Monday, July 12

8:30 - 9:30

Breakfast

9:30 - 10:15

Vijay Krishna (Penn State University)

Mechanism Design under Imperfect Commitment

Chair: Sergiu Hart

10:15 - 11:00

Olivier Gossner (CERAS)

Ability and Knowledge

Chair: Sergiu Hart

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:15

Muhamet Yildiz (MIT)

Finite-order implications of any equilibrium

Chair: John Hillas

12:15 - 2:00

Lunch

Session A

Chair: Andrey Garnaev

Session B

Chair: Paul Schweinzer

Session C

Chair: Andreas Westermark

Session D

Chair: Marco Scarsini

2:00 - 2:25

Zafer Akin (Penn State University)

The role of time-inconsistent preferences in intertemporal decisions and bargaining

Leandro Arozamena (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)

The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions

Duozhe Li (Boston University)

Bargaining with History Dependent Preferences

Noa Nitzan (Hebrew University)

Non-Genericity of Strict Correlated equilibrium

2:30 - 2:55

Yutian Chen (Stony Brook University)

Partial Outsourcing in Cournot Competition

Sergio O. Parreiras (University of North Carolina)

All-play auctions with endogenous asymmetries

Quan Wen (Vanderbilt University)

Wage Bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act

Adam Kalai (University of Chicago)

On Program Equilibrium and Metagames

3:00 - 3:25

Andrey Garnaev (Saint Petersburg State University)

Competition for Staff between Two Departments

Paul Schweinzer (University of Bonn)

Dissolving a common value partnership in a repeated "queto" game with incomplete information on both sides

Andreas Westermark (Uppsala University)

Worker Substitutability and Bargaining Delays

Marco Scarsini (Universita di Torino)

A Folk Theorem for Minority Games

3:25 - 4:00

Coffee Break

4:00 - 4:40

Sergei Izmalkov (MIT)

Shill-bidding and optimal auctions

Chair: Vijay Krishna

4:40 - 5:20

Roko Aliprantis (Purdue University)

Some applications of Riesz spaces to Economics, Finance, and Econometrics

Chair: Vijay Krishna

Tuesday, July 13

8:30 - 9:30

Breakfast

9:30 - 10:15

Michael Maschler (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Applying the Reduced Game Property to Analyze Cores and Nucleoli of Various Enterprizes

Chair: Nicolas Vieille

10:15 - 11:00

John Hillas (University of Auckland)

On the relation between backward and forward induction 

Chair: Nicolas Vieille

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:15

Jerome Renault (CEREMADE, University Paris 9)

Multicast communication in networks: reliability and security of information transmission 

Chair: Wojciech Olegewski 

12:15 - 2:00

Lunch

Session A

Chair: Alexander Matros

Session B

Chair: Jeff Shamma

Session C

Chair: Bryan McCannon

Session D

Chair: Marcin Peski 

2:00 - 2:25

Justin Lenzo (Boston University)

Correlated Equilibrium in Evolutionary Models with Subpopulations

Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University)

Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay (University of Birmingham)

Economic reforms, conflict resolution and leadership quality: A model of political failure

Jeff Kline (Bond University)

Modeling a Player's Perspective II: Inductive Derivation of an Individual View

2:30 - 2:55

Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Stony Brook University)

Regret-Based Adaptive Dynamics with Finite Memory

Wei-Torng Juang (Academia Sinica)

A Folk Theorem on Equilibrium Selection

Eyal Beigman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Aggregation with Many Effective Voters

Zhen Liu (Stony Brook University)

An extended No-Bet theorem

3:00 - 3:25

Alexander Matros (University of Pittsburgh)

Evolutionary Learning with Multiple Decision Rules

Jeff Shamma (UCLA)

Feedback control for learning in games

Bryan McCannon (Elmira College)

Party Formation and Platform Selection with Binary Issues: Can the Minority Win?

Marcin Peski (Northwestern University)

Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizabilty

3:25 - 4:00

Coffee Break

4:00 - 4:40

Andrew Schotter (New York University)

Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice

Chair: Olivier Gossner

4:40 - 5:20

Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University)

Extensive Robustness Revisited

Chair: Olivier Gossner

6:30 - 9:30

Reception Dinner at Three Village Inn

Wednesday, July 14

8:30 - 9:30

Breakfast

9:30 - 10:15

Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion)

Computation Social Systems: Reputations Systems and Non-Coperative Computation

Chair: Sylvain Sorin

10:15 - 11:00

Nicolas Vieille (Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV)

Timing games with informational externalities

Chair: Sylvain Sorin

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:15

Stefano Demichelis (University of Pavia)

On some (mis)applications of topology to game theory

Chair: Steven Brams

12:15 - 2:00

Lunch

Session A

Chair: Pierfrancesco La Mura

Session B

Chair: Mandar P. Oak

Session C

Chair: Virginie Masson

Session D

Chair: Ricardo Nieva 

2:00 - 2:25

Ryan W. Porter (Stanford University)

Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium

Amrita Dhillon (University of Warwick)

