Contract Theory
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| THURSDAY, JULY 26 |
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| Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603 | |
| 9:00-10:30 | P. Dubey: Competitive prizes: When less
scrutiny induces more effort. co-authors: O. Haimanko and C-W Wu |
| 11:00-12:30 | S. Matthews: A simple dynamic
theory of capital structure:Renegotiating debt with observable effects. co-authors: M. Dewatripont, P. Legros. |
| 2:00-3:30 | L. Felli: In complete
contracts in a complex world. co-authors: N. Al-Najjar, L. Anderlini. |
| 3:45-5:15 6:00-9:30 |
A. Postlewaite: Courts of law and
unforseen contingencies. co-authors: L. Felli and L. Anderlini Reception Dinner |
| FRIDAY, JULY 27 |
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| Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603 | |
| 9:00-10:30 | J. Ely: Ex-post incentive compatible mechanism design. |
| 11:00-12:30 | D. Bergemann: Information structures in
optimal auctions. co-author: M. Pesendorfer |
| 2:00-3:30 | I. Segal: Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer? |
| 3:45-5:00 | L. Marx: Upfront payments and exclusion
in vertical contracting. co-author: G. Schaffer |
| SATURDAY, JULY 28 |
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| Social and Behavioral Sciences, Room N603 | |
| 9:00-10:30 | C. Snyder: A symptotic solution to the
hold up problem. co-author: R. Pitchford |
| 11:00-12:30 | S. Reiche: Sequential screening, renegotiation and incompleteness of contracts. |
| 2:00-3:30 | J. Levin: Career concerns and collective
reputation. |
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| Last updated on July 19, 2002 by Hakan Timbil. | |