El Colegio de Mexico)
Cheap Talk on the Circle
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Debasis Mishra
(Universite Catholique de Louvain)
Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem
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12:30 - 2:00 |
Lunch
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3:30 - 4:20 |
David G. Pearce
(New York University)
Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures
Chair: Shmuel Zamir
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4:25 - 5:15 |
John Nash
(Princeton University)
Results from Studies on the Reduction of Cooperative Games to Non-Cooperative Form (Using the Agencies Method) and Project Plans for Further Study
Chair: Shmuel Zamir
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