Scoring Rule Voting Games and Dominance Solvability

Peter Engseld (Lund University)

Choosing Opponents in Prisoners Dilemma

Marilda Sotomayor (Universidade de São Paulo)

The competitive multiple-partners assignment game

2:30 - 2:55

Sham Kakade (University of Pennsylvania)

The Economics of Social Network

Raphael Soubeyran (GREQAM)

Political Alternation: A Suggested Interpretation

George Waters (Illinois State University)

An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to Rational Expectations

Xiao Luo (McGill University)

Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together

3:00 - 3:25

Pierfrancesco La Mura (Leipzig Graduate School of Management)

Computation of Strategic Equilibria in Game Networks

Mandar P. Oak (Williams College)

Approval Voting with Endogenous Candidates

Virginie Masson (University of Pittsburgh)

Neighbors versus Strangers in a Spatial Interaction Model

Ricardo Nieva (Concordia University)

ANC Analytical Payoff Functions for Networks with Endogenous Bilateral Long Cheap Talk

3:25 - 4:00

Coffee Break

4:00 - 4:40

Arieh Gavious (University of Toronto)

Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions

Chair: Jerome Renault

4:40 - 5:20

Steven Brams (New York University)

A Minimax Procedure for Electing Committees

Chair: Jerome Renault

Thursday, July 15

8:30 - 9:30

Breakfast

9:30 - 10:15

Myrna Wooders (University of Warwick)

Behavioural Conformity in Games with Many Players

Chair: Arieh Gavious

10:15 - 11:00

Sylvain Sorin (U. Pierre et Marie Curie)

Differential inclusions, stochastic approximations and dynamics in games

Chair: Arieh Gavious

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:15

Peter Eso (Northwestern University)

Information Disclosure in Auctions

Chair: Muhamet Yildiz

12:15 - 2:00

Lunch

Session A

Chair: Irinel Dragan

Session B

Chair: Jose Vila

Session C

Chair: Jinpeng Ma

2:00 - 2:25

Johann Choi (UCLA)

Computation of Ordinal-Invariant Trajectory Solutions to Multiperson Bargaining Problems

Leif Albers (IMW, Bielefeld University)

Feasible Beliefs in Noncooperative Games

Larissa Batrancea (Babes-Bolyai University)

Homo Oeconomicus Ludens

2:30 - 2:55

Vladislav Kargin (Cornerstone Research)

Theory of Quantum Games

Hyunho Kim (Stony Brook University)

A Location Model with Preference for Variety

Jaehee Lee (Penn State University)

Standard setting, compatibility externalities and R&D

3:00 - 3:25

Irinel Dragan (University of Texas)

On the Semivalues and the Least Square Values, Average per capita formulas and relationships

Jose Vila (Universidad de Valensia)

Communication through Noisy Channels

Jinpeng Ma (Rutgers University - Camden)

Jobless Recovering and Equilibrium Involuntary Unemployment with Simple Efficiency Wage Model

3:25 - 4:00

Coffee Break

4:00 - 4:40

John Geanakoplos (Yale University)

Incentives in Games of Status: 100,99,...,1 or A,B,C?

Chair: William Sudderth

4:40 - 5:20

Daniel Diermeier (Northwestern University)

Political Constitutions

Chair: William Sudderth

Friday, July 16

8:30 - 9:30

Breakfast

9:30 - 10:15

Robert Aumann (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Assessing Strategic Risk

Chair: Yair Tauman

10:15 - 11:00

Thomas Palfrey (CalTech)

Self-Correcting Information Cascades

Chair: Yair Tauman

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

11:30 - 12:15

Wojciech Olegewski (Northwestern University)

The Folk Theorem for All Games with Almost Perfect Monitoring

Chair: Amrita Dhillon

12:15 - 2:00

Lunch

Session A

Chair: Chun-Hsien Yeh

Session B

Chair: Abhijit Sengupta

Session C

Chair: Eugene Nudelman

Session D

Chair: Soiliou Namoro  

2:00 - 2:25

David Housman (Goshen College)

Solutions for Partially Defined Cooperative Games

Amparo Urbano (Universidad de Valencia)

Markets with Complementarities and Mixed-Bundling Pricing

Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia)

Action-Graph Games, and an Algorithm for Computing their Equilibria

George Hwang (Shih Hsin University)

The War and Peace between the Snipe and the Clam

2:30 - 2:55

Chun-Hsien Yeh (Academia Sinica)

An alternative characterization of the nucleolus in airport problems

Abhijit Sengupta (Stony Brook University)

Inducing Efficiency in an Oligopolistic Industry with Increasing Returns to Scale

Eugene Nudelman (Stanford University)

Understanding Game-Theoretic Algorithms: The Game Matters

Soiliou Namoro (University of Pittsburgh)

Economic Incentives of the Olympic Games

2:55 - 3:30

Coffee Break

3:30 - 4:10

William Sudderth (University of Minnesota)

Strategic Market Games with Production

Chair: Pradeep Dubey

4:10 - 4:50

Lloyd Shapley (UCLA)

A Walrasian Core?

Chair: Pradeep Dubey