Speakers |
Hebrew University of Jerusalem My Michel Abstract TBA |
CNRS, Université Blaise Pascal Stability with Michel [pdf] Abstract
I will present the first and the last results that I obtained with Michel Balinski along with some souvenirs and personal appreciations. This work was centered on two questions that Michel posed: |
Cornell University Confessions of an Erstwhile Game Theorist Abstract
While I was a graduate student at the CUNY Graduate Center preparing myself for research in game theory, Michel Balinski did his best, as my assigned "academic advisor", to prepare me for work in combinatorics and convex polytopes. He did this both through the courses he taught and by creating an atmosphere in which an endless series of visitors came in to lecture on a wide variety of topics that proved to be central to research in these areas in the decades that followed. So it is not too surprising that I eventually drifted into research in the combinatorics of convex polytopes. |
Universidad de Chile Adaptive dynamics and equilibrium in congested networks Abstract
In this talk we discuss a class of discrete-time adaptive dynamics that model the behavior of individual drivers in a congested network. The system is viewed as a repeated game in which players can only observe the payoff of the pure strategy used in each stage, and use this minimal piece of information to myopically adapt their future behavior. |
SUNY at Stony Brook The Allocation of a Prize [pdf] (joint work with Siddhartha Sahi) Abstract
Consider agents who undertake costly e¤ort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is sufficient diversity in agents skills relative to the noise on output, then the proportional prize will, in a precise sense, elicit more output on average, than the deterministic prize. Indeed, assuming agents know each othersskills (the complete information case), this result holds when any Nash equilibrium selection, under the proportional prize, is compared with any individually rational selection under the deterministic prize. When there is incomplete information, the result is still true but now we must restrict to Nash selections for both prizes. |
John Hopkins University "Reverse Bayesianism": A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness [pdf] (joint work with Marie-Louise Viero) Abstract This paper invokes the axiomatic approach to explore the notion of growing awareness in the context of decision making under uncertainty. It introduces a new approach to modeling the expanding universe of a decision maker in the wake of becoming aware of new consequences, new acts, and new links between acts and consequences. New consequences or new acts represent genuine expansions of the decision maker's universe, while the discovery of new links between acts and consequences renders nonnull events that were considered null before the discovery. The expanding universe, or state space, is accompanied by extension of the set of acts. The preference relations over the expanding sets of acts are linked by a new axiom, dubbed act independence, which is motivated by the idea that decision makers have unchanging preferences over the satisfaction of basic needs. The main results are representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that have the flavor of "reverse Bayesianism." |
University of Pennsylvania Strategic Evaluation in Majority Evaluation Abstract TBA... |
Université de Caen Social Choice and Cooperative Games: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions [pdf] (joint work with Mathieu Martin) Abstract We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the non-emptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are `ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure. |
Yale University On Mass Experiments in The Social Sciences Abstract The computer and communication systems have fundamentally changed the nature of feasible social choice . In particular Political Science, Economics and Social Psychology have been opened up to experimental and social choice methods that could not have been considered empirically fifty years ago. The future will see an explosive growth of survey, choice and experimental methods on the web. The possibility of such development is illustrated with a web based experimental game. The importance of mass experimentation in political science, political economy, social psychology and game theory is discussed. This will also be illustrated in part by a game provided to the audience to be played for a monetary prize. |
Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 Zero-sum repeated games: asymptotic analysis and limit game Abstract To be posted... |
University of Oxford The Mathematics of Representative Government: A Tribute to Michel Balinski Abstract TBA |