Workshop on Macroeconomic Applications of Dynamic Games and Contracts

Stony Brook, NY, July 12 - 13, 2012

Schedule of Talks

Thursday, July 12
	Session 1: ( 9:00am - 10:30am) Optimal Taxation
9:00 - 9:45	Pricila Maziero (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) A Theory of Political and Economic Cycles
9:45 - 10:30	Julian Neira (UC Santa Barbara) Optimal Taxation in a Life Cycle Economy with Endogenous Human Capital Formation
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee Break
	Session 2: (11:00am - 12:30pm) Costly State Verification
11:00 - 11:45	Harold Cole (University of Pennsylvania) Why Doesn't Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?
11:45 - 12:30	B. Ravikumar (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break
	Session 3: ( 2:00pm - 3:30pm) Limited Contract Enforcement
14:00 - 14:45	Vincenzo Quadrini (University of Southern California) Risky Investments with Limited Commitment
14:45 - 15:30	Mark Wright (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy
15:30 - 16:00	Coffee Break
	Session 4: ( 4:00pm - 5:30pm) Methods
16:00 - 16:45	Nicola Pavoni (Bocconi University) On the Dual Approach to Recursive Contracts
16:45 - 17:30	Ennio Stacchetti (New York University) Agency Models with Frequent Actions: A Quadratic Approximation Method
18:30 - 22:00	Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

Friday, July 13
	Session 5: ( 9:00am - 10:30am) Limited Commitment
9:00 - 9:45	Tim Worrall (University of Edinburgh) Dynamic Relational Contracts with Limited Liability
9:45 - 10:30	Alexander Karaivanov (Simon Fraser University) Moral Hazard and Lack of Commitment in Dynamic Economies
10:30 - 11:00	Coffee Break
	Session 6: ( 11:00am - 2:15pm) Dynamic Games, Credit Frictions
11:00 - 11:45	Laurence Ales (Carnegie Mellon University) Revision Proofness
11:45 - 12:30	Fabrizio Perri (University of Minnesota) International recessions
12:30 - 13:30	Lunch Break
13:30 - 14:15	Xavier Mateos-Planas (Queen Mary University) Credit Lines

